“low cost” weapons, the key to resistance against the Russian army? – The Express

In the Kursk region, this August 6, the Ukrainian drone flies at high speed. Its target, a Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter, which approaches at low altitude. After a lurch, the small machine manages to hit the rear rotor of the aircraft. If the Ukrainian security services claim the aircraft was destroyed in mid-flight, the Russians will claim that it managed to make an emergency landing and save its crew. Whatever the outcome of this spectacular attack, it marked a first in the history of the conflict. And remarkably illustrated the way in which low-cost technologies – sometimes from civilian sources – have revolutionized the conduct of war. “There have been several cases of drones costing a few hundred dollars hitting helicopters costing several million,” confirms a Ukrainian military source.

Faced with a Russian army with much superior means, Ukraine was forced to seek innovative solutions to resist. And after almost three years of war, the demand for cheap equipment is growing. “We need inexpensive weapons that can be produced quickly,” insists a Ukrainian commander. FPV (First Person View) drones are one of the best examples. Piloted in subjective view by an operator connected to an onboard camera, these flying machines quickly invaded the battlefield. At the beginning of October, Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that Ukraine was today capable of producing four million drones annually – compared to a few thousand before the war – and that the Ukrainian state had placed an order for 1.5 million drones over the course of the year.

“It’s quite a transformative moment: the Ukrainians took civilian technology and put it to use on the battlefield,” notes Stéphane Audrand, international risk consultant and reserve officer. “Their massive use in the midst of an early munitions crisis 2024 probably saved the country, by making up for some of the missing firepower.” Faced at that time with a serious shortage of shells against a backdrop of blocking American aid in Congress, the Ukrainians intensified their use of FPV drones to carry out kamikaze strikes against enemy armor and soldiers. These machines have a significant advantage: their cost. Between 500 and 1,000 euros depending on the model, compared to around 8,000 euros for a 155 mm shell.

Cheap, mass-usable hardware

The need for cheap weapons, however, is not limited to these devices alone. For a Ukraine targeted daily by Russian strikes, there is at the same time the crucial question of anti-aircraft defenses to protect its civil and energy infrastructures. And the way to face, without emptying its limited stocks of anti-aircraft missiles, an ever-increasing mass of threats coming from the sky. In October alone, more than 2,000 long-range Shahed drones were launched against the country, the Ukrainian president said. “Using high-quality interceptors to shoot down this type of inexpensive weapon would lead us to bankruptcy,” points out Mykola Bielieskov, associate researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS), a think tank under the authority of the presidency. “We need low-cost interceptors to specifically target drones and keep the most efficient ones to shoot down ballistic or cruise missiles.”

Among the equipment provided by Westerners, one of them proved particularly effective in countering Russian aircraft: the German Gepard. Although rustic and produced during the Cold War, this 50-year-old anti-aircraft system – featuring two radar-guided 35mm cannons mounted on a Leopard tank chassis – has been praised for its performance. “The Russians have an objective of exhausting our air defenses. This is why we must increase our means adapted to shoot down drones. Today, the Gepard is the best in this regard, in terms of profitability”, had underlined , from 2023, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force.

At this stage, Germany has transferred 55 to Ukraine, to which 15 additional copies are expected to be added in the coming months. At the same time, the United States delivered 60 in June, purchased from Jordan a year earlier. Problem is, this system has not been produced since the 1980s, the equipment still available is rare. “With the end of the Cold War and the professionalization of armies in the 1990s, Westerners began to abandon the segment of cheap equipment that could be used en masse, preferring to focus on increasingly complex and expensive equipment. However, some of the impasses that were made at the time are felt today in Ukraine, recalls Stéphane Audrand. Even if we have started to redo short-range anti-aircraft artillery in recent years, the. delays in restarting industrial sectors are long.”

Low-cost innovations

In September, German industrialist Rheinmetall unveiled a prototype of its new Skyranger turret mounted on a Leopard tank chassis – intended to eventually replace the old Gepards. But scaling up production could take many more years. “A relevant strategy to survive over the long term would be to have a combination of very high quality equipment, but few in number, and other lower quality equipment but available in greater numbers, to cope with the saturation maneuvers of the “adversary,” summarizes Yohann Michel, research fellow at the Institute for Strategy and Defense Studies (IESD) in Lyon-3. Overall, no force can hope to oppose the Russian army with only Patriot missiles. and Javelin: because we will run out before the end of the war.”

Far from relying solely on the aid of its partners, Ukraine has set in motion its own arms industry. By 2024, more than 200 companies were registered as producing military drones – up from seven a year earlier. Several innovations have already seen the light of day, such as the “Sting” FPV drone, unveiled in October, and designed specifically to destroy, at lower cost, the Shahed drones sent by Moscow. At a time when 60% of the state budget is devoted to defense, kyiv is also working to sharpen its deep strike capabilities. On December 10, Volodymyr Zelensky announced the mass production of the Palianytsia “drone-missile”, equipped with a turbojet and capable of hitting targets located 700 kilometers away, as well as the delivery to the Ukrainian armed forces of a first batch Peklo (“hell”, in Ukrainian), a prowling ammunition that can reach 700 km/h.

“These weapons developed over the last two years combine characteristics of both drones and missiles,” notes Mykhailo Gonchar, president of the Ukrainian institute Center for Global Studies Strategy XXI. “And they have the advantage of being relatively cheap in comparison of ATACMS, Scalp or Storm Shadow, provided by our American and European partners.” In November, the Ukrainian president set the goal of producing at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025, and more than 3,000 cruise missiles.

The acclaimed “Danish model”

The variation of these competitively priced strike assets is also carried out at sea. And offered Ukraine one of its most important victories of the war. Despite their virtual absence of a navy, the Ukrainian forces managed, thanks to their naval drones, to push the Russian Black Sea fleet away from their coasts, forcing it to move some of its ships from its historic base of Sevastopol, towards the port of Novorossiysk, further east. This success, obtained against all expectations, de facto put an end to Moscow’s attempted blockade of Ukrainian ports. “Our maritime drones made it possible to scare away Russian ships,” adds Mykola Bielieskov of the NISS. “This shows that relatively cheap technologies are sometimes capable of obtaining the same result as much more expensive equipment.” Despite much superior resources, the Russian navy lost more than twenty ships, or 30% of its fleet based in the sector.

Well aware of its shortcomings in this area, the Russian army has accelerated its transformation efforts in recent months. “They are progressing quickly and catching up,” whispers a Ukrainian officer. At the end of July, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Beloussov said that Russia was now able to produce 4,000 FPV drones per day (or 1.5 million annually). “We are better at innovating, but the Russians are better at mass production,” slips another Ukrainian military source. According to data from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, in 2024 Moscow increased its production of missiles by 50%, that of Shahed drones by 100%, and that of its formidable glide bombs – modernized large-caliber bombs – by 260%. thanks to the addition of wings and a guidance module.

“The Ukrainians are very good at finding innovative solutions, but the problem is that they are quickly copied by the Russians who have greater industrial potential,” observes Yohann Michel of the ESDI. “The ideal would be for Westerners to help them to develop solutions that they find on the front, in order to then accelerate the move to industrial scale.” In this regard, the “Danish model” is unanimously accepted in Ukraine. After exhausting its stockpile of transferable weapons to kyiv, in 2024 Denmark became the first country to directly invest in Ukraine’s defense industry, allocating $680 million for weapons manufacturing in the country. “The advantage is twofold: our production costs are lower than those of our partners and this develops our defense industry,” underlines researcher Mykhailo Gonchar. In September, 18 Bohdana self-propelled guns financed by Copenhagen left the factory. At just over $2 million each, they are almost half as expensive as their European counterparts.