The war in Ukraine has accelerated the reconfiguration of alliances in the new world order, analyzes the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), an American think tank, in an in-depth study published on May 2. Faced with this new situation, the organization calls on Westerners to rethink their strategy with regard to the “pivotal states” such as India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Brazil. Otherwise, the latter “will fall completely into the arms of China or Russia”, analyzes the director of the Paris branch of the GMF, Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer. Interview.
L’Express: In this study, you describe the advent of a new international order. How do you define it?
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer : Two events favored this turning point: on the one hand, the war in Ukraine, which accelerated the erosion of the world order built after the Second World War. On the other hand, the competition between the United States and China, which deepens on several levels: technological, economic, political, ideological and military. This rivalry imposes a reading of the binary world and encourages us to position ourselves. However, all players outside the United States and China want to escape this bipolarity, starting with those I call the “Swing States”, the “pivotal states”, such as India, Brazil or Turkey.
These countries weigh in the current geopolitical game and choose fluctuating alliances according to the subjects. It is not a question of a non-alignment, because neutrality does not exist in geopolitics, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated it well: the States which do not vote for a resolution at the UN or choose to abstain are not neutral, they take a stand in another way. In reality, we have shifted from a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War to a strategy of multi-alignment. The pivotal states are seeking to develop simultaneous cooperation with the United States, Europe, China and Russia, but also with players in their region, in order to multiply their influence.
Westerners are indignant at this opportunist strategy, but it is quite classic…
Absolutely. Moreover, the Europeans are perceived by countries like India and China as pivotal States, because they maintain strategic partnerships with India, certain countries of Africa, Latin America, while being aligned with American policy on other subjects, and by cooperating with China on the climate, for example. The war in Ukraine was an electroshock for Europeans and Americans: today we are witnessing the collapse of a Western myth according to which, naturally, the Latin American and African states or India would align themselves with our vision of the world and our strategy. This is absolutely not the case.
A scene remains in my memory, it dates from 2010: I was at the Center for Analysis and Forecasting at the Quai d’Orsay at the time of the Iranian nuclear crisis. Brazil and Turkey had offered diplomatic mediation. And there, amazement in the Western chancelleries, where we then thought, outraged: “By what right do these countries position themselves as mediators?”
Today, we must change our outlook on the mediation initiatives undertaken by these so-called “global South” countries. The six states we analyzed in the GMF study [Brésil, Inde, Indonésie, Turquie, Arabie saoudite et Afrique du Sud] position themselves in this niche. We can think in particular of Brazil’s recent proposal to negotiate, with China and the United Arab Emirates, the end of the war in Ukraine; China’s 12-point “peace plan”; to the success of Turkey in concluding the agreement for the export of cereals via the Black Sea, or even to the recent Chinese mediation to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia… In short, crisis diplomacy n is no longer a domain reserved for Westerners. We are also witnessing a shift in Western software on this subject. A recent episode says it all: Joe Biden and Emmanuel Macron applauded with both hands the phone call from Chinese President Xi Jinping to his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky.
When Emmanuel Macron, after his visit to China, expressed himself on the need not to be “follower” of the United States on the Taiwan file, his remarks were freshly received…
Basically, the idea of a European policy not aligned with Washington on the subject of China can be a strategic asset for the Europeans, for relations in the Indo-Pacific space, but also potentially an asset for Washington: its preferred ally, Europe, would thus have a less conflictual position complementary to its own. The problem is the way Emmanuel Macron expresses himself on this subject, full of awkwardness. To say that the United States provokes China or that, in the event of an attack on Taiwan, one does not know what one would do, all of this is very clumsy. But, basically, this strategic complementarity makes sense and, in reality, Emmanuel Macron is saying out loud what many Europeans think to themselves, namely that Europe does not want a confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait.
Moreover, the head of American diplomacy, Antony Blinken, is increasingly adopting this language: he no longer speaks of “decoupling” from China. [ce qui signifierait une scission], but to “derisk” this relationship. The nuance is significant: this implies identifying the critical sectors where we are too dependent on Beijing (notably technology) and investing in these areas to strengthen our sovereignty. Americans and Europeans agree on the diagnosis in relation to the threat posed by China. But, in practice, what tools to deploy, a fortiori in the scenario of an invasion? There, there is discord. This is why I recommend that we completely rethink the transatlantic dialogue, not only with regard to China, but also with regard to the pivotal states. If we do not reinvest in relations with these countries of the Global South, the latter risk falling completely into the arms of China or Russia. For now, Westerners are struggling to compete with the so-called “shuttle diplomacy” of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in Africa and Latin America.
What does it consist of?
We can cite several examples: the tours of the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, and Chinese emissaries from one African capital to another; the Russia-Africa and China-Africa summits; the sending, in the middle of the war in Ukraine, of senior Chinese and Russian representatives to Brazil or Chile. It’s pure diplomacy, it allows Beijing and Moscow to strengthen their partnerships with these countries which, in turn, diversify their relations. The case of Saudi Arabia is interesting: in the absence of American leadership perceived as credible and solid, this Gulf State is increasing its partnerships, first and foremost with China. Riyadh needs investment and Beijing needs oil and gas. As a result, growing interdependence is emerging between pivotal states such as Saudi Arabia on the one hand and China and Russia on the other.
For Westerners, competition from Wagner’s mercenaries in Africa is indicative of this new geopolitics of alliances over which we currently have little control.
How can they go about turning the tide?
First, you have to change the narrative. Dividing the world into two camps, democracies against autocracies – “the West against the Rest [l’Ouest contre le reste du monde]” –, seems completely counterproductive to me. This policy of bipolarity is fueled by the Biden administration, breaking with the Trump era, but it contributes to alienating these famous pivotal states.
Second, we must not impose alignment choices on these countries. The Europeans and the Americans themselves are very pragmatic and have long since opted for “multi-alignment”, just look at the countries to which we sell arms: they are not always large democracies !
Thirdly, faced with the general breakdown of the major international organizations (UN Security Council, World Trade Organization, World Health Organization), we must invent more restricted and flexible formats of cooperation, in order to directly involve India, as well as countries in Latin America and Africa. Today, there is a Euro-American partnership which never ceases to work together; for the Indo-Pacific, there is the Quad [le Dialogue quadrilatéral pour la sécurité], which brings together the United States, Japan, India and Australia. Members of these two groups share many values, principles and strategic interests. Why not imagine this type of format with other pivotal states? Furthermore, we can also use existing forums, such as the G20, in a much more effective way to involve these countries in the conversation on subjects that directly concern them: food security, agriculture, drought… We must be more attentive to the concerns of these States in order to propose collective solutions.
You mentioned the “breakdown” of the UN Security Council. Many states in the Global South have been calling for its reform for years. Is it possible?
In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the competition between the United States and China, this reform does not seem likely: Washington already perceives international organizations as co-opted by China, which sees the current order as an institutionalization of the domination of the United States… In short, neither of these two powers will be able to resolve to accept any proposal from the other to reform the Security Council. On the other hand, the demand for “Swing States” to reform this institution is far from being purely symbolic: the under-representation of emerging countries, and in particular of African States, considerably undermines the legitimacy of this body, especially since a multitude of its decisions concern regions that are not shown.