The year does not begin auspiciously for the Russian army. On Wednesday January 4, Moscow raised the death toll of the Ukrainian strike which targeted its troops concentrated in a building in Makiivka on New Year’s Eve to 89. For its part, the Ukrainian army had reported on Sunday more than 400 dead and hundreds of wounded among Russian soldiers during this bombardment alone. For General Dominique Trinquand, military expert and former head of the French mission to the UN, this heavy toll is explained above all by the “major errors” committed by the Russian army.
However, at a time when the Ukrainian authorities are warning of a possible new wave of mobilization in Russia, the senior officer recalls that Moscow is far from having drawn a line under its ambition “to reverse the balance of power”. Maintenance.
L’Express: Is the Makiivka strike a major setback for the Russian forces?
General Dominique Trinquand: It is indeed one and in more ways than one. First of all, it is a confirmation of the amateurism of the Russian forces, which for more than ten months have been waging war without learning the lessons of caution. In the case of Makiivka’s strike, three major errors were made. Already, the Russians have concentrated a large number of soldiers in one place. Then they let these soldiers use their cell phones, which presumably allowed the Ukrainian forces to pinpoint their precise location.
And finally, they stationed these soldiers next to a large stockpile of ammunition, which further increased the violence of the explosions on the spot. These are three fatal errors that explain the heavy toll of this attack. Conversely, we can underline the fact that the Ukrainian army has shown remarkable efficiency, being able to locate and strike this site in just a few minutes.
The fact that the Russian army confirms – which is rare – first 63 dead, then 89 in a second time, does it confirm the thesis of very significant losses?
Absolutely. We have seen that the toll put forward by the Ukrainians is much higher, since they speak of around 400 dead. It is possible that the exact figure lies between the figures put forward by Moscow and those of kyiv. Moreover, the Russians had no choice but to recognize these losses insofar as the battalion which was struck was made up of soldiers all from the same region in Russia. In fact, information about this bombardment began to circulate very quickly on social networks in this locality, before spreading more widely to the rest of the country.
The information was in any case strongly commented on in Russia, with some military bloggers going so far as to denounce the “criminal negligence” of the Russian command…
It’s the case. When you are close to the front line, and you are not in a combat position, the rule that applies is the dispersion of the troops, not their concentration in one place. The responsibility of the Russian command is enormous, because this allowed the Ukrainians to maximize the number of casualties in just a few strikes. Now, one can wonder whether the responsibility for this fiasco lies with the battalion commander, who was not able to foresee this risk, or with his superiors, who imposed this totally absurd measure on him. What is certain is that there is an obvious command problem in the Russian army.
Does this event illustrate Moscow’s disregard for the lives of its soldiers?
Indeed, it can hardly be denied that Russia places little value on the lives of its soldiers. And there are many historical examples. Let us remember that at Stalingrad, the Russian soldiers sent to the front had behind them forces of roadblocks responsible for shooting them down if they ever tried to beat a retreat. There has always been in the Russian army this temptation to drown the enemy in a mass of men, even if it means incurring many losses.
Rally in Samara on January 3, 2023 in tribute to Russian soldiers killed during a strike in Makiivka (eastern Ukraine)
© / afp.com/Arden Arkman
Despite the fact that Russian demographics are much less dynamic today than they were then, this military culture still seems to permeate the Russian command. There’s always a temptation to use cannon fodder, even though I don’t like that term. This is evident with the Wagner militia, which sends untrained men to death in Bakhmout. Or with part of the soldiers who were mobilized in September and sent to the front without preparation.
The Ukrainian authorities fear a next wave of mobilization in Russia. If it is confirmed, could this rebalance the balance of power in favor of Russia?
We can fear it. It must be borne in mind that Russia is counting on the long term, and hopes in the long term to be able to mobilize enough men and resources to reverse the balance of power. I think two scenarios are emerging for the next few months. In the first, which in my opinion is favored by Moscow, the Russians will place themselves firmly in a defensive position, in order to stabilize the front and no longer experience the defeats they suffered in Kharkiv and Kherson. Then, their objective could be to gradually increase in power in order to relaunch offensive operations at the end of the spring, that is to say after the sludge of the raspoutitsa of March, April, or even May.
And what is the second scenario?
The second scenario depends on the ability of the Ukrainians to mount a counter-offensive quickly, to prevent them. This could happen when the ground has frozen sufficiently, that is to say between the end of January and February, depending on the weather. For the time being, it has been milder than expected and prevents the Ukrainian army from deploying its forces as it would like, insofar as the mud considerably complicates the maneuvers of its armored vehicles. But one to two weeks of freezing could allow their deployment.
At that point, the Ukrainians could take the opportunity to mount a counter-offensive and destabilize the Russian army, before it has completely stabilized the front, preventing it, de facto, from preparing a massive attack in the coming months. Now, will the Ukrainians benefit from favorable weather in the next 10 or 15 days? Then, will they have the necessary stock of ammunition to be able to launch an offensive? We cannot be sure. In any case, the Ukrainians have an interest in aiming for the short term, because the long term could pose a problem for them in the event of Russian reinforcement.
In a speech delivered in December, Vladimir Poutine had rightly recognized that this conflict was “a long process”. Are we witnessing a change in the speech of the Russian president?
Yes, and it’s pretty neat. In the first few months, he said everything was going according to plan. It’s no longer the case now. In a way, it’s an acknowledgment of his failure. The second point is that he is reorganizing the economy like Russian society, under the prism of this war. During his speech in front of 15,000 Russian generals, or during his New Year’s greetings, he spoke only of the conflict in Ukraine. For him, this has a double effect: already, to mobilize the means to put an end to the failures, but also to control Russian society and the narrative around this war more firmly.
Can Russians learn from their mistakes?
It all depends on what level you are at. At the tactical level, that is to say closer to the field, Makiivka’s strike shows that serious mistakes are still being made. This is explained in particular by the fact that the army is sorely lacking in non-commissioned officers. In fact, there are not many frameworks between the battalion commander and his soldiers, which leads to a significant number of bad decisions. On the other hand, at the operational level, the commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine, General Surovikin, seems to be learning from the mistakes of the past.
This was seen when he decided to withdraw his troops from Kherson, to concentrate his efforts elsewhere. The fact that Russian forces are now trying to consolidate their defence, probably with the idea of preparing for later attacks, also seems to go in the same direction.