Iran is holding the second round of the presidential election this Friday, July 5. Face to face, the reformer Massoud Pezeshkian and the ultra-conservative Said Jalili. We return with the historian and Iran specialist, Jonathan Piron, to the major issues of this second round, as much for the candidates as for the regime and the Iranian population.
7 mins
RFI: Compared to the last presidential election, where Ebrahim Raisi was declared the winner even before the first vote, it seems that this election has more unknowns. As an Iran specialist, is this also your impression?
Jonathan Piron: We are facing a presidential election of uncertainty. This is not an election that was planned, it was anticipated. [suite à la mort d’Ebrahim Raïssi, NDLR] and the two candidates for the second round were not predestined to become President of the Republic either. Another surprising point is that the first round saw a very low turnout, with the reformer nevertheless in the lead, which is also unprecedented. So, we don’t really know how things will evolve for the second round. We might as well have the final surprise of Jalili or Pezeshkian.
The reformer came out on top in the first round. How was that a surprise?
For several years, it was thought that the reformist camp no longer represented anything politically, and that it was also discredited by the population. The candidacy of Massoud Pezeshkian was also notably boosted by other moderate candidates who supported him, such as Mohammad Javad Zarif. One of the reasons for his rise to power is perhaps also that he led a very local campaign. Many campaign offices were opened in provinces such as Azerbaijan, but also in very busy places, such as Tehran, near major traffic routes. Finally, there was an underground campaign among the population which may have had an effect with this very high score. He also wanted to play this campaign close to the people, by trying to have a discourse on the harshness of daily life, on the need to reopen negotiations with the West to try to lift the sanctions, in opposition to the stance of Said Jalili, who remained very ultra-conservative in his positions. Now, we can also see that Massoud Pezeshkian has not managed to broaden his electoral base either. The turnout is historically low, among those who can precisely identify with his discourse, a large part did not turn out.
The Iranian regime gives the impression of being in permanent control of the country’s political life. Clearly this time, despite the validation of the candidacies in advance, it too seems to have been surprised.
The validation of Pezeshkian’s candidacy was perhaps an attempt by the Iranian regime to show that it could also accept different candidacies that were outside the system. Perhaps it was also convinced that the reformer Pezeshkian, who is also a dull and uncharismatic character, would not succeed in winning. The idea was also to increase the turnout to try to reach 50%, or even exceed it. And therefore, precisely for the regime in power, to show that it still had legitimacy among the population despite the protests that are quite regular in Iran. Ultimately, the result is a double snub for the regime. Not only is the turnout the lowest ever recorded and therefore the question of the legitimacy of the system is still raised, but in addition it is the reformist candidate who of all the candidates presented is the most critical of the regime, who managed to win. We are in an unprecedented situation where the regime will question the way in which political sociology evolves and also the way in which the regime could maintain itself over time, since we are still in a cycle where it would not be unprecedented for major moments of demonstrations and protests against regimes to occur at one time or another.
In 2021, the turnout was already very low. Do we know if the Iranians who went to the polls this year are the same as for the election of Ebrahim Raisi?
In the few figures that have reached us, we see that there has been a collapse in the participation rate in the provinces where there are ethnic minorities, notably in Khuzestan or in the Sistan-Baluchistan which is close to Afghanistan. In other regions, in Tehran for example, it has risen a little, or it has not fallen as drastically, as in the northeast, where Pezeshkian campaigned. Now, the question to ask about voter turnout is what did the young people do? Since we saw in particular that the young people were very present during the demonstrations in support of Mahsa Amini. We should see if they turned out to support the reformist candidate or if this electorate is in fact the heir to the large electoral demonstrations of 2009 which contested the fraudulent re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Slogans of this movement were put forward during the campaign. Political sociology and the study of the electorate in Iran should be pushed further. This remains very difficult since on-site observations are prohibited.
Said Jalili, the second candidate in this election, has indeed presented himself as an ultra-conservative. If he were to come to power, could Iran become even more closed off than it is today?
Said Jalili is very hostile to negotiations with the West. In the past, he has adopted belligerent postures, particularly in very virulent speeches, also on the subject of internal repression. Even if the President of the Republic has few resources, if he were elected, we could end up with a character who, through all series of statements, could further reinforce Iran’s isolation. These statements could frustrate partners such as Russia and China, but could also isolate Iran in the partnerships that Ebrahim Raisi had tried to revive with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The question that could arise is whether the regime would allow him to have this kind of speech that can go very far, particularly on the subject of strategic partnerships. All the more so since we know that the question of Iran’s regional role is managed by the hard core that includes the Supreme Guide and the Revolutionary Guards. Said Jalili could become a “troublemaker” who could hinder strategic decisions taken by the heart of the regime. The regime could therefore be forced to limit its room for maneuver.
Said Jalili is also a very divisive figure within Iran. Conservative Mohammad Ghalibaf, who came third on the first day, called for a vote for him. Do you think he will be able to unite the conservative electorate?
It is possible that part of Ghalibaf’s electorate will not fall back on the ultra-conservative Jalili. We have also seen members of Ghalibaf’s campaign committee call for support for Pezeshkian. The transfer of votes could therefore also benefit the reformer. We will have to closely monitor the turnout, but also the number of votes that Pezeshkian will win compared to those who turned out. We could ultimately see quite significant transfers. It should be noted that in the first round, out of the 26 million people who abstained, if Pezeshkian had had 3 million, he would have gone straight to the first round.
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