While the authors of the coup d’état of July 26, 2023 had taken acts in the direction of diplomacy, the declarations of their leader, General Tiani, who decreed a transition of three years maximum to turn the page of the 7th Republic in Niger, put the cursor back towards a logic of confrontation with ECOWAS where everyone is camped on positions that are difficult to reconcile. Ads that distance “ a little the chances of finding a political compromise according to journalist and specialist in the Sahel, Seidik Abba. Interview.
RFI: Seidik Abba, were you surprised by the timing of the announcements by General Tiani, head of the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP), Saturday August 19 on Nigerien national television, while the delegation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was still in Niamey ?
Seidik Abba: It’s a real surprise. The CNSP had taken actions in recent days that seemed to reinforce the diplomatic and political option, by first authorizing President Mohamed Bazoum’s doctor to visit him; by receiving the ECOWAS delegation for the second time in better conditions, since the first time the delegation had been welcomed at the airport. This time, she was welcomed at the airport by the Prime Minister, but she was able to go to the city of Niamey afterwards and she was even received by the President of the CNSP, in person, General Tiani, with whom she had a working session. The ECOWAS delegation was also able to meet President Bazoum, whom we had not seen since July 26 [date du coup d’État, NDLR].
These are gestures that seemed to indicate an openness on the part of the CNSP. And then, almost suddenly, there was this announcement on Saturday evening of a transition that could not exceed three years. By doing this, the military perpetrators of the coup d’etat set the bar for discussion very high. For them, it is no longer a question of discussing the return to normal constitutional order, but of turning the page on the 7th Republic and considering the contours of the 8th Republic with the convening of a national dialogue which will define the conditions of power sharing during the transition. So that takes away the chances of finding a political and diplomatic compromise.
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How do you understand this choice on the part of the CNSP ?
The CNSP is on its agenda, has set up a government, recovered all the levers of power and finds a favorable echo in part of the opinion on these nationalist and sovereignist postures. He may think he doesn’t “need” to back down.
ECOWAS, for its part, by taking sanction measures against Niger even before having negotiated, has chosen a posture of confrontation. The CNSP, too, is preparing for it, considering that it has sufficient support, also on the side of Mali and Burkina Faso, not to give in to the injunctions of ECOWAS.
Do you think that the CNSP feels in a position to stand up to ECOWAS because the latter appeared divided on the possibility of a military intervention? ?
Contrary to what one might think, I think that ECOWAS can go so far as to intervene despite the random nature in terms of effectiveness and the serious implications that this can have. ECOWAS, let’s not forget, has not succeeded in imposing a balance of power on the military in power in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea and it considers Niger to be one coup too many. If it does nothing in Niger, that means it won’t do anything anywhere. For the regional organization, it is also in these terms that it is played. Despite the reluctance expressed here and there, and despite the somewhat ambiguous position of the United States, ECOWAS is determined to make this intervention.
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And concretely, I am not sure that the CNSP is in a favorable balance of power. Niger’s economy is very fragile. The sanctions have already started to be felt. Niger’s economy is less resilient than that of Mali. In the case of Mali, the large diaspora has played a vital role in the resilience of the economy. Niger does not have such a large diaspora. In addition to this, Niger has only one point of access to the sea, the port of Cotonou, access to which has been closed to it since the decisions of ECOWAS. These sanctions, for the moment, are fueling nationalist, sovereignist sentiment in Niger.
How strong is the solidarity displayed between the Sahelian juntas ?
There is a front of refusal, the desire to free oneself from the former colonial power. These are elements that federate. But from an objective point of view, if support were to be provided, it could only be at the expense of other commitments…
Read alsoNiger: General Tiani’s announcements are an “hermetic closure to dialogue”
The Malian armed forces, the Burkinabè armed forces are already engaged in the agenda of the fight against terrorism. Withdrawing them to remobilize them in the fight against ECOWAS can be counterproductive from the point of view of the fight against jihadist groups who are already in ambush and are just waiting for that to be able to take advantage, occupy the ground, progress territorially and descend towards the countries of the Gulf of Guinea.
The former president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, predecessor of Mohamed Bazoum, for his part, took time to speak.
He took three weeks to speak and in an unusual fashion because, usually, President Issoufou has been addressing Nigeriens for two and a half years since he left power through tweets on behalf of his foundation.
There he took three weeks, leaving his two predecessors still alive [les présidents Mahamane Ousmane et Salou Djibo, NDLR] react quickly after the coup. He chose a mode that is not particularly aimed at Nigeriens. That’s on the formal level… On the content level, there were no real positions taken in relation to the events. His position remained ambiguous. He did not even defend his record while the CNSP soldiers castigated his years of governance. These ambiguities mean that even today there is no clarity on the role he may have played during these events of July 26. In my opinion, it is in his credibility to clarify this. His speech was not enough to remove all the gray areas.
And meanwhile, the CNSP mobilizes in Niger on a discourse of rupture, while its leaders were part of the previous regime.
Yes, this is one of the facts which is interesting from the point of view of analysis. There were governance problems in Niger, that’s undeniable. We remember when the Court of Auditors published the declarations of assets of the leaders [en avril 2021, NDLR]. We have seen billionaire ministers, multi-billionaires… There have been scandals, problems of embezzlement of public funds, awarding of contracts by mutual agreement. All of this may have fueled the disappointment of many people who believed in democracy and who saw that democracy was going astray. They associate this with the PNDS [Le parti des présidents Issoufou et Bazoum, NDLR].
For this, the coup, whatever its reasons elsewhere, is perceived in Niger as a form of deliverance, which will make it possible to reshuffle the cards, to rebuild democracy, to start afresh on new bases. Many opposition activists hope this will reset the counters in the upcoming elections. It remains to be seen how long the transition will take…
But, in terms of the evaluation of economic and social governance or the results in terms of the fight against the security of the PNDS regime, some of the members of the CNSP cannot say that they are foreign to this. General Tiani led the presidential guard during President Issoufou’s two terms and during President Bazoum’s mid-term. So he’s not a total stranger to the system. But, beyond this ambiguity, people see the opportunity for deliverance, whoever brings it.
A novelty in the field is the mobilization of citizen watch brigades in Niger.
We lack objective elements to tell the extent, but the direction it takes is totally new for the country. Niger had refused to have citizen brigades for the fight against terrorism, despite the insistence of the populations. Until now, the policy has been to entrust policing and law enforcement missions only to the Defense and Security Forces.
When we enter this type of methods [la mise en place de milices citoyennes, brigades citoyennes, NDLR], there is a risk of slippage. We do not know who is supervising, what is the morality of the people involved. In my opinion, it is not in the interests of the junta to allow brigades to grow. It is better to let the defense and security forces do the work because they are legitimate and supervised.