The lazy assertion that France would have failed in Mali deserves, a few days after Emmanuel Macron’s announcement of the end of Operation Barkhane, a spell. First, we cannot seriously speak of success or failure without returning to the original objective of the operation launched by François Hollande in January 2013: to prevent a jihadist troop – which was advancing rapidly towards Bamako after having occupied and martyred several cities of Mali – to seize the capital. The victory was all the more indisputable and precious since no other power would have been able to dispatch such high quality human and material resources in a few hours and since, without it, a Muslim capital would have been conquered for the first time. by jihadists. It should be added that, since then, the latter have invested neither in Bamako nor in any major Malian or Sahelian agglomeration.
Operation Barkhane is a failure for those who mistakenly think that it also had the mission of resolving corruption, social mismanagement, clanism or even interethnic rivalries (in this case linked to the Tuaregs of the North) – none of these scourges unfortunately widely present in sub-Saharan Africa being unfortunately exclusive of the others. The late Malian president did not ask this of France, which was not in any case the vocation, despite the aid granted to the country. Under the pretext of a complex social, political and societal situation and a fragile regime, should France have allowed the jihadists to destroy the Malian state and its neighbors? On this account, we should never intervene anywhere – including in the face of crimes against humanity -, each situation threatening by its complexity the guarantee of total success. This self-deductive process is absurd.
Fault, then, to have “conquered” the heart of the Malian population, France would be rejected today. No referendum, no serious opinion poll or the slightest vote can bear witness to this. Protesters chanted anti-French slogans? Certainly, and they have the right to do so. But how many times? In how many localities? How many were they? And how many of them were paid by Wagner’s Russian mercenaries? The junta resulting from a double coup d’etat has chosen to drive out France, it is its choice; but let us beware of subscribing to its propaganda and that of Moscow by making it the faithful translator of a popular infatuation. For once, he had really accompanied the arrival of French forces against the Islamist barbarians who had already massacred thousands of Malian women and men and ransacked a number of sacred places, particularly in Timbuktu.
Has the French army defeated jihadism in the Sahel?
Another criticism: the French army has not defeated jihadism in the Sahel. Most modern wars are asymmetrical and take place between a state and sub-state groups. However, when the State is democratic and its enemies are fanatical in search of “martyrdom”, the first fights with an obvious political handicap. Losing dozens of soldiers is in this respect morally very painful for France, but not for the jihadist groups released from any obligation. We recognize the failure of the G5 Sahel, except that it is attributable to the weak will and ability of several Sahelian armies to coordinate and act powerfully.
Last but not least, many overlook a fundamental aspect in geopolitics: credibility. Let us sum up: 1) the sovereign Malian State is calling on France for help, like most of its Sahelian neighbours, the latter and still others, duly allied, retaining at the time when these lines their request for a French military presence on the ground; 2) France continues to represent itself as a global power, embodying this representation through substantial human, political and budgetary efforts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa; 3) it is already suffering very harshly on its soil from radical Islamism, which it fights elsewhere. And, despite these three authentic realities, France should have abstained in 2013? She should flee the area in 2022? With what disastrous consequence on its political credibility and its economic presence in the Middle East, in Eastern Europe, in the Indo-Pacific?
The French military presence in the Sahel is not the remedy for everything. Interrupting it would be disastrous.