How could Vladimir Putin be allowed to invade Ukraine? In an enlightening and very lively book, The blind. How Berlin and Paris left the way clear for Russia (Stock), Sylvie Kauffmann, columnist at World, looks back on these years of complacency, naivety, negligence, and even venality, which led to what is – for the moment – the “greatest catastrophe of the 21st century”: the return of war to a continent that , after the Second World War, was convinced that the rule of law would henceforth replace brutal force. Wrongly.
L’Express: How could Europeans allow themselves to be fooled for so long by Vladimir Putin?
Sylvie Kauffmann: The case of Germany is interesting, because this country has long maintained a complex, deep, almost psychoanalytic relationship with Russia. These two countries gave birth to the two European totalitarianisms of the 20th century, Nazism and Stalinism. “We are two great nations that have committed monstrosities, we have that in common,” a former German politician told me. This weight of History has created a very deep feeling of guilt among the Germans, analyzed across the Rhine throughout the second half of the 20th century.
Added to this feeling of guilt is a feeling of gratitude for the reunification, because it was Gorbachev who made the reunification possible. Finally, there was this idea, generated by theOstpolitik [NDLR : la “politique vers l’Est”] of Chancellor Willy Brandt, of change through rapprochement: that is to say that we can, through closer relations, influence the course of Soviet, then Russian, policy. This idea of “change through rapprochement” was a sincere illusion, but it was then subverted and transformed by “change through trade”. The illusion was then mixed with venality. Germany’s booming industry needed energy, and there was this supply of Russian gas – a very cheap and almost inexhaustible source of energy. To ensure their growth and the profits of their industry, the Germans threw themselves into the den of the wolf.
In the case of France, it is different. Thanks to nuclear energy, we did not have energy dependence. For us, the weak point, apart from the fascination of some of our elites for “great Russia”, was rather our dreams of grandeur and reorganization of European security – a constant that we find in almost all the presidents of the Fifth Republic. It is the idea that France is a nuclear power and therefore has, in a certain way, a European responsibility in matters of security. And also that this reorganization of security can only be done with Russia, another endowed power, with which we deal as equals.
Did the Germans and French show contrition after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ?
The shock was so violent in Germany that it provoked a very intense political debate. We have not had such a thing in France. However, France’s Russian policy over the last thirty years deserves to be analyzed. Have we left the way clear for Putin? I think so, particularly during the Sarkozy period. In the book, I recount the episode of the war in Georgia, when Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated a ceasefire on terms favorable to Russia. Can we blame him for that? Maybe he was naive, but he thought he would do what was possible. Putin had instilled the idea in the minds of the Americans that he intended to go to Tbilisi and overthrow President Saakashvili. In this perspective, Sarkozy’s idea was to obtain a ceasefire before Russian troops arrived in the Georgian capital. On the other hand, President Sarkozy took other serious decisions, such as the sale of Mistral helicopter carriers to Moscow and warships after the conflict in Georgia. How and why was this decision made? This is an interesting question to study in hindsight, as is the decision to allow Vladimir Putin’s Russia to build an Orthodox cathedral and a government building in the heart of Paris, Quai Branly.
Another episode that deserves a retrospective examination: the refusal of Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel to open the way for Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO, during the Bucharest summit in 2008. Four months later, Putin invaded Georgia. Six years later, he annexed Crimea and invaded Donbass. We can certainly think that if Ukraine and Georgia had been given the opportunity to join NATO, Putin would not have invaded them.
I could also cite the decision of François Hollande, alongside Chancellor Merkel, to carry out endless and futile negotiations with Russia on the Donbass, and that of Emmanuel Macron to relaunch dialogue with Moscow – in vain, again . We need to be able to analyze all these decisions, less to distribute blame than to avoid repeating our mistakes.
“Putin has his own instructions and has no intention of changing them,” you write. What are its psychological springs?
His training and experience in the KGB were decisive. We see this in the way he approached, for example, Gerhard Schröder. He really understood the character psychologically. When he came to power, Putin wanted to have a special relationship with Europe. He chose to enter through Germany, because it was a leading country, in which he had lived for five years as a KGB officer, in Dresden, and where he speaks the language. By an extraordinary coincidence, Gerhard Schröder had just been appointed chancellor when he came to power. For Putin, Schröder was the ideal prey. They have a lot in common, a poor and difficult childhood in the post-war generation, political ambition, virility, love of money.
It is also from his training in the KGB that his art of lying and manipulation comes, particularly in the rewriting of History. Finally, we must also mention his use of force as an instrument of power. To say that Russia only functions based on the balance of power may seem like a cliché but, ultimately, it is true! Conversely, the Europeans have avoided the use of force. And that’s why we were so surprised. This is also our blindness: having thought that we would no longer use force, that the rule of law had taken over and that everyone would stick to it, including for the resolution of conflicts.
Do we continue to be blinded today?
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine was an eye-opener. I admired the reaction of Western governments, but also of the population. I thought support would wane during the first winter, but public opinion held firm. We also saw it in the reception of refugees and in the way in which far-right movements have lowered their tone on Russia. No one dared to defend Putin anymore.
But, over the past two months, things have become more complicated in the United States. Of course, the prospect of a possible Trump return has a huge impact. There is a little music coming from Washington and whispering that Ukraine cannot win this war militarily, that the human and financial cost is exorbitant and that it is better to negotiate now. But let’s ask ourselves a question: why did the Ukrainian counter-offensive not produce the hoped-for results? Ukraine fights with its soldiers but with our weapons. However, we only give them sparingly, really measuring, each time, what the risk of escalation is. Besides, we don’t have enough of it.
We have known for over a year that we are running out of ammunition. We did not take the necessary measures in time to speed up their production. Once again, we thought that everything would work out, be resolved, and that Putin would back down. This is what makes me wonder: to what extent have we really opened our eyes to this regime? In reality, I fear that Europeans will allow themselves to be blinded by Putin again.
The most worrying thing is that we keep talking about how much it costs us to supply the Ukrainians with weapons. It’s true that it’s very expensive! But there is a calculation that we do not make: how much would the defeat of Ukraine cost us? Our leaders owe this explanation to their public opinions and their electorates: if we let Russia keep all the territories it has invaded, what will be the consequences? It will be necessary to strengthen the defenses of the eastern flank of Europe, fortify the rest of Ukraine which will be integrated into the EU and which Moscow will continue to destabilize: all this will cost an enormous amount of money and will involve budgetary sacrifices. The truth must be said. This also means that we will have shown Putin, once again, that we are backing down and letting him carry out his threats. Who will be the next target?
Is Putin part of a continuum, an agenda established since his first years in power, or does he demonstrate, in your opinion, an opportunism that evolves according to circumstances and fortunes – and misfortunes – of war?
If we consider its trajectory, we can indeed say that there is a continuum. When he came to power in 2000, he reestablished internal order, which he did by taking control of the media, placing siloviki – security forces – at strategic positions, etc. Restoring order also means, for him, standing up to the West, which he suspects wants to expand and wants to do battle with Russia. With Putin, there is always this permanent idea, this paranoia which increases over the years and takes up an enormous place today with Ukraine, that “the West wants to attack Russia”. There is, also, this desire to reestablish Russian domination over the territories lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “near abroad”, if necessary by force, as we see in Ukraine. It is a purely imperial ambition, in the long tradition of Russian imperialism. In the book, I recount a conversation that took place in 2002, in Moscow, between Vladimir Putin and the then Polish president, Aleksander Kwasniewski. It was early in Putin’s first term, and Kwasniewski asked him about his ambitions as president. Putin told him: “My first goal is to restore Russia’s status on the world stage.” Then he added: “The second is to rebuild Great Russia.” In 2002, Putin already had this project in his mental framework.
What could be the next step ? Probably to redeploy Russian presence or influence everywhere, as at the time of the Soviet Union. The process began with the military intervention in Syria in 2015 to save the Assad regime and regain a foothold in the Middle East. Russia is also back in Africa. Westerners, again, have not at all understood the phenomenon. They did not perceive quickly enough the strategy of the presence of Wagner’s mercenaries and the disinformation campaigns which contributed to drive France out of several West African countries. Supported by military force, hybrid warfare or the war of influence, the ambition is there: to reconnect with Soviet expansionism, everywhere in the world. And counter the liberal international order, in conjunction with China and other authoritarian regimes.
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