Fires, floods or droughts… The effects of climate change are intensifying and multiplying. They put to the test both the States themselves, called upon to adapt at full speed in the race against time for ecological transition, and international relations, due to the global challenge represented by the massive reduction in emissions. of greenhouse gases. A geopolitical recomposition has begun, against a backdrop of protection of natural spaces and exploitation of critical resources for the energy transition. Who could come out a winner? In Environmental geopolitics (Editions Que sais-je?), Adrien Estève, contract lecturer in international relations at the Strasbourg Institute of Political Studies, gives us the keys to understanding these evolving interactions.
L’Express: Will the powers of the future, just as they are today economic, military or technological, be ecological?
Adrien Estève: The logic of ecological powers already exists, with nations having responsibility for important, even critical, ecosystems, such as the Amazon for Brazil or the boreal forests in Russia. These nations can use them in international negotiations to bargain or blackmail their protection or destruction. Brazil has been doing this very well for a number of years, both under the Bolsonaro presidency, when it was a question of threatening to destroy the Amazon, and under the Lula presidency, where it was more a question of preserving it. This trend will increase as the ecological crisis progresses.
Could new powers emerge?
Many countries have forest areas that are being destroyed. I am thinking in particular of Indonesia, which has one of the most significant deforestation policies in the world. It has already started to present the preservation of its forests as an economic issue, and will be required to intensify it in the years to come to influence climate negotiations – rather in a threatening way. But it’s not just forests: countries with common assets, water areas, lakes for example, will be able to use them as elements of negotiations!
So this is only the beginning of this politicization of natural spaces?
In a world at +3 or +4 degrees and with the extinction of species as announced today, these ecosystems will prove even more critical. It is therefore very possible that it will increase.
You talk about natural spaces to be protected… But the energy transition is also giving rise to nations that have large deposits of crucial minerals and metals.
Absolutely. Rare earths for batteries perfectly illustrate this resource-related problem. China makes interesting use of it: contrary to what we often hear, it does not own the majority of rare earths, but it has the most advanced infrastructure for their processing and conversion into batteries. China therefore presents itself as a power from the point of view of energy transition due to its capacity to use and process these rare earths. We could also talk about other countries in the Asian region, such as Vietnam, which could play a big role in this new trade.
You write that the ecological definition of a power is not only based on the material aspect, but also on the identity that States give themselves in the transition. What do you mean ?
Some states are more symbolic and moral leaders: they position themselves as promoters of international efforts to protect the environment and the climate. France is the most eloquent example. It does not have extremely critical ecosystems under its responsibility, except perhaps via its overseas territories. On the other hand, since 2015 and the Paris agreement, she has clearly been a moral leader in climate negotiations. A position which is not always the most comfortable: France must be exemplary to maintain this status, and it is not necessarily so…
Does France have any other choice than to opt for this symbolic and moral position?
Due to lack of resources, not really. If France wants to be a climatic or ecological power, it must therefore rely on this moral vision. This posture is in line with the country’s foreign policy in other areas. Since de Gaulle, France has relied on Enlightenment thinking and positioned itself in a form of exception, that of a multilateral power with a particular role in the world. It is therefore part of its identity beyond the climate, even if it adopted a very obvious moral tone on the matter thanks to COP21.
But in a logic of transition and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, will material powers not gain the upper hand over symbolic powers?
It depends on the vision we have of the evolution of the crisis. We are heading towards a deterioration of the climate, the IPCC shows that the commitments do not match the ambitions of the Paris agreement. This situation therefore speaks in favor of the material powers, because the ecosystems they possess will prove to be more and more critical. They have more leverage in negotiations: the transition will not happen without them.
However, we must not neglect the symbolic powers, which will remain important. And we must not forget the moral weight represented by the Paris commitment, and more generally the agreements. Furthermore, rather powerful states position themselves in a hybrid manner. I’m thinking of the United States. When a Democratic administration is in place, it promotes multilateralism and embraces a position of moral leadership. But when it is not in power, a more material vision takes hold. Donald Trump wanted to open oil and gas pipelines in the north of the United States to exploit shale gas – which is still being done under Joe Biden – and has done a lot of blackmail to ecosystems.
Isn’t it a luxury to be able to “choose”?
It is a luxury of large states, in terms of size, which have de facto critical ecosystems on their territory and at the same time a very active foreign policy. The case of the United States is emblematic, but we could take the example of Russia. Even if a change of regime is not planned immediately, Russia, if it had a government that played more of the game of international climate negotiations, could also perfectly achieve a mixture of the two, given the size of its territory. China also does this very well, sometimes pushing for climate negotiations, and often blocking them with ecosystem blackmail.
The size of States is obviously a variable that should not be neglected. But some nations, thanks to significant mineral resources on their soil, are very powerful, or have the potential to become so. An example: a race for hydrogen is currently underway. Countries are positioning themselves in Latin America, Argentina is making a lot of progress on marine hydrogen, Chile too. Imagine the seafront of these countries. There is a recomposition at work with the energy transition and nations, perhaps smaller, will have more leadership on certain subjects.
Could other energy sectors reshape relations between countries, and therefore the notion of ecological power?
Nuclear. France is the most important promoter, particularly in Africa and Asia. It will be necessary to closely monitor its diffusion in order to really see if the elements of decarbonization will be structured around nuclear power, and if there will be nuclear powers other than France in the years to come. Certain areas will mainly focus on solar: the United Arab Emirates, China. This source of energy appears to be a solution for the future, even if, I want to be very clear, we are still in oil for at least fifty years. The energy transition has not started: we remain with transport systems and infrastructures made for fossil fuels. This recomposition will take time.
Transition powers already exist, but remain secondary to those of hydrocarbons and fossil fuels, such as the United States and the Emirates. You just have to look at what is happening today in Guyana, with the interest around this oil field. Relations between powers continue to be largely dictated by hydrocarbons, even if States are preparing for the shift. In international negotiations, the promotion of ecosystems is emerging more quickly than the issues of energy transitions.
Do other countries have a card to play?
African countries, particularly from the point of view of the conservation of tropical forests. The Congo, and more generally the countries of West Africa, have the possibility of preserving large areas of forest which they partly own. Real trade-offs are taking place today between economic interests, for example around cocoa, associated with more deforestation, and the conservation of ecosystems, allowing certain countries to present themselves as important and essential, within an ecological Africa. .
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