On October 1, 180 Iranian missiles peppered the skies over Israel. But alerted by American officials of the imminence of the attack, the Israeli authorities were able to call some ten million people to go to air raid shelters. Enough to inspire some observers to note a “spectacular and embarrassing failure ” for Iran, starting with the White House. “Many commentators downplay the seriousness of this attack because there were very few victims. But that was not Iran’s intention,” said Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “This attack marks a huge escalation in terms of provocation in this war.” Israeli response, involvement of Hezbollah, possible arrival of Russia in the equation, scenario of total war… The specialist reviews the burning questions of the moment. And answers to that of knowing whether Tehran would go so far as to play the nuclear threat card… Interview.
L’Express: On October 1, a shower of missiles were launched from Iran on Israel, almost six months after a first attack by Tehran. How do you interpret this new offensive?
Matthew Levitt: The main difference between the attack launched by Iran in April and that of October 1 lies in the nature of the operation. In April, the attack included more drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (some 300 in total compared to 180 this time), but Iran had warned in advance that an attack would take place, and proceeded in waves. First, drones take a few hours to cover the distance to their target. Next, low-altitude cruise missiles with the speed of an airliner, then ballistic missiles.
This time, it’s different: Iran only fired ballistic missiles at once, without prior warning (it was the United States which shared intelligence indicating the imminence of an attack a few hours before it occurs). However, ballistic missiles have a particularity: they only take around twelve minutes to reach their target. I think many commentators are downplaying the severity of this attack because there were very few casualties. But that was not Iran’s intention. This attack marks a huge escalation in provocation in this war. It is a miracle that there were not more injured or dead.
This attack comes at a time when the Islamic Republic is weakened, notably by the elimination of Hassan Nasrallahthe leader of Hezbollah…
Yes, I think they made a very bad calculation. There are certainly “reasons”, from the Iranian point of view, to think that a “response” was necessary. Between the assassination of the political leader of Hamas, Ismaïl Haniyeh, in Tehran, the elimination of a commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps in Beirut, then that of Hassan Nasrallah and, probably more importantly, the cumulative effect of all the blows dealt by Israel to Hezbollah in the space of two and a half weeks… This is a a real open-heart operation that Iran is undergoing. But on the other hand, this country has only one red line: it does not want in the event of a regional war to extend to its own territory, because it fears that this will have internal consequences. Many Iranians are not happy with the theocratic revolutionary regime. So I think that the Iranians are, at the very least, very worried about the outcome and the response that Israel intends to make to the attack on October 1st.
Is the scenario of total war credible?
This scenario is unfathomable as the situation could evolve in one direction or the other. Ultimately, I believe it is Iran and its “proxies” who will decide whether this is a regional or all-out war, because it was Iran who started it all. Hamas attacked Israel on October 7. The next day, it was Hezbollah’s turn. And soon after, the Houthis got involved too. What do each of these groups have in common? Iran.
I do not believe that the Israelis, for their part, want a regional war, but it seems unlikely to me that they will not react. What should Israel target? This is the question that is debated. Some say the time has come to deal a blow to Iran’s nuclear program, which poses a huge threat to Israel. Others say it would lead to too much escalation. I, for one, doubt that the Israelis will strike Iranian oil and gas installations.
For what ?
This would affect the price of oil and gas and probably make people angry with Israel. Additionally, the Iranians have already threatened to attack their neighbors – the oil and gas facilities of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait – if anyone attacks their own facilities. Which, by the way, underscores the nature of the threat Iran poses, not just to Israel, but to the entire region.. Just as what happened on October 1 only reinforces the idea, for the countries of the Middle East, that Iran is a threat and that the air defense of the region (provided by the United States and Israel) is in the interest of all.
For these reasons, I think one possible target could be Iranian intelligence and security facilities – the Iranians claim they were targeting, among other things, Israeli military bases and Israeli intelligence headquarters, and the Israelis want their response to be as reciprocal as possible. Regardless, I expect Israel’s response to be greater than the more subdued response we saw after the mid-April attack.
The United States announced that it “fully” supports the Jewish state and wants to “coordinate” with it. Presidential National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Washington had “made it clear that there would be consequences, serious consequences,” for the attack. Can the United States afford, particularly in the middle of a presidential campaign, to take a leading role in an Israeli response?
It remains to be seen what the United States means by “consequences”. But we have to realize that we are talking about one of the most significant incidents of violation of international security that we have seen in a very long time. I say it again: 180 ballistic missiles were fired by one country at another sovereign country, threatening the lives of millions of civilians and killing one Palestinian. Not to mention that the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, claimed to have “warned the American forces to withdraw from this matter and not to intervene, otherwise they would face a harsh response from us.” They do not hide their game, their threats are very clear. So I don’t think that the American government, nor indeed those of the United Kingdom and your country [qui ont apporté leur soutien à la défense d’Israël] can afford not to be fully involved in the response to Iran. To ensure that Iran gets the message, and also so that Israel does not go too far, by maintaining an open and honest dialogue on the conditions for implementing self-defense.
The fact remains that in the face of the Israeli offensive in Lebanon, the influence of the United States may have seemed limited. Do they still have weight with Israel?
I think too much is being made on this issue. These are two sovereign countries. The United States does not expect to be able to dictate to Israel what it should do, but relations between the United States and Israel are still very strong. There is no doubt that the Israelis pay close attention to what Washington says. Over the past eleven and a half months, the Israelis have repeatedly changed the way they intended to act because of the United States’ advice. I therefore think that it would be wrong to say that the United States does not have the expected influence with its partner. But yes, ultimately the Israelis will do what they feel they need to do based on their assessment of the situation to protect their citizens. Because, ultimately, it is not Washington that has just been bombed.
Can Hezbollah, although greatly weakened, still play a role alongside Iran?
I think that when you carry out a series of spectacular attacks against a group as strong, as powerful and as large as Hezbollah, even if it results in reducing it to its simplest form, there will always be something left. Hezbollah certainly lost a lot of command personnel. The American and Israeli authorities, cited by the New York Timestoday estimate that nearly 50% of Hezbollah’s rockets have been destroyed. But that still leaves 75,000 to 100,000. I think it’s no exaggeration to say that the Hezbollah we knew two weeks ago no longer exists. He is a shadow of his former self and has suffered enormous losses.
Now is the time for the international community (Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.) to redouble their efforts to prevent Iran from rearming, resupplying and refinancing Hezbollah , Hamas, the Houthis and other groups. Without Iranian weapons and money, Hezbollah would be far from the threat it represents today, as would Hamas. As for the Houthis, they would only be a small thorn in the side of the Saudis, nothing more. The international community’s failure to pay enough attention and do enough to prevent Iran from supplying weapons to its proxy network has come at a huge cost to not only regional security, but international. Let’s not repeat this mistake.
Does Tehran today have the means to play the nuclear deterrent card?
The Iranians have intensified their nuclear program over the past eleven months. They have never been closer to the nuclear bomb than today. The last time this happened was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) [NDLR : La République islamique s’est progressivement affranchie des engagements pris dans le cadre de cet accord conclu en 2015, censé encadrer ses activités atomiques en échange d’une levée des sanctions internationales. Après le retrait des Etats-Unis en 2018, des discussions menées à Vienne pour le ranimer ont échoué à l’été 2022]. This time, it’s more complicated, the situation has evolved. Two dynamics are therefore at play.
On the one hand, Iran could use this argument to respond to the actions of Israel and the rest of the international community against it. This could involve taking some steps never taken in the past to implement its nuclear program, perhaps arming it. But at the same time, if Iran wants Hezbollah to attack Israel, it also wants the powder to stay dry on as many of Hezbollah’s medium- and long-range rockets as possible. Because Iran considers Hezbollah’s rockets to be the best deterrent it has against an Israeli or other attack on its nuclear program (and the best second-strike capability if Israel or another country attacks Iran’s nuclear program). Iran). These elements are thus linked in a complex way.
Could this conflict go beyond the Middle East, with the involvement of other state actors?
Everything is possible. But I think that Russian-Iranian cooperation, for example, is more of a marriage of convenience than a solid alliance. And I don’t think Russia, which is already involved in its own war in Ukraine, has any interest in getting deeply involved in the operations carried out by Iran (which Moscow probably also considers as a miscalculation and a war of choice…).
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