Drone attack on the Kremlin: “Putin can use it to justify national unity”

Drone attack on the Kremlin Putin can use it to

kyiv and Washington in the dock. Russia on Thursday (May 4) accused the United States of ordering the alleged drone attack on the Kremlin in Moscow, which it blames on Ukraine. The day before, Russia had claimed to have intercepted two Ukrainian drones, denouncing an assassination attempt on President Vladimir Putin. Volodymyr Zelensky denies any involvement, and the United States questions the Russian accusations.

This “attack” comes as drone incursions and acts of bomb sabotage have multiplied in recent days on Russian soil. The Kremlin’s accusations surprised many analysts. General 2ᵉ section Jérôme Pellistrandi, editor-in-chief of the national defense review, explains why Russian statements lack credibility.

L’Express: What are the different hypotheses on the table after the explosion of two drones on the Kremlin? A “staging” of Moscow, as accused by Ukraine? An attack carried out by the Russian opposition?

Jerome Pellistrandi: The images provided by the Russian media give the impression that these drones are flying at a relatively slow speed. One would think that they are quadcopter drones, that is, with a small explosive charge, since we see that the explosion is not very large and the damage is extremely minimal.

If so, that means those drones never left Ukraine. They presumably took off from the suburbs of Moscow. In any case, wanting to assassinate Vladimir Putin with this type of device is totally illusory. Especially since we know that the Russian president does not live in the Kremlin.

Separately, Russian authorities say they destroyed the drones, but there is no image of the debris. We also know that Russian anti-aircraft defense has been greatly reinforced in recent months. Another surprising detail: we see two silhouettes on the roof of the Kremlin, which is still curious at such a late hour.

Who would have an interest in committing these attacks?

Different hypotheses are circulating, such as that of Russian sympathizers of the Ukrainian cause. But I don’t see how opponents could do that in such a police state. The internal opposition is hunted down and there are CCTV cameras all over Moscow, so the risk would be huge, even if it is possible to get these types of drones. Moreover, if opponents were responsible for these attacks, this would further reflect the fragility of the regime.

Is this a montage made by the Russian services to, in a way, justify an escalation of the conflict? It’s possible. Or are they Russian nationalists who want to add fuel to the fire in order to go further in the conflict? These are questions we can ask ourselves.

Be that as it may, Russia displays a very great feverishness in relation to the Ukrainian counter-offensive. The Russians do not manage to make a military difference, even if they nibble a little ground in Bakhmout, for example. It should be remembered that the laborious battle for the conquest of this city began in August 2022. The Kremlin sent elements of language to the Russian media, which are all under its control, in order to be able to justify a possible defeat at the time of the counter-offensive.

May 9 celebrations [NDLR : commémorant la victoire de l’URSS sur l’Allemagne nazie] approach, and this date must inevitably question the Kremlin on the question of the story of the war to be given to Russian opinion. It should be remembered that a year ago everyone was apprehensively awaiting this military parade, but the Russian army later proved that it was not up to it.

The drone attack can serve Vladimir Putin: it could justify the need for national unity. The Russian president could for example say that Russia is attacked by the Ukrainians, who are themselves supported by the West. In other words, Moscow could therefore dramatize and show that it is a victim of the Ukrainians, supported by Western countries.

Is the hypothesis of an attack by Ukraine, which has so far rather sought to avoid an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict, plausible? If so, what then would kyiv’s objective be?

I would be very cautious about the possibility of an attack organized by the Ukrainian services, because kyiv has no benefit to draw from it. Since the start of the conflict, Ukrainians have never called for regime change in Russia. Conversely, since February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin’s Russia wants to “denazify”, “demilitarize” and therefore “eliminate” Volodymyr Zelensky. Likewise, since the beginning of the war, the Western allies have always been very reluctant to allow the conflict to spill over into Russia. So far, the Ukrainians have unclaimed targeted facilities of a logistical nature, such as fuel depots, but they have gone no further.

If Ukraine carried out an attack against Vladimir Putin, then it would take the risk of giving Russia a pretext to strike Volodymyr Zelensky in the heart of kyiv. In other words, I do not see the Ukrainian leadership giving the green light to an operation like this, because they know that it would lead to extremely serious and damaging reprisals. It would therefore be very suicidal on the part of the Ukrainian authorities.

It should be remembered that kyiv is relatively close to the border with Russia [NDLR : environ 200 kilomètres à vol d’oiseau]. The presidential palace in kyiv can therefore be the object of a Russian strike, even protected by anti-aircraft defenses provided by the West.

There has been talk for several months of the hypothesis that the Kremlin would consider filming a fake Ukrainian attack against Russia, in order to justify the invasion of Ukraine. What do we know about Moscow’s desire to use this strategy of attack in this conflict? “false flag”, either under “false flag” or “false banner”?

Lying and systematic denial have been an integral part of the Russian political system, especially since the start of this war. We remember that, in April 2022, Russia denied having killed civilians in Boutcha and accused Ukraine of having “fabricated” images of corpses. The bigger it is, the more it passes.

Moreover, these images showing a bombardment in the heart of Moscow can have an impact on public opinion elsewhere than in Russia, in non-Western countries, for example in China or on the African continent. They can thus allow Russia to appear as a victim and thus contribute to strengthening the camp of the anti-Westerns.

lep-general-02