In a short text written more than twenty-five years ago (1), the American political philosopher and liberal thinker Gerald Gaus (1952-2020) attempted a rehabilitation of Ebenezer Scrooge, the protagonist of Charles Dickens’ tale A Christmas Carol, whose selfishness has sometimes been simplistically associated with a form of liberal greed. Gaus’s text deserves to be read again today, not because it defends selfishness or greed, but because it underlines that behind the character of Scrooge hides a virtue at the heart of the liberal conception of living. -together: having the ability to restrain oneself from interfering in the way others choose to live or, in other words, knowing how to “take care of one’s business”.
That, from a liberal point of view, this ability is considered a virtue seems to fuel criticism of liberalism. After all, isn’t it justified to interfere in the way of life of our neighbours, if we think we have good reasons to do so, reasons sometimes linked to the survival of our own way of life, our nation, or even our planet?
The reasons for interfering in the lives of others
One can easily understand the desire to live surrounded by individuals and populations whose mores, customs and ideas we value. We can also understand the desire to preserve the lifestyles and beliefs to which we attach particular value because they are part of our personal and social identity. However, as many liberal thinkers, such as John Stuart Mill and John Rawls, have pointed out, a free society that respects civil and political freedoms naturally tends to generate a diversity of behaviors and beliefs. This diversity can undermine the pursuit of certain life or social projects that require the participation and cooperation of the entire population. It is a reality that cannot be discussed: in a free society, certain ways of life will not prosper, will change, or even disappear. Learning not to interfere in the lives of others involves accepting this fact.
Another form of resistance to the liberal virtue of non-interference comes from the fear that, by allowing others to choose what they read, what they watch on television or on the Internet, one takes the risk of generating behavior that is harmful or even dangerous for oneself or for society. Gaus wrote his text at the time in response to reactions that arose on the occasion of the release of the film The People vs. Larry Flynt. From a certain feminist point of view (which is not THE feminist point of view), by the vision of the woman that it promotes, pornography would be likely to cause violent behavior of men towards women. Contemporary times reveal similar preoccupations on many subjects. We are naturally inclined to identify a causal link between certain beliefs and representations and specific behaviors. If these behaviors are perceived as harmful, then the root must be tackled. Let’s ignore the fact that identifying such a causal link is a delicate practice and will always be subject to strong scientific uncertainty. Gaus reminds us that there is only a liberal society populated by individuals considered to be morally autonomous, in other words whose behaviors are not necessarily determined by their more or less fanciful impulses, desires and beliefs. Invoking a causal link between drives, desires, beliefs on the one hand and behaviors on the other amounts to denying this autonomy. To deny this autonomy implies seeing the other no longer as a person morally responsible for his actions but as an automaton endowed with an inferior moral status.
It may be objected that the problem is of another nature: letting people think, express themselves and live as they see fit is highly likely to favor the propagation of ideas and representations which we dislike, or even which we consider attacking our identity and dignity. That in itself would be grounds enough to interfere in the lives of others. We understand, however, that in a diverse society where, by definition, individuals do not all share the same beliefs and opinions, the same mores, it is inevitable that such ideas and representations develop. The only way to control them in a (possibly) effective way is to drastically reduce the diversity of society, in other words to inevitably give up certain civil liberties. Critics of liberal society will object that, in their view, having others hold ideas that insult their group or social identity is an attack on their own civil liberties. Gerald Gaus notes that, if they are right, then liberal society is an impossibility. Civil liberties give us rights that define a sphere within which we are free to think and act as we wish. There are no civil liberties if this sphere does not exist. Its extent is and will remain a subject of discussion in a liberal society; one thing is certain however, it cannot include a right to demand that the thoughts, words and deeds of others be as we approve of them.
Liberal living together, a demanding model
The moral to be drawn from these reflections is that liberal living together is demanding. It is demanding, because it asks us to curb the almost instinctive temptation to meddle in other people’s affairs. This temptation is all the more difficult to contain because it is, sometimes at least, based on intelligible reasons. Living together cannot be just about each living their own life without ever suffering any interference. Social science and philosophy – including liberal ones – have largely taught us that radical individualism has socially harmful effects. To use the famous distinction of Benjamin Constant, if the “liberties of the moderns”, those which allow us to live and express ourselves as we see fit, are essential, the “freedoms of the ancients”, those which allow us to participate in our collective destiny and therefore to impose a social and political framework in which individual lives can evolve, are nonetheless essential.
However, there is no liberal society, with all the benefits that go with it – that of economic prosperity, that of being able to free oneself from any form of arbitrary authority –, in the absence of the presupposition that its members are all equally morally autonomous and reasonable. If we accept this presupposition, then we must admit that, as a general rule, the reasons for letting others live as they see fit are stronger than those which lead us to want to interfere. If we reject this presupposition, it is because we affirm from the outset that certain individuals have a natural authority over others.
(1) “On the Difficult Virtue of Minding One’s Own Business: Towards the Political Rehabilitation of Ebenezer Scrooge (On the Hard Virtue of Minding Business: Towards the Political Rehabilitation of Ebenezer Scrooge)“, by Gerald Gaus. The Philosopher, No. 5, 1997, p. 24-28.
* Cyril Hédoin is professor of economics at the University of Reims-Champagne-Ardenne.