JERUSALEM Israeli intelligence completely failed to anticipate the bloody attacks of the terrorist organization Hamas on the seventh of October. This left Israel, considered an intelligence superpower, deeply wounded.
There is going to be a big cleanup. Israeli military historian specializing in intelligence Danny Orbach believes that after the war in Gaza, none of the political, military or intelligence leaders will be allowed to retain their posts.
– In particular, the management of internal intelligence and military intelligence has not been capable in its tasks.
Danny Orbach says that Israel failed because Hamas was able to keep its intentions very well secret and known to a small circle.
In addition, the planners of the attacks communicate very little on cell phones or otherwise on the internet. Information passed through face-to-face conversations.
– In the end, many of the attackers found out about the operations only at the last minute.
The interpretation of the intelligence information was lame
According to intelligence historian Orbach, Hamas destroyed several Israeli reconnaissance balloons intended to monitor Gaza. The Israeli army interpreted the threat as saying that it is enough to fix the issue after the holidays. Hamas carried out its attack early Saturday morning.
In Orbach’s opinion, Hamas was able to surprise Israel precisely because Israel did not interpret the intelligence it received and the events on the Gaza border correctly.
– Strategic failures are often caused by bad interpretation of intelligence information, and not so much by bad data collection, he says.
Another major failure, according to Orbach, was the failure of Israeli intelligence to grasp Hamas’s broader goals. Israel assumed that Hamas wanted to cause mayhem and confusion in the West Bank.
According to Israeli intelligence, this was more logical because Hamas controls Gaza, but not the West Bank. Therefore, it would make more sense for Hamas to “set the West Bank on fire.”
– Hamas misled Israel and gave signs that it would operate in the West Bank, Orbach says.
To top it all off, Hamas’ exercises at the border were interpreted as just regular exercises, not as preparation for an actual attack.
– That’s why Hamas completely surprised Israel.
Border forces in unte countries
The Israeli army and intelligence were also on the move when the attack began.
In the middle of the night, several hours before the first Hamas attack, the Shin Bet, or the Central Intelligence Service, had an evaluation meeting, where it was understood that something special was happening.
– They estimate that it is perhaps a small-scale attack. They sent a quick action strike force to the border. It wasn’t enough, historian Orbach says.
According to him, no one can still say why the intelligence did not have a correct picture of what was to come even at this stage.
A wider alert was not given to the forces near the Gaza border at that time either. They slept in their rooms.
– When the attack started, it was not realized that a brigade’s worth of fighters, i.e. at least 2000 men, were coming to the border.
According to Orbach, the army probably thought that a small terrorist attack on one or two kibbutzim was being attempted across the border.
– The army did not react the way the threat demanded. If it had been awake, all the troops that could fire would have been alerted.
Fresh intelligence people non-intellectual
Danny Orbach sees a few big root causes behind the intelligence’s problems. One is the educational background of the persons recruited for intelligence. New arrivals have even less intelligence training.
Instead, people with combat training come to the intelligence. According to Orbach, they have a good understanding of military practices and field operations.
– I think that the intelligence lacks professionalism. People are a bit unintellectual in a way.
Orbach thinks that the new guard that came to intelligence is more interested in what to attack in Gaza and how to carry out targeted assassinations.
According to him, they want to prevent terrorist attacks and are interested in counterespionage, but a deeper knowledge of the long-term strategy of Hamas and the Iranians is missing.
– We have not considered the thinking of Hamas and the fact that it is an ideological organization. It can be pragmatic, but its thinking is guided by ideological goals.
Orbach’s view is that the long-term strategic goal of Hamas and Iran is the destruction of Israel. The October attacks were part of this strategy.
Benjamin Netanyahu is responsible
Danny Orbach sees the intelligence problems as part of Israel’s broader political and strategic problems.
– Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the strategy has completely failed. And it’s not just Netanyahu, but the entire political system.
So Orbach is calling for a complete overhaul of the entire political, military and intelligence leadership.
According to him, the current right-wing government’s Hamas strategy is now at a dead end.
Both Netanyahu and the far-right finance minister Bezalel Smotrich have said several times that Hamas in Gaza is useful for Israel.
– This strategy is now scattered. Since Netanyahu has been in power since 2009, he is responsible for this, says Orbach.