A new sequence opens in the history of French nuclear deterrence. The anti-European outings of the new Trump administration are undermining the security balances in place for decades. The future chancellor Friedrich Merz affirmed his desire to emancipate Germany in the United States, with whom confidence seems broken. He called for responding to Emmanuel Macron’s offer of strategic dialogue on the protection that French nuclear weapons can bring to their European allies.
During His speech of March 5 and three days earlier at Figaro – to whom he confided in his return trip from the London summit -, the French leader confirmed the in progress and given some tracks. But this rapprochement could take time. “We must listen to what other European countries want, it is also up to us to adapt to build a real European defense,” said researcher Florian Galleri, author of a thesis on the “European dimension of French deterrence” since the end of the Cold War. Interview.
L’Express: Emmanuel Macron, in his speech on March 5, announced that he was going to respond to the “historic call” of the future German Chancellor, Friedrich Merzto open a “strategic debate on protection by our deterrence of our allies from the European continent”. How is it a turning point?
Florian Galleri: You will have to see how it will happen, but it is a turning point. Emmanuel Macron has multiplied the proposals for dialogue, but that did not interest German chancellors. In the past, in 1996, there was a response to “concerted deterrent” proposed by Prime Minister Alain Juppé to the Germans, in the form of a common Franco-German security concept, specifying that French deterrence participated in the security of the continent. But the subject then became less in tune with the times and was put under the carpet. This as much as Germany benefits from the nuclear umbrella of the United States and that there are American nuclear weapons on its soil. But the new Trump administration has changed the German approach.
This “European dimension” of French deterrence, mentioned by Emmanuel Macron, is not new …
Yes, since General de Gaulle. The deterrence is there to protect the vital interests of France from an external aggression. France has always had vital interests beyond its borders. During the Cold War, this concerned for example the French troops stationed in Germany. The European dimension also was due to the fact that the Soviet, massive threat concerned the entirety of Western Europe.
Another “European dimension” really emerged during the second presidential term of François Mitterrand. In 1992, before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, he opened deterrence on a European horizon, even evoking a possible “European doctrine” to “design”. But two points brake this. First, the other European countries are not very interested. Then, the French vision of deterrence remains very sovereign. In 1995, Prime Minister Alain Juppé proposed a solution: a “concerted dissuasion” with reunified Germany. There has been a continuity of speech since.
How did European countries perceive, until the second Trump administration, the affirmation of this European dimension of French deterrence?
This varied from one country to another. Most were not interested. Poland, she was interested, but she first wanted the American guarantee, perceived as more credible. Some countries were already very worried about the departure of the Americans and wanted to accentuate their military anchoring in Europe. But the war in Ukraine has enhanced interest in French deterrence. And this is even more the case with the new Trump administration.
Many European countries believe that Russia’s nuclear aggressiveness calls for nuclear protection in response. But it seems less and less certain that Donald Trump is ready to add, to risk his population or his interests, to protect a European country attacked by Russia. This means that there would be no nuclear counterweight to Russia on the continental level.
In Le FigaroEmmanuel Macron began to mention participation in exercises, even nuclear weapons positioned in allied countries …
Discussions with European countries and proposals exist. The participation of partners in our nuclear exercises would allow them to integrate our way of doing things. But it would also feed our deterrent practice, more open to Europe. Park weapons abroad would significantly expand the French nuclear shield. An attack on these nuclear weapons deployed outside the border would be at high risk for an adversary: it would call a significant response to restore deterrence. In the president’s confidences at FigaroI note that it is the first time, in the history of French nuclear deterrence, that the president has sketched concrete measures. It is a very great novelty.
Do we have an idea of the form that such a “extension” of French deterrence could take with arms parking abroad?
From a technical point of view, this requires creating bases capable of storing French nuclear capacities, such as Asmpa missiles that Rafale can take. These bursts could patrol near the borders of partner countries. An example: if we park burst in Finland, this gives another practice of French deterrence because they would have the ability to hit, potentially, nuclear submarines of Russian machinery from the Mourmansk base. Currently, it can only be air capacities, because we no longer have terrestrial missiles, such as the Hades dismantled by decision of Jacques Chirac.
There have been very few debates in recent years on nuclear deterrence. In your thesis, you recall that this nuclear question has however remained central in French political life …
There were until the 1990s. Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin opposed the interest of taking over the nuclear tests during the in-between of the 1995 presidential election. The “Franco-German concept in terms of security and defense” then aroused reactions from the left, when it was in opposition, but also of the sovereignist part of the right. European questions were then highly debated and the Cold War was barely over. During the Euromissile crisis in the early 1980s [NDLR : des missiles de portée intermédiaire installés par l’URSS et les Etats-Unis sur le sol européen]we talked about nuclear weapons at the opening of the 20 -hour newspaper to explain what a missile of intermediate range is, what a long -range missile is. The deterrence was at the heart of the news.
Can the nuclear question become central again?
It has already started to be a subject of debate and friction, as was recently in the National Assembly. The problem is that the parties that defend a European dimension of French nuclear deterrence speak very little, if not because only the president has its use and therefore fixes the philosophy of use. Result, the most audible on this question are those against, but are based on untruths, like those pronounced by Marine Le Pen, or more recently by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who said that there was no European dimension. By the way, it can be noted that they are to maintain a nuclear deterrence.
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