kyiv’s strategy to find a second wind – L’Express

On Thursday February 24, 2022, at 5:30 a.m., the dreaded scenario began. After a martial speech by Vladimir Putin on Russian television, announcing the launch of a “special military operation”, a rain of bombs fell on Ukraine, followed by the incursion of thousands of Russian soldiers and armored vehicles on the territory of their neighbor. Two years later, this Saturday February 24, 2024, the Kremlin leader’s hopes of a quick victory were shattered. “At the start, no one was banking on the Ukrainian army,” recalls General Nicolas Richoux, former commander of the 7th Armored Brigade. “But it managed the feat of standing up to what is considered the second most powerful army in the country. world.”

The whole challenge for the Ukrainian forces, on this day when the war enters its third year, is to hold out over the long term. “The densification of defensive lines on the front and the scarcity of ammunition have accentuated the situation of tactical blockage that we have observed since the end of 2022, gauges Thibault Fouillet, scientific director of the Institute of Strategy and Defense Studies of the Lyon III University. After the failure of the counter-offensive launched by Kiev last June, the Russian army regained the upper hand, and succeeded in capturing the town of Avdiivka, on February 17, at the end of a deadly four-month siege. “The situation on the front line is extremely difficult in several areas, particularly where Russian forces have concentrated the majority of their reserves,” conceded Volodymyr Zelensky two days later.

Caution should be in order for the coming year. At this stage, there no longer seems to be any question of major offensives for the Ukrainians. In parallel with the waves of Russian assaults at Avdiivka, they reinforced their defense lines on the rest of the front. Previously determined to attack, “they had only dug contact trenches, but since their defensive shift at the end of the year, they have the desire to concrete their lines to reduce the asymmetry with those very dense of the Russians”, explains a French military source. These multi-level fortifications should allow the Ukrainian army to reduce its losses and increase those of its adversaries.

This defense in depth is also the surest way for the Ukrainian army to regain momentum. “The year 2024 seems destined to generate or regenerate capacities, which could take time, to really get off to a good start in 2025,” estimates Thibault Fouillet. The first challenge concerns numbers, with more than 450,000 Russian troops reportedly in occupied Ukrainian areas. “Ukraine needs a new wave of mobilization – a debate which has still not been resolved – to breathe new life into the soldiers engaged on the front, but also to give itself a new mass of maneuver,” continues the researcher.

In two years, the Ukrainian army has demonstrated its strong capacity for transformation. “It has more than doubled in size: its land forces have gone from around thirty maneuver brigades to sixty-five,” underlines Michel Goya, former colonel of the marine troops, today a war historian. According to data from Military Balance 2024, an annual benchmark assessment of each country’s military capabilities, the Ukrainian army today has between 500,000 and 800,000 troops on active duty.

The need for new blood must be accompanied by an increase in skills. “The command structure has not grown as quickly as the army, which lacks staffs, particularly at the brigade level [NDLR : environ 3 000 hommes], notes Michel Goya. He underlines the need to give time to training, provided in part by his allies in NATO training camps: “The profession of soldier requires months and months of apprenticeship, to know how to work together in a combat group, adapting to the terrain, evolving with armored vehicles, in addition to the psychological aspect of getting used to the stress of confrontations.”

In 2022, the Ukrainians have demonstrated remarkable tactical agility. “This allowed them to exploit enemy weaknesses and seize opportunities that presented themselves,” notes General Richoux. In September of that year, taking advantage of a reduction in the Russian presence in the Kharkiv region, kyiv’s forces led a dazzling counter-offensive, managing to reconquer more than 12,000 square kilometers. In the process, they regained control of the western bank of the Dnieper, in the Kherson region. Partly isolated by the river, the Russian troops had no choice but to withdraw in November, after three months of combat, to avoid being trapped.

kyiv needs a lot more shells

To move the lines again and reconquer its 20% of lost territories, the Ukrainian army will not be able to do without an essential ingredient: firepower, which it sorely lacked during its summer 2023 offensive. in the Zaporizhia region. “Ukraine will need around 75,000 to 90,000 artillery shells per month to support the war defensively, and more than double – 200,000 to 250,000 – for a major offensive,” insists one recent report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

On this level, Western support is both essential and insufficient. Certainly, the European Union is increasing its production capacities and hopes to supply 1,155,000 shells to the Ukrainians by the end of the year. But they do not have the luxury of being able to do without American support in this area. In this regard, the return to the White House of Donald Trump, who does not hide his desire to reduce this aid, could undermine the hopes of reconquest of kyiv in 2025.

In the meantime, kyiv should continue its strikes into Russian depth. Thanks to their long-range missiles and naval drones, Ukrainian forces have already managed to inflict heavy losses on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. At the end of December, the British Secretary of State for Defense, Grant Shapps, estimated that “20%” of it had been destroyed “in the last four months”. Result: the Russian navy was forced to transfer some of its assets from its historic base of Sevastopol, in Crimea, to the port of Novorossiysk, on the eastern part of the Black Sea, further away from the Ukrainian firing zones.

More than ever, a war of attrition is looming. It is not said that it will necessarily be to the advantage of Moscow. A recent RUSI report, a London think tank, believes that Ukraine could eventually achieve the capacity to erode the Russian military beyond its industrial and human regeneration levels. But only “if Ukraine’s partners continue to provide it with sufficient ammunition and training support.” Moscow’s “significant deterioration in combat power” could, ultimately, “force Russia […] to actually negotiate an end to the war on terms favorable to Ukraine”. But not before 2026.