At the end of the presidential election in March 2024, Putin will, in all likelihood, begin his fifth term at the head of Russia. And will add six years to a reign of terror that began 24 years earlier, which saw him profoundly transform post-Soviet Russian society. In the updated reissue of his work The Immortal Regiment, or Putin’s sacred war (Premier Parallèle, 2023), Franco-Russian historian Galia Ackerman explores how the head of the Kremlin, through the creation of a new national narrative in Russia, prepared the ground over the years for the war in Ukraine . “There is a very great responsibility on the part of Russian society and intellectuals for not having fought Putin’s regime more ardently, when this was still possible,” judges the author. Interview.
L’Express: In what way did the creation of a new national narrative by Vladimir Putin prepare for the war in Ukraine?
Galia Ackerman: Putin has been planning to invade Ukraine for a very long time. During an interview with American President George W. Bush in 2008, he stated that “Ukraine is not even a country.” Already, it refused to recognize it within its borders of 1991, the date on which the USSR ceased to exist. But at that time, the invasion of Ukraine was not feasible: it was first necessary to prepare the Russian population and the army, by mobilizing their minds. To do this, Putin began to forge a new national narrative, based on the cult of Soviet victory in World War II, the militarization of society, and the idea that the Russian people are “eternal and invincible.” .
In this regard, the phenomenon of the Immortal Regiment in Russia is very interesting: it is the catalyst for this aspiration. It is a momentous event for the regime, taking place every year on May 9, in almost every city across the country, to celebrate the Soviet victory in what Russians call the Great Patriotic War. [la Seconde Guerre mondiale]. Millions of Russians then gather for commemorative marches, taking with them portraits of those in their families who fought and fell on the battlefield. If initially it was a citizens’ initiative launched by three Siberian journalists, Putin very quickly took it up on his own, after understanding its mobilizing potential. It was a way for the government to reinforce the surge in nationalist sentiment. And it fit perfectly with his imperialist aspiration to annex Ukraine.
Has the war in Ukraine changed this new national narrative?
This new national narrative was important for transforming Russian society itself, but it was insufficient for Russia to gain support from other countries, particularly in what is now called the Global South. Indeed, for many countries in this sphere, the war in Ukraine was only considered a regional conflict that did not concern them. A new element was then developed by the Russian power: this messianic desire according to which Russia would be the spearhead of the fight against a West deemed neo-colonialist, and wanting to impose its system and its values, such as democracy, on other countries. and human rights.
Russian propaganda thus began to present Putin as a champion of anti-colonialism. Playing on this fiber resonated in certain developing countries which, due to their history, have held grudges against Westerners. Putin, for his part, did not hesitate to caress dictatorships, presenting himself as the man who lets authoritarian leaders govern as they wish, and in particular in a brutal manner. But behind its facade anti-colonialist arguments, it is above all a means for Russia to replace Westerners in the countries of the Global South, and to monopolize their wealth, in addition to obtaining their support at the United Nations or in other countries. other international institutions.
Isn’t it paradoxical for Putin to present himself as a champion of anti-colonialism, while he is waging a war to reclaim territories that were previously part of the Soviet Union?
Yes, it is indeed paradoxical. But the Russians never define the war in Ukraine as a colonial war, even though that is what it actually is. They deny themselves by claiming that they want to recover lands that they consider to be historically Russian. They have the conviction that everything they do is moral and justified by their “glorious past”. This therefore does not prevent them from positioning themselves as champions of the fight against neo-colonialism.
Moscow also relies on the image that the Soviet Union had in this area. In the 1960s-1970s, she was seen by many countries as the champion of the anti-colonial struggle, systematically supporting revolutionary movements in different countries that sought to achieve national independence. On the one hand because it weakened the West, but also because there was the idea that some of these countries would choose the socialist path.
What are the roots of Russia’s imperialist aspirations?
The roots are old. This imperialist aspiration has crossed the centuries and regimes: we found it under the Soviet Union, but it was already present under the Empire. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the idea was formed that the State had the natural vocation of expanding geographically so as to no longer be disturbed by its enemies. But contrary to the Russian narrative, this did not happen peacefully. Many peoples were repressed with extreme cruelty, such as the Chechens in the 19th century during the conquest of the Caucasus. It was the same then, during the communist era, in European countries such as Poland, or the Baltic States. We then found this old idea according to which any territory that had once been Russian must remain so.
This imperialist aspiration is materializing today in the form of the recent wars led by Putin, whether in Chechnya, Georgia or Ukraine. In Georgia, in 2008, Russia was satisfied with 20% of the territory, but above all it obtained great influence over this Caucasian country. This is what Moscow still aspires to today in Ukraine. If Russia does not manage to conquer it completely – which in my opinion is impossible – it will seek to destabilize the Ukrainian political system by all means, to try to impose a regime favorable to the Kremlin. This is already what happened with ex-president Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014).
Does the Russian population have any responsibility for the current situation?
In my opinion, the Russian people cannot be held responsible for the outbreak of war. This decision was taken by Putin and only a very restricted circle was made aware of it. On the other hand, there is a great responsibility on the part of Russian society and intellectuals for not having fought Putin’s regime more ardently, when this was still possible. Let us remember that when he came to power, there were still real political parties in Russia, many NGOs, a free press, and demonstrations were not repressed. But the Russians have moved very little.
Unlike them, Ukrainians fought for their freedom. And they won it. In 2004, when there were suspicions of fraud in the presidential election, they took to the streets in their millions, and won a new vote two months later. Then in 2013, when President Yanukovych reversed course by refusing to sign an agreement with the European Union, the entire country stood up, despite fierce repression. The Russians did none of this. In 2011, fraudulent elections to the Duma did lead to some protests, but at the peak, there were only 100,000 people in Moscow, and a few tens of thousands in the rest of the country. Why were there not more of them, in a country of 146 million inhabitants? Similarly, Putin’s re-election in 2012 resulted in only weak protests.
The moral responsibility of the Russian population is therefore to have allowed this to happen for so many years. Even today, we see this with the war in Ukraine: many Russians consider that it does not concern them and that they cannot do anything about it anyway. These are not the reactions of responsible citizens: Russians do not consider themselves the subjects of their own history. Faced with Putin, they prefer to suffer rather than fight.