Former fighter pilot deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina within Fropronu, promoted to air force general, Jean-Paul Palomeros served as chief of staff of the Air Force from 2009 to 2012. Within NATO, he oversaw, from 2012 to 2015, the military modernization of the Atlantic Alliance at the head of the Allied Command Transformation. After the incident of the missile falling on a Polish village, this Tuesday, November 15, he suggests that a kind of new “red line” be reestablished between NATO and Moscow, in order to prevent any risk of escalation in the war of ‘Ukraine.
L’Express: The tension suddenly escalated with a missile that caused the death of two people in Poland. How to assess the seriousness of the situation?
Jean-Paul Palomeros: What happened is serious. But it’s not serious. What would be serious is if a Russian missile had been deliberately fired by the Russians aiming at Poland and the Americans had outbid from the start. And if we had found ourselves in a logic of escalation. The tension would then have been difficult to relieve.
Is the scenario of a sudden escalation foreseen by NATO?
During the Cold War, it was anticipated. Specific measures were aimed at preventing a misunderstanding, or an error in interpreting the adversary’s danger, from leading to the outbreak of a confrontation between the USSR and the United States that was impossible to stop. There was the famous “red telephone” as well as concrete military agreements which had allowed the creation of buffer zones (“buffer zone”, in English) in the east of Europe, in particular on the border of the two Germanys.
In order to reduce the risks, the air forces on both sides had agreed that no planes or missiles would fly over the area. This was to avoid any ambiguity about the opponent’s intentions. It was necessary to remove all uncertainties, to rule out any misunderstanding that could have triggered an escalation. At the time the tension was extreme and it was a question of avoiding the worst. Gradually, as confidence grew, these measures became, in a way, “institutionalised”. Even though everyone was on edge, no unfortunate incident involving a missile took place. The current different situation is different.
That’s to say ?
A missile fell in a Polish village near the Ukrainian border and the large city of Lviv. It had never happened. Since the beginning of the conflict, there is always the risk that a missile deviates from its course or is badly programmed. But let’s stay measured. There is currently a vagueness on the situation, which disrupts the analysis a bit. What is involved is an S-300 style missile. However, this missile, of Russian manufacture, is used by the Russians and the Ukrainians.
The latter use it as an anti-aircraft defense missile (ground-to-air), which is its initial function, while the Russians also use it as a ballistic missile (ground-to-ground). This leaves room for interpretation. What is the nationality of the machine? It seems likely that it was a Ukrainian missile used in its original function but which crashed in Poland, either entirely or in the form of debris.
Is the idea that Russia intentionally fired a shot in order to test NATO’s reaction plausible?
I doubt. Firing a missile at a small border village cannot seriously be considered a test. Such a village is not a significant target. Moreover, the Russians have other fish to fry. Right now they have no need – or interest – to excite the Americans or NATO, or anyone else.
However, it is normal for the Poles to react strongly. The incident happened on their soil. They ask for a consultation meeting at NATO. This is normal and expected. This case will perhaps lead to a reflection on how to better control risks through dialogue mechanisms with Russia, such as existed during the Cold War. Because it is almost certain that this kind of incident will happen again.
Why ?
From the moment the war is also taking place on the Polish border, because Putin is targeting energy infrastructures and cities in western Ukraine (where many refugees live and through which a lot of equipment passes), c is a likely scenario. The closer the bombardments are to the border, the greater the risk that a missile will deviate from its course or be badly programmed.
So the escalation scenario exists?
If a missile crossed the border and struck a few tens of kilometers inside Poland or another NATO country, that would at least create an ambiguity. However, NATO doctrine consists in saying that if the slightest inch of NATO territory is touched, or threatened, by Russia, then the Atlantic Alliance reacts. The question would immediately arise as to whether the shooting was intentional. If that were the case, it wouldn’t matter, it would be extremely serious.
Has NATO foreseen all scenarios so that it is ready to retaliate in the event of a real attack?
All of NATO’s plans and work are about predicting the future. Many military exercises are conducted in this direction. And, since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, a big budgetary effort has been made, with increased planning and the reinforcement of Western forces on Europe’s eastern border. France is also present in Romania and in the Baltic countries, where we contribute to air safety.
“There will always be people, like Dmitri Medvedev, to blow on the embers”
Everyone knows that a massive frontal attack by Russia against NATO seems unlikely. On the other hand, an action carried out with a missile cannot be ruled out. It was to avoid this kind of thing that the NATO-Russia Council was created, which existed until 2014. Too bad we didn’t manage to keep it afloat because this consultation mechanism would be very useful today today. We are not exactly in a cold war, but we find ourselves in a risky situation.
The Americans warned a few months ago that they would destroy the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and all Russian positions in Ukraine if Moscow resorted to chemical or nuclear weapons…
It seems to me – and that’s good – that the discussion on the nuclear threat is falling like a puff, even if there will always be people like Dmitry Medvedev to blow on the embers. Everyone seems to come to their senses. Nuclear war is too serious a matter to be talked about lightly on a daily basis as if it were conventional forces. Nuclear power has regained its rightful place, that is to say a strategic place. Everyone is satisfied with it: Russians like us. If we can stop trivializing nuclear power, no one will be worse off.
Are the Russians afraid of NATO?
They know that it is a considerable force with a significant involvement of the United States and two other nuclear powers: France and Great Britain. Yes, the Atlantic Alliance is robust. But what frightens the Russians is what NATO represents, namely: an umbrella for democracies and freedoms. They know very well that NATO does not invade countries but that it is there to support nations that intend to defend their sovereignty. This is precisely why Vladimir Putin attacked Ukraine: he feels that the wind of democracy and freedom is blowing a little too close to its borders. From this point of view, his problem is not military, it is political.
What would NATO’s maximum response be in the event of a serious incident, for example if a missile fell on a Polish town or school?
We are entering a field that is both speculative and confidential. With NATO and the European Union, there is the principle of a graduated or proportional response, as shown by the series of political and economic sanctions already applied, not to mention military aid to Ukraine. The West has a global vision of the problem. And speculating on a possible scenario is difficult. In fact, everything would depend on the attitude of the two parties, in particular the attitude of the Russians. Would the Russians admit their mistake and flatly apologize or would they deny it altogether? It would make all the difference, because NATO has the means to know and prove the origin of any object flying over Ukraine.
In the event of an escalation, NATO would reinforce its presence at the borders. Would she lead a retaliatory strike? That’s the whole question. It all depends on the context, which is difficult to predict. There are plenty of science fiction books on the subject – which, moreover, are not necessarily wrong. Personally, I think it would take more than a stray missile strike to trigger an escalation. It would take a deliberate attack from Russia. But given the current balance of power, I hardly see how that could happen. But there are other scenarios. Military events can occur elsewhere, in the Black Sea, in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic Sea. In international waters or airspace. The war is not over.