Journalists, elected officials, advisors, diplomats… They all assiduously frequented the Elysée. Their other point in common? They were Kremlin spies. The KGB and its successors recruited these “moles” by banking on ideology, ego, sometimes compromise, often money. They had to report everything they saw. On special occasions, they were sent to poison the “Château”. Revelations on Russian penetration within French power, up to the Presidency of the Republic, from General de Gaulle to Emmanuel Macron.
Autumn 2022. Hervé Berville is summoned to the Ministry of the Interior. The Secretary of State for the Sea and Biodiversity has no idea why. The member of the government was told that he was the subject of an approach by the secret services… in Rwanda, the country where he was born, reports a source then close to the matter. The person concerned confirms. The “buffering”, as these contacts are called in intelligence, was direct. He was asked if he couldn’t help his home country. The elected official rejected the diplomat. Contacted to express his feelings about this episode, he did not respond.
French counter-espionage closely follows foreign diplomats in embassies in Paris or in consulates in the provinces. In addition to the “totem” positions, these foreign intelligence agents supposed to serve as liaison agents with their French counterparts within embassies, likely to spy in parallel, DGSI agents have learned to gauge the shady attitudes of ” diplomats.” During the USSR, KGB spies were recognizable by their free time and… their car models. Despite a modest position as embassy counselor, they drove BMWs or Volvos. Since 2012, the 27 member states have also shared a common file of foreign diplomats considered to be spies, within the framework of the EU Situation and Intelligence Center. Useful for flushing out Russian moles used to moving from one capital to another. “But we don’t go all out! We consider certain services in the East to be less reliable, sometimes corrupt…”, specifies a former leader of French intelligence.
The DGSI has specialized services for each threat. The legendary H4 division deals with Russian affairs, while H2 deals with China. They work in liaison with the S service, responsible for spinning mills. In the mid-2010s, it was observed that certain members of the Russian embassy followed DGSE agents in the street as they left the headquarters of the “Boîte”, boulevard Mortier, reports a French intelligence executive. When the agent becomes too enterprising, he is issued a “PNG”, an acronym evocative of the diplomatic decision to designate a foreign national persona non grata. He then has a few hours or a few days to leave the territory. Since 2017, Paris has, for example, expelled 46 diplomats in this way. Sometimes, we proceed differently, explains a former ambassador, a specialist in Russia: we simply let it be known that the visa will not be extended, in complete discretion. Alexander Makogonov, spokesperson for the Russian embassy, left France this way last September.
When an abnormal situation is noticed, the information goes up… to the highest level. Awareness-raising actions can be carried out with regard to personalities linked to undercover secret agents. Depending on the case, the DGSI, the Ministry of the Interior or an advisor to the President of the Republic may be mandated to “raise awareness” of the targeted person. According to our information, Jean-Pierre Raffarin was informed on several occasions of the presence, in his contacts in China, of false Chinese diplomats. These warnings seem to have ended up annoying the former Prime Minister, who is now cutting things short by claiming to know who he is dealing with.
The use of the telephone is not prohibited
At the Elysée, liaison with the DGSI is done via the chief of staff, sometimes in conjunction with the intelligence coordinator. Beware of anyone who mentions a classified matter on the phone or on a messaging service like WhatsApp, or even Signal, considered the most reliable application in the sector. For secret-defense messages, we communicate on Isis, a platform created by the operator of classified interministerial information systems, attached to Matignon. Videoconferences are held via the Horus system, from the same operator.
However, the use of the telephone is not prohibited. To prevent risks, Elysian employees are asked to regularly deliver their devices to the IT department, so that they can carry out a “screening” for spyware that may have been installed, a person close to the Head of State tells us. Some, like Pegasus, can infect a smartphone without a physical link with it and therefore provide full access to the content of messages as well as communications made from the device. In 2021, Morocco was suspected of having targeted the cell phone of Emmanuel Macron and 15 of his ministers with this software manufactured by the Israeli company NSO.
It now happens that “advisors conspicuously raise their eyebrows”, smiles one of them, when a collaborator enters Emmanuel Macron’s office with his device while he is in communication with a foreign counterpart. The General Secretariat of Defense and National Security (SGDSN) also provides training, at the Elysée and in the ministries, on the attitude to adopt when traveling abroad.
An alert concerning a former minister of Emmanuel Macron
However, there is no systematic control of the contacts that advisors may receive at the Elysée or whom they may see outside. “Everyone is considered knowledgeable enough to report situations that require it,” explains an advisor. Under Nicolas Sarkozy, the case of Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash divides the presidential entourage. Some employees, contacted by the person concerned, are surprised by the administrative difficulties encountered in France by this energy magnate, co-shareholder of a group with Gazprom, and close to numerous Russian interests. After a meeting at the Elysée in the presence of a director of Tracfin, financial intelligence, it was however decided to maintain vigilance with regard to this billionaire. He will be prosecuted by the FBI for corruption, and was placed under sanctions by the British government last month.
The entourages of the most sensitive advisors and senior officials are supposed to be the subject of an investigation, as part of their security secret clearance procedure. This is entrusted, with exceptions, to Division Z of the DGSI and launched upon their appointment; while waiting for their pass, they have provisional authorization, a rule that the secret services hate, since it allows access to the most secret information for sometimes several months. But “when for a member or a cabinet colleague, a clearance investigation in progress or a clearance poses a problem due to the discovery of a difficulty or fragility, we immediately send the message to the minister concerned without prejudice to other possible follow-ups”, testifies Louis Gautier, head of the General Secretariat of Defense and National Security (SGDSN) from 2014 to 2018. He is the boss of this institution attached to Matignon who issues authorizations, by delegation from the Prime Minister.
According to our information, the close advisor of an important minister of Emmanuel Macron has been the subject of an alert in recent years, about his links with China, while he was in charge of technological negotiations. He is quickly exfiltrated from his post. Ministers are not subject to a procedure of this type: their appointment to the government constitutes authorization at the highest level. This does not prevent the security services from carrying out their investigations. Under François Hollande, at least two ministers have been identified as particularly vulnerable to foreign interests. A minister of Emmanuel Macron was subject to the same reservations. “In these cases, we operate the old way: we keep the minister on edge, so, when we can, we don’t invite him to meetings, or we are very careful about what we say “, according to a former senior executive official.
Today there are two levels of clearance, “secret” and “top secret”, to which is added the “need to know” principle. This expression, popularized by the series The Legends Officemeans that we are only informed of what is strictly necessary for the exercise of our missions. It also applies to the defense councils organized around Emmanuel Macron at PC Jupiter, under the east wing of the Elysée. From the participant’s memory, it has happened that a minister, for example of Health, was asked to leave before discussing sovereignty issues. The agenda for these defense councils is never sent by email. A courier comes to hand it over to a duly authorized assistant. Only the minister and his chief of staff are authorized to consult it, tells us a source informed of these files. “These documents are numbered and watermarked. I also had a special font added for all our classified documents,” Louis Gautier also reveals. A way to trace any leak of the document.
“5% chance it ends badly”
Can you be empowered at the highest level by having family or in-laws in a hostile country where the dictatorship has all the powers? The dilemma concerned several recent advisors to the executive, who otherwise seem beyond reproach. Emmanuel Macron ruled: in the absence of other elements, family ties do not justify a refusal of authorization. A policy different from that of the DGSE, for example. Faced with the risks of targeted threats and blackmail, the “Box” almost systematically rejects applications from candidates with relatives in China or Russia. “In these cases, there is perhaps a 5% chance that it will end badly. Is it worth taking the risk?” asks a former intelligence director on this subject.
Candidates for authorization must first complete a form where they are invited to mention their travels abroad over the past five years and to describe at length those around them. Due to a lack of human resources – around 400,000 people have defense secret clearance in France – we sometimes stop there. For the most sensitive files, a team of investigators from the DGSI – or the Directorate of Defense Intelligence and Security (DRSD) for the military – interviews the person concerned. The most intimate subjects, such as sex life, lifestyle or spouse’s habits, can be discussed.
At the beginning of 2012, a particularly delicate case arose at the highest level of the State. The clearance investigation of a leader in the intelligence sphere resulted in a surprise. The senior official did not mention it, but checks revealed that he regularly meets an Indonesian national. Contacted, the DGSE expressed doubts about its possible relations with its country’s intelligence. Great discomfort at the Elysée and Matignon. According to four sources, the executive then decides… not to decide anything. The file is placed in the hands of the new team which will be installed from May in the luggage of François Hollande, the new president. In the absence of other elements, we then ruled in favor of maintaining the leader, despite the reservations of the DCRI (the former name of the DGSI) and the DRSD. The person concerned remained qualified at the highest level until 2021.
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