The illusion did not last long. On October 6, in Prague, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kyriakos Mitsotakis find themselves around the same table for the first summit of the European Political Community, a new format for discussion between forty-four countries, launched on the initiative of the French president. But hardly does the Turkish leader speak than the Greek Prime Minister leaves the room, as Erdogan said. Later, a journalist challenges the Turkish head of state on the threats he made, at the beginning of September, towards Greece. Athens “should get the message”, simply replies the latter.
You have to go back a month earlier to grasp the allusion. “We can arrive suddenly at night,” Erdogan said during a speech on the shores of the Black Sea, accusing Greece of having “violated” its airspace and “occupied” several islands in the Dodecanese, along Turkish coasts. “Greece, look at history, go back in time. We have only one thing to say: remember Izmir,” he added.
A real concern in Greece
Recep Tayyip Erdogan knows how to put Athens on high alert. By evoking the fate of Izmir, the Turkish president knows that he touches the Greek collective memory. In this town on the Aegean coast, a hundred years ago, the troops of the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, inflicted its greatest defeat on the Greek army. Victory celebrated in Turkey, the episode remains a trauma on the side of Athens, engraved in the minds as “the great catastrophe”. “This event led to theexpulsion of the populations greeks ofAsia Minor and is part of a major operation of Greek ethnic cleansing in Turkey”, underlines Georges Prévélakis, teacher-researcher and Franco-Greek specialist in geopolitics, who says he is “worried about Erdogan’s words”. “We are now afraid that his weaknesses on the internal level do not cause its headlong rush”, he explains.
Weakened as the presidential election of June 2023 approaches, Erdogan is toughening his tone abroad in order to seduce his nationalist electorate, against a backdrop of economic crisis and record inflation, at more than 80% over one year. “We are of course concerned, these declarations are unheard of, comments Alexandros Papaioannou, the spokesperson for the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We note that Mr. Erdogan, through his speeches, is preparing Turkish public opinion for such a contingency [d’intervention, NDLR]. We hope it won’t happen but we never know what can happen… These statements are also used by him to create a diversion, to avoid discussing internal problems.”
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, implicated in a phone tapping scandal involving journalists and politicians, is also facing domestic trouble. The fragility of these two heads of state fuels the verbal escalation between Greece and Turkey, each accusing the other of trying to destabilize it.
In their diplomatic contest, the two men also use migrants, who have been crossing the Greek-Turkish border for years to join the European Union. Mid-October, 92 refugees have thus were found naked on the Greek side of the border. Since then, Athens and Ankara have rejected each other’s responsibility for this humiliation, accusing each other of barbarism and lies.
Greek islands at the heart of climbing
All these current tensions are the result of a major historical dissension. For decades, Ankara has contested the sovereignty of certain Greek islands, which it considers “occupied”. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 draws the borders of modern Turkey, while the Dodecanese islands are still under Italian occupation. In 1947, the Treaty of Paris, signed by the allied countries, finally formalized the cession of these islands to Greece. But Turkey, which has not ratified it, contests. The recent discovery of hydrocarbons in the Aegean Sea, in areas claimed by the two countries, has revived these tensions.
These Greek islands are supposed to be demilitarized, according to the Treaty of Paris. But in fact, the Greeks installed permanent troops there, invoking their “self-defense”. This question of militarization is at the heart of Ankara’s rhetoric. Greece arms these islands “in violation of the treaties and thus gives [à la Turquie] the right to self-defence, thus publicly justified Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar on September 24.
“The Turkish Fleet [de l’Égée] is based on the Turkish coasts, just in front of our Greek islands. This fleet is one of the most important in the Mediterranean”, retorts, bitterly, Dimitrios Paraskevopoulos, former Greek ambassador to France (2005-2009) and director of cabinet at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009-2012). In fact, Greece has unfortunately had to spend money for decades to defend itself against Turkish aggression,” he said. Ankara’s actions “refer to the Blue Fatherland, a neo-Ottoman theory “, adds Dimitrios Paraskevopoulos. This doctrine – “Mavi Vatan”, in Turkish – affirms that the security of Turkey begins with “advanced lines” outside its borders, in particular at sea, which must be defended.
For years, Athens has maintained a large military budget, around 2 to 3% of its GDP – including during the debt crisis (2008-2018). In 2021, in the midst of a pandemic, these expenses for the army further increased by 63% over one year, from 3.35 billion to 5.44 billion euros. The length of military service has been increased from 9 to 12 months. A decision precipitated by the movements of a seismic research vessel Turkish off Crete.
At the same time, Athens takes care of its alliances. She can count on France, which has resolutely sided with Greece in its dispute with Turkey. At the beginning of 2021, Athens thus acquired 18 French-made Rafale combat aircraft, including 12 used. Then, in September of the same year, the two countries agreed to establish a strategic partnership for cooperation in security and defence. It provides, among other things, for mutual assistance, “by all appropriate means in their possession, if necessary the use of armed force” in the event of “armed aggression”. against the territory of one of the two countries. In March 2022, Athens formalized the purchase of six additional new Rafales and three Belharra frigates.
The United States, an essential ally of Athens
Greece is also intensifying its ties with Washington. “For Athens, it is a guarantee of security against Ankara, notes Ioannis Grigoriadis, researcher specializing in Turkey at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policies (Eliamep). The United States, for their part, have had to reconsider their alliances in the region, especially due to the deterioration of their relations with Turkey. In this context, Greece is a very reliable ally.”
In 2021, the Greek government has amended an agreement of cooperation with the United States, allowing Washington to access more Greek military bases, but also offering them “privileged” access to the port of Alexandroupoli (north-east), gateway to the Balkans, where military equipment intended to support NATO’s eastern flank. According to the US military, these Alliance reinforcement operations, developed since 2014, are a response to the Russian annexation of Crimea. A version questioned by Erdogan, whose country is nevertheless a member of NATO.
In recent years, Turkey has also continued to develop its own defense industry, in order to free itself from military dependence abroad. The annual turnover of this booming sector has increased from 1 to 11 billion euros in ten years. Its famous Bayraktar combat drones, exported to Syria, Libya and now Ukraine, are the pride of Ankara.