The war in Ukraine makes Europeans aware of their weaknesses as much as of their strengths and their abilities to overcome crises. Specialist in European construction, Sylvain Kahn demonstrates this in his new book, Europe versus Ukraine (PUF, released February 14), a plea that is as argued as it is concise.
“All European parliamentary majorities – with the exception of Hungary – say that Russia must withdraw from the invaded Ukrainian territories. But to achieve this result, we must change gear, believes this researcher at the Center for history of Sciences Po in the interview he gave to L’Express.
L’Express: What does the war in Ukraine reveal for Europeans?
Sylvain Kahn: They were made to become aware of what they had built together in the face of the radical otherness of Russia on their borders. This triggered a war to achieve its ends, while the Europeans have not done so for three generations and the launch of European construction in 1950, an unprecedented bifurcation in their history. Thus, France and the United Kingdom have retained in their political culture the use of their army, but almost never again to resolve a dispute with a neighbor. Another new fact, Europeans are experiencing a fear that they no longer felt: that of being invaded, bombed and of no longer being free. One of the fathers of Europe, the Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak, at the UN in 1948, addressed the Soviets by telling them “you scare us”. This fear was one of the elements that pushed the Europeans to close ranks.
What is truly new in the European response to this war in Ukraine?
The Europeans have decided to materially support a belligerent, the attacked Ukraine, by supplying it with weapons. While not waging war and not committing their armies, the Europeans clearly took sides.
However, it is difficult to see the European “war economy” being put in place in the face of the Russian industrial machine…
The majority of public opinion in the Twenty-Seven is in support of the Ukrainians. But how far? The Europeans have not fallen into a “war economy”, to use Emmanuel Macron’s slogan; they should ask themselves if they want to do it and debate it. For what purpose? All European parliamentary majorities – with the exception of Hungary – say that Russia must withdraw from the invaded Ukrainian territories. But to achieve this result, we must change gear.
The European Union has accelerated the process of integrating Ukraine as a member state. Is this realistic for a country with such a border dispute, even if the war ends?
There is a precedent, that of Cyprus, which joined the EU while the northeastern third of the island was occupied by a foreign army, that of Turkey, the only country to officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Cyprus. North. Cyprus nevertheless returned because the European Union made significant efforts to promote the reunification of the island – rejected, during a referendum, by the Greek side in 2004. The scenarios of accession while a country is waging a war or its territory is partly occupied by a foreign army are not included in the treaties.
Certainly, in the case of Ukraine, the aggressor is Russia, one of the main military powers, with the world’s first nuclear arsenal. But nothing is set in stone, because since the start of European construction, each enlargement has been treated as a singular case. Ukraine’s accession will be a very political sequence and we cannot know how we will see things in a few years on this subject.
You insist on European acceleration since 2020 and the end of a “fifteen-year crisis” that began with the rejection, by the French and the Dutch, of the Constitution for Europe. What changed ?
Currently, for the majority of public opinion, Europe is seen as part of the solution, or even is the solution. Whereas during this “15-year crisis”, the dominant feeling was that Europe was part of the problem, or even was the problem. The change came with the way Europeans responded collectively to the Covid epidemic and its consequences, and not just to buy vaccines together.
What do you mean ?
The history of the EU is a succession of crises and moments of recovery, when a whole bunch of problems are solved at the same time and the EU sees its construction dynamic relaunched. It’s schematic, but accurate. This was the case during the 1984 European summit in Fontainebleau. On a proposal from Chancellor Kohl taken up by President Mitterrand, it was decided that Jacques Delors would be the next President of the Commission, while recurring budgetary problems were resolved suddenly with an increase in financial resources and a reduction in the British participation.
There was something of the same order in the European response to Covid, with a plan to revive their economies via the invention of an unprecedented debt system and European treasury bonds. It’s a qualitative leap in the skills they share together.
In your book, you also highlight the role of Brexit…
Brexit did not give rise to a domino effect towards European deconstruction. On the contrary, it has brought about, from 2017, unfailing cohesion and coherence among the Twenty-Seven. Faced with a totally disorganized British political class, the chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, with a dedicated team of around fifty people and the support of all Commission services, obtained a very defined and solid mandate.
Then, in 2018, the Greek state was able to issue treasury bonds again on the financial markets, with the lifting of the supervision of its troika donors [NDLR : la Commission européenne, la Banque centrale européenne et le Fonds monétaire international]. Unemployment was falling and growth was rising. Then, negotiations for a free trade agreement between London and the EU were concluded just before Christmas 2020, in the middle of Covid.
When this epidemic and the invasion of Ukraine presented themselves, the Twenty-Seven, although they were picked up cold, were able to mobilize very quickly, because they were already doing unprecedented things together with cohesion. The speed with which Europeans supported Ukraine and sanctioned Russia had as a precedent the speed in fighting Covid. The state of mind allowing the relaunch of European construction is once again at work.
According to polls, far-right parties will win seats in the Strasbourg Parliament. They thrive on the idea that Europe is being built against popular sovereignty…
Citizens and political movements remain attached to the exclusively “state-national” form of democracy. However, popular sovereignty, this desire to make decisions together to decide on a common future, is changing. There is a parliament elected by universal suffrage, but also a chamber of states, the Council of the European Union, where the representatives of the 27 governments resulting from parliamentary elections meet. If there is no European nation there is, in any case, a European society and a European political regime which does not exist anywhere else in the world: nation-states that are both sovereign and federated in a supranational political life.
The extreme right is almost no longer in favor of leaving the European Union. What do they want to do with it?
The AfD [NDLR : parti d’extrême droite allemand, en deuxième position dans les sondages] seems to be hesitating and is talking about a referendum again… Most of the Europhobic parties, which consider that we must leave the EU, have however become Eurosceptic, like the National Rally of Marine Le Pen or Fratelli d’Italia by Giorgia Meloni. They criticize the EU, want to “reform” it, but not to the point of breaking it. They realized that their voters are not at all convinced by Brexit, also calculating that leaving the euro would have consequences on their salaries, their savings and their purchasing power.
As for knowing what they want to do with it, the doctrine to follow is that developed by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, very critical of European elites. He says that they must not restrict national sovereignty, while recognizing that Europeans must do things together. But behind this vision, there is no plan to reform the institutions.
What are the next frontiers that the EU can push back?
The common agricultural policy, the CAP, should be transformed into a European food policy, so that it concerns the entire ecosystem in which producers are integrated, with distributors, research, consumers, etc. All the political levers for such a policy would need to be found at European level, with a decision by Parliament. Even if it is complicated, it would be important to Europeanize the industrial policy of defense and rearmament for good.
Would the victory of a Trump or an isolationist president in the United States be, paradoxically, good news for European construction, pushing the Twenty-Seven to rely less on Washington in the area of security?
President Trump did things he didn’t say, said things he didn’t do, and sometimes did the opposite of what he said. While being very critical of the interests of the Atlantic Alliance, he strengthened the American presence in the European Union by notably increasing the number of soldiers in the countries on the eastern border. Furthermore, he was not the first American president to emphasize that Europeans tended to rely on the contribution of the United States to ensure the defense of their territory, within the framework of NATO.
Would it be reasonable to integrate the countries of the Western Balkans, given Serbia’s proximity to Russia and Bosnia’s political sclerosis?
Nostalgia for a small Europe makes no sense. European construction is characterized by the extension of the territory of the EU according to free and voluntary membership. There were four waves of enlargement from 1973 to 2013, where the EU grew from 6 to 28 countries – only to withdraw in 2020. Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission, hand in hand with the European Council and Parliament launched the fifth wave in 2022.
Because Russia is very aggressive, the Europeans are making the diagnosis that the countries of the Western Balkans, as well as Moldova, Ukraine, and perhaps Georgia, would be less destabilized – and less destabilizing for them – by being more anchored to the EU. It’s a risky bet. It would not be coherent to bring in those from these countries whose society has a majority preference for nationalist parties, who are not shocked by corruption and who feel attracted by the Russian regime. But nothing is set in stone, on the contrary.
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