Banning of Facebook and Instagram, censorship of the Russian media, condemnations of citizens taking a stand against the war… The Russian digital space is today under the yoke of the Kremlin. However, it has not always been so. In the wake of the end of the USSR, the development of the Russian Internet was even a vector of hopes for democratization. Written under the direction of Françoise Daucé, Benjamin Loveluck and Francesca Musiani, Genesis of a digital authoritarianism. Internet repression and resistance in Russia, 2012-2022 (Presses des Mines and free access) analyzes this worrying turning point. Interview with Francesca Musiani, Deputy Director of the CNRS Internet and Society Center.
L’Express: Since when has the Russian Internet been under control?
Francesca Musiani: For a time, the Russian digital space was a space of semi-freedom. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, as the Soviet space crumbled, a tech community was created. The internet service provider sector has developed in a fairly decentralized way in Russia, with many small players. Digital freedoms were then relatively important. In the early 2000s, there were first worrying signals, but it was really in the early 2010s that there was an authoritarian push, with a series of laws that brought Russian digital infrastructure under control. Vladimir Putin sees digital technology as an instrument for controlling daily thoughts and actions. He perceived the power of the tool very well and made it a pillar of his authoritative strategy. He likes to make believe that the territory and the Russian population are threatened by external actors, and digital is a powerful tool to convey this message.
What laws has the Kremlin passed to strengthen its control over Russian digital space?
One of the main measures was to require Internet service providers to retain data collected on users for a much longer period than before. They also had to design new tools to meet the demands of the Kremlin. While often the law tries to follow the evolution of technologies, here, it was the opposite: the technology had to follow the law. The other part of this strategy was to promote, as China does, national champions: the Russian search engine Yandex instead of Google; the Vkontakte social network instead of Facebook… The objective was to leave as little room as possible for Western players. This has also resulted in what has been called the anti-Apple law which obliges all manufacturers to pre-install Russian applications on devices (Editor’s note: a practice which Apple strongly opposed).
Has the authorities’ grip on the Russian Internet been strengthened since the beginning of the war in Ukraine ?
Yes, it became very clear that this process of enlisting the Internet in the service of authoritarian politics was in reality also in the service of warmongering politics. Russian digital laws have become even more restrictive, especially in terms of content. Any criticism of the military is prohibited. It is not even authorized to use the term “war”. Officially, it is still a “special operation”. The situation has become such that certain media which had until then maintained a foothold in Russia have renounced any presence and any publication on the national territory. More and more people are likely to be considered “foreign agents”. And the control over the Russian digital champions has grown even stronger.
The West has implemented quite heavy technological sanctions against Russia, in order to block the sale of semiconductors or certain software. What impact does this have on Russia?
It has an impact. Russia realizes that despite its isolationist tendencies, it was still far from being disconnected from the global Internet. After the departure of foreign digital operators and the cessation of certain cooperation, some Russian Internet players have also found it impossible to continue to provide their services to their customers.
Is the control exercised by the authorities over the Russian Internet total? Is it very difficult for Russian citizens who wish to access prohibited information?
The Russian Internet is not as isolated from the global Internet as Vladimir Putin hoped. And the Russian territory is heterogeneous with large cosmopolitan cities like Saint Petersburg, up to Siberia. But apart from cities that are very open to foreigners, Putin seems to have rallied a large part of the population behind him. We see resistance movements with, for example, a proliferation of digital security trainers who help citizens identify useful tools for obtaining information and communicating freely without putting themselves in danger. However, a large part of the Russian population is not aware of the existence of these alternatives. And those who only use traditional channels receive very biased information. One of the problems with environments where there is a lot of misinformation and diffuse risk is that people gradually isolate themselves from the public debate, and choose to communicate less. The threat is present but difficult to locate. To protect themselves, populations therefore tend to isolate themselves and self-censor. As if they put themselves in a cage. This effect of paralysis of society is frequently observed in sick public spaces.
Was the idea that the Internet couldn’t be controlled by tyrants a sweet dream?
It has long been believed that the natural governance model for the Internet is multi-stakeholder governance. We had the idea of an essentially decentralized and open Internet. There is a realization that other players are developing it in very different and isolationist ways. This could lead to increasing fragmentation of the global Internet, a phenomenon often referred to as the “splInternet”.
Is the way Russia controls its digital space similar to what China does?
The big difference with China is that the implementation of this control is more recent in Russia. And control is not as coordinated as in China. If it is less well coordinated, it is unfortunately no less effective. However, there are forms of resistance. For the humanities, Russia is a kind of open-air laboratory on questions of resistance to censorship.
How is the Russian tech community reacting to the measures taken by the Kremlin?
In recent years, many Russians belonging to the most educated strata have left. Which does not suit Vladimir Putin. This is also why he said that IT developers should not go to the front. Some Russian digital players who until now enjoyed a certain laissez-faire attitude are now increasingly under the control of the Kremlin. So some leave, others change jobs. Some try to resist on the legal level or act in secret.
Are the Kremlin teams in charge of operating this digital control as powerful and efficient as we fear?
The actor who best symbolizes the new model authoritarian Russian Internet is Roskomnadzor, the Russian telecoms policeman whose powers have been significantly extended over the last ten years with the new laws. This body has also been given many more means and human resources. This does not mean, however, that he is omnipotent. The jokes and memes of the digital resistance also like to make fun of this actor. We must also keep in mind that Russia is a big state machine and a big bureaucratic machine on several levels. And at the local levels, we observe a kind of embolization, with local authorities which sometimes sluggishly carry out orders from above and constantly try to negotiate more means to carry out this policy. Russian laws are written as if there is an almighty hand that can push a button controlling the Internet, but it doesn’t work that way.
Genesis of a digital authoritarianism. Internet repression and resistance in Russia, 2012-2022, under the direction of Françoise Daucé (CERCEC-EHESS), Benjamin Loveluck (Télécom Paris) and Francesca Musiani (CIS-CNRS). Published by Presses des Mines and available in free access.