It was to last five years, at a cost of 3.3 billion euros. But its construction ultimately took place over nearly seventeen years, for a cost estimated at 19.1 billion euros. Expected this Thursday on the Flamanville EPR site to witness the end of fuel loading, Emmanuel Macron will undoubtedly emphasize that the new reactor – the most powerful in France with its 1,600 megawatts – will actively contribute to the energy independence of France.
However, a question remains: is such a fiasco in the construction of an EPR still possible in the future? Several elements suggest that the worst is behind us. First of all, the teams responsible for future projects will undoubtedly no longer take the risk of skipping steps. In Flamanville, the lack of upstream preparation was notably denounced by the Court of Auditors in 2020.
“We started with a gun even though we had not built any project of a similar scale over the previous 25 years. The preliminary studies were not far enough along, remembers Claude Jaouen”, President of Consulting4TOP and former director of Reactors and Services at Areva. At the same time, regulations evolved as construction progressed, creating additional complications. EDF could have learned lessons from the difficulties encountered by Areva in Finland where the construction of an EPR had already started. But given the rivalry between the two companies, this was not an option.
Arrogance ? Naivety? Since then, water has flowed under the bridges. Aware of the difficulties, EDF is reorganizing itself in order to better manage projects. It thus attempts to remedy the poor coordination between project management and project management. A weakness pointed out by the experts of the Court of Auditors. The company is also banking on the experience accumulated in recent years to facilitate the future.
“It happened this way during the construction of the old park. We must not forget that the Flamanville EPR is a bridgehead: we knew from the start that we were probably going to take more time and spend more money to achieve it in the hope of gains later”, analyzes Yves Bouvier, teacher-researcher in history at the University of Rouen Normandy.
However, in the future, EDF will not be able to afford further excesses of this kind. To avoid disappointments and succeed in the relaunch of nuclear power, the sector will have to continue to increase its skills and recruit tens of thousands of people. This will take years. “We must not have any illusions. The construction context is not the same as in the 80s. Everything is more complicated, there is more administration. We will not make an EPR 2 in 5 or 6 years. This is not possible,” warns a specialist.
China is moving faster
China built the Taishan EPR in ten years. But how could we compete? “On the site, 10,000 people worked constantly, day, night, weekend,” confides an expert who visited the site several times. Today Beijing prides itself on being able to deliver civilian nuclear reactors in 5 years, but these are simplified, smaller and less powerful models.
Another concern for the EPR is its cost. “Due to our very complicated design and our security requirements, we are by far the most expensive on the market. However, not all customers have the necessary budget to equip themselves,” underlines a diplomat. India, for example, seems hesitant to buy after years of negotiations, citing cost issues but also the need to make local companies do more work.
“India has its cultural specificities which can slow down negotiations, argues Claude Jaouen. For example, the Bhopal disaster in the 1980s changed the law. From now on, the project manager can be held responsible in the event of “nuclear accident. This does not exist anywhere else. In general, States bear the risks.” Another specialist is annoyed: “we are being fooled. We have spent millions to develop the offer. There have been numerous visits on site. All this for not much. India has not put money on the table and she ultimately seems more interested in SMRs.
Would Flamanville’s setbacks discourage potential buyers? “There was a real drama surrounding the construction of this EPR with numerous announcements of delays or additional costs. This gives the image of an industry which was unable to plan how to manufacture a large piece of equipment,” agrees Yves Bouvier . However, the Chinese and Finnish EPRs are working. “Flamanville will get underway, that will reassure everyone. In a few years, many will have forgotten the cost and time slippages. It’s the same thing in Finland: the construction of the EPR dragged on and cost a lot very expensive. But now the Finns are very happy to have carbon-free electricity”, notes a nuclear expert.
Political choices
Oblivion effect or not, we won’t have to wait long to find out if EPRs are still popular. The Czech Republic will decide this summer whether it chooses the French model. Competition is tough with the Koreans, who are much more competitive. “It would be a disappointment if we did not win the market. When it comes to nuclear power, a European country should logically favor European technology. The sovereignty of the Old Continent is at stake,” underlines a French source. Except that in the field of energy, politics often plays spoilsport.
Recently, Poland chose the American AP 1000 for its future reactors despite the subsidies it receives from Europe and the difficulties encountered by the manufacturer Westinghouse on its construction sites. Certainly, the Americans cannot provide a completely integrated offer. This leaves room for the sale of fuel or certain equipment. But for France, it’s a cold shower. “Ukraine will also do with the Americans. There was not even a call for tenders, points out an expert who adds. “If we built 14 units here, plus a few others in England and the Czech Republic, we would increase, in total, to around twenty reactors. This would make it possible to reduce the costs of using the series effect. However, the EPR remains a very expensive machine intended for a small market. France will undoubtedly have more export opportunities with its SMRs.
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