The script was written in advance. While Xi Jinping was reappointed for a third term on Friday March 10, one of his trusted men, Li Qiang, was appointed Prime Minister on Saturday. The 69-year-old head of state has become the country’s most powerful leader for generations. And its course for the years to come is set: to put China back on the path to economic prosperity. For 2023, the government has set itself a growth target of around 5%, one of the lowest in decades. Internally or internationally, while the crisis with the United States, the challenges facing China are numerous. And the Chinese power wants to show that it is not shaken, estimates the historian François Godement, adviser for Asia at the Montaigne Institute.
L’Express: Does this re-election mark the culmination of the rise for Xi Jinping, who has become the country’s most powerful leader for generations?
Francois Godement: The term re-election is hardly appropriate for a unanimous vote where people applaud without interruption – which was the case for the election of the Prime Minister, even before knowing the final result. The renewal of Xi Jinping was expected, no one imagined that it could be otherwise. However, this scenario may surprise those who believed that Xi Jinping could be in trouble after the political and economic differences in the context of the fight against Covid-19. In reality, the Chinese head of state has locked everything down, creating a monolith of personal power. Among his former collaborators is therefore this new Prime Minister, Li Qiang, who was already at his side when Xi Jinping was party secretary of Zhejiang Province from 2002 to 2007. His relationship with the President comes from afar.
What does the appointment of this new Prime Minister change?
You have to have a mixed opinion about Li Qiang. Above all, he is a faithful, a loyalist, who applied containment in Shanghai with an iron fist last spring, when it was beginning to be challenged. At the same time, he is a technocratic apparatchik: he has proven himself in Shanghai with foreign investors. From this perspective, he looks like Xi Jinping who once knew how to be a corporate charmer. Li Qiang has this double face. Neither Li Qiang nor Xi Jinping are reformers, but they are introducing changes in governance. There will be, on the one hand, an absolute authoritarianism, increasingly under the control of the party and of Xi Jinping and, on the other, a developing technocratic governance.
Will Li Qiang have more leeway than his predecessor?
Former Premier Li Keqiang was not Xi Jinping’s candidate, the duo was imposed on him. Moreover, it has always been said that his own predecessor, Hu Jintao, would have preferred that the tandem be reversed, in other words that Li Keqiang be number 1. An economic law lawyer, he was a man of rules, who had been gradually marginalized. He had never, of public knowledge, formed a powerful personal clan. Xi Jinping had reduced it to its simplest expression, however, charging it with difficult tasks such as, since the spring, making announcements on policy related to Covid-19. Li Keqiang’s final speech, which received little applause, focused mainly on the economy.
How to explain that the position of power is not weakened after the failure of the zero Covid strategy?
The demonstrations somewhat masked the fact that the Chinese population is not made up of a single block on this issue of health control. Paradoxically, in major cities, including Beijing, residents continued to hunker down in anticipation of a pandemic wave after the zero Covid policy was lifted. The Chinese have a collective behavior that is quite different from other populations, especially Western ones. Even if there were many deaths linked to the pandemic from December, the population was then relieved to resume their daily lives. There is certainly a certain skepticism with regard to what the authorities say, but from there to becoming a factor of direct and frontal opposition… I don’t think so.
However, the Chinese population had to suffer the economic slowdown of the country…
Yes, it’s true. We can see that Li Keqiang’s report emphasized the creation of jobs for young people. Caution and concern about accumulated debts remain important concerns for Xi Jinping who wants a China invulnerable to external events and possible sanctions. China never transitioned to a consumer and service economy. It relies heavily on forced savings, but this growth model cannot be renewed indefinitely. It should be noted that the growth rate has been on a downward trend since 2010. The 5% target announced for 2023 will perhaps be easier to maintain: with the economic slowdown in 2022, it is possible that there will be an effect bounce. On the other hand, for the moment, I do not see the emergence of real revivals of consumption nor opening of the floodgates of credit.
Beijing accuses Washington of all ills. What are the challenges facing Sino-US relations?
Diplomatically, it is striking that Xi’s final speech, as far as the United States is concerned, is harsher in Chinese than it is in its English translation. Other speeches, notably by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, were the occasion for new warnings against the United States. With Washington, there is a short-term challenge which will be to maintain exports, which are the engine of Chinese growth. Indeed, in this regard, the European and American markets are the most important. For Xi, this success is also a triple dependence – technological, financial and political. He wants to make China invulnerable to sanctions. It has long been his project, to develop innovation to make China more self-sufficient – while selling his products to us!
How does the population view this pass of arms between the two powers?
My axis of interpretation is as follows: the more one arrives in educated and young strata, the more the opinions are clear-cut. They can be ultra-nationalist or, on the contrary, very attached to the integration of China into different political systems. The more you go towards the popular classes, the more manifests an attachment to peace and the fear of seeing China engage in conflicts. But on the other hand, the official propaganda repeats every day that it is the outside world that stirs up conflicts and attacks China.
How has the discourse of Chinese power with respect to Western countries evolved in recent months?
Since the end of December, we have witnessed a moderation of diplomatic language on certain fronts. However, we have great difficulty in seeing any concrete openings, particularly vis-à-vis the European Union. Chinese diplomacy is refocusing on what are called the countries of the “Global South”, in other words those which are the least close to Western standards and alliance. It is over them that Beijing wants to exert a predominant influence, thanks to its commercial power or its financial loans.
This is a global bypass strategy, not only of the United States but of the Europeans as well, just look at West Africa to see China’s progress in this area. Overall, she wants to show that she is strong, that she does not give up and that she has supports and friends. Finally, on the diplomatic side, there is something else on which Beijing’s speech proves to be influential: it is the part concerning the war in Ukraine. If one day we arrive at a negotiation, it will undoubtedly be done with sponsors around the table. China will no doubt be one of them.
How far can the Chinese threat to Taiwan go?
The noose is getting ever tighter as China’s military capabilities grow. Leaders refuse to rule out a conflict, which is nothing new. In reality, the answer to your question remains difficult, because it is necessary to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio of a military aggression. The invasion of Taiwan is not easy, with 160 kilometers of strait. Moreover, China can also observe what is happening in Ukraine. Logistically, China has never tested its military against another great power like the United States. But we have to hypothesize an invasion of Taiwan by China, as the declarations, the military preparations and the regular incidents suggest.