It is not quite 8:30 p.m. this Wednesday, December 4, when the bell rings at the Palais Bourbon. The “brouhaha” which resonates in the National Assembly suddenly gives way to a cathedral silence. The deputies return to their seats. Surrounded by his ministers, Michel Barnier waits. A few seconds later, he learns, as he had prepared, that he will have to hand over the keys to the Matignon hotel the next morning.
By voting on the motion of censure tabled by the New Popular Front (NFP), 331 deputies forced it to do so. Almost half under the orders of their leader, Marine Le Pen who ultimately did not hesitate to mix the voices of her own with those of “the extremist left”, as she put it. An alliance of carp and rabbit which would have been limited to political fiction across the Rhine. Like Belgium and Spain, Germany is one of those parliamentary regimes which, marked by long periods of instability, has opted for tougher censorship conditions.
What if a motion of censure could be “constructive”?
Thus, in Berlin, the common will of a majority of deputies cannot be enough to overthrow a government in Berlin. To do this, it is up to elected officials to tune their violins, propose a common score and agree to play as one and the same orchestra. Understand, propose an alternative programmatic platform and above all, find a replacement for the chancellor – or head of government – whom they are preparing to debunk. We then speak of a constructive motion of censure
Included in Article 67 of the German Basic Law of 1949, this parliamentary tool was designed to wring the neck of the chronic political instability which reigned under the Weimar Republic (1918-1933). “The constructive motion of censure makes it possible both to avoid a power vacuum and to prevent extreme parties, or those who have no common project, from joining forces on a text to bring down a government in place,” deciphers Hans Stark, political scientist and professor of German civilization at Sorbonne University.
A little-used procedure
Concretely, when a constructive motion of censure is tabled, the overthrow of the government is divided into two parts. The first, which consists of the dismissal of the current chancellor. The second, by its replacement. “The procedure takes place on the same day, because everything is prepared in advance, the deputies agree on a personality before provoking a vote of no confidence. There is therefore no suspense on the identity of the successor of the one he overthrows”, explains Hans Stark, who specifies: “Once the motion of no confidence has been adopted by the absolute majority of the Bundestag, the deputies vote for the new government.”
In seven decades, the operation has only been implemented twice – compared to 65 for the spontaneous motion of censure in France. In April 1972, when the CDU/CSU coalition proposed replacing Willy Brandt with Rainer Barzel. But the conservative lacks some votes to obtain confidence. We then had to wait ten years for the first – and so far only – motion of censure to be adopted. Also, on October 1, 1982, Helmut Schmidt was forced to give up his place to Helmut Kohl who would celebrate sixteen New Year’s Eve at the Federal Chancellery. “This rule which consists of saying ‘you only overthrow a government by replacing it’ forces the forces which defend contrary projects to make compromises and thus makes it possible to avoid falling into periods of instability or becoming stuck. in institutional blockages”, argues political scientist Hans Stark.
Constructive distrust: a solution to the French political crisis…
Return to the National Assembly, where two opposing blocs have for the first time since 1962 cut off the head of the Prime Minister. While Michel Barnier submitted his resignation to Emmanuel Macron this Thursday morning, a question hovers over the institutional sky. Should France take inspiration from the German model? At a time of political tripartition, the constructive motion of censure has never seemed so “necessary”, points out political scientist and historian Jean Garrigues. “This is the only way to avoid falling into a trap where we would have a succession of overthrows of governments,” he argues in the wake of constitutionalist Jean-Jacques Urvoas. “We have to look at how to prevent coalitions that don’t agree on anything – other than overthrowing – from dismissing a government.”
Prevent the “alliance of opposites”, therefore. But also, force the different chapels of the lower house to communicate and find compromises. “What caused the fall of Michel Barnier was the inability of the government parties to dialogue and agree on a line to follow,” analyzes Jean-Jacques Urvoas, who defends: “Conditioning the overthrow of a government to a common programmatic basis and to an agreement on the replacement of the Prime Minister would force those who want to table a motion of censure to find conciliations as is done among our European neighbors.” An alignment which would however require amending the institutional sketch thought out by General de Gaulle, for several reasons.
…but which blends in with difficulty into our institutional system
Firstly, establishing a constructive motion of censure necessarily implies a constitutional revision. Or the triggering of article 89 of the Constitution which opens a sequence which is divided into three episodes: the submission of the initiative, the vote on the text by the two chambers of Parliament and the meeting of a Congress with the adoption of the text by 3/5ths of parliamentarians. Secondly, unlike the chancellor in Germany, the French Prime Minister does not come from parliamentary will but is appointed at the discretion of the head of state. However, the collision of a constructive motion of censure – which supposes that the choice of a head of government falls to the Assembly – with the appointment of the tenant of Matignon by the President of the Republic, therefore appears contradictory.
Reason why, according to the former socialist Minister of Justice Jean-Jacques Urvoas, “it would not be incongruous to specify in article 8 of the Constitution [qui pose le cadre dans lequel est nommé le Premier ministre, NDLR] that the President of the Republic must appoint the head of government taking into account the appearance of the National Assembly”. But for Benjamin Morel, lecturer in public law at the University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas, the key lies elsewhere: in the voting method “If the socialists reach out to the government to make a deal, they will have a rebel facing them in all the constituencies in the event of dissolution and they will lose their seats. So it’s political hara-kiri. This would not be the case if we had complete proportional representation,” argues Benjamin Morel.
Postpone indefinitely the debate on proportional representation when he was in charge. This would have been the original sin of Michel Barnier. “Opening the way to the establishment of proportional representation would have allowed socialist deputies to free themselves from the yoke of the rebels without risking losing too many votes in the next early legislative elections,” points out Jean-Jacques Urvoas. In 89 days, when he had to build a budget from odds and ends, give pledges to some without alienating others too much, could he really do it? “It might have allowed him to save his skin,” defends Benjamin Morel. It is up to his successor to take note of it.
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