During his thirty-four year career with the CIA, Douglas London served in the Middle East, Africa, South and Central Asia. He now teaches intelligence at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. His book The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence, published last year, criticizes the evolution of the CIA after September 11: the agency, according to him, almost lost its soul. Interview with one of the world’s leading spy experts.
L’Express: In your book, you explain that the CIA saw its know-how and its values deteriorate after the attacks of September 11, by allowing itself to be exploited by the authorities. How did things turn out?
Douglas London : In the period after 9/11 and before America’s invasion of Iraq, CIA leaders believed they faced a crisis that could end their organization’s very existence , or watch it fall apart and be swallowed up by other government agencies. The American people wanted a culprit for the attacks: the CIA compromised its credibility by validating the White House’s insistent assertions that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.
Weakened, smaller, and less influential than the Department of Defense or the FBI, the agency used its unique powers and abilities in covert action to secure the protection of the White House. And it did so by tackling counterterrorism challenges politically, such as pursuing al-Qaeda in Pakistan and debriefing and detaining fighters neither the FBI nor US military forces were willing to detain. This led to underinvestment in foreign intelligence gathering and its ability to be an elite spy service, as rival major powers like Russia and China grew more aggressive.
“Trump politicized intelligence in a way that undermined the credibility of the CIA”
With the CIA’s resources and size being limited – although this may surprise your readers – by prioritizing counterterrorism, it has devoted fewer resources to countering Russian and Chinese cyberattacks on US government servers or our businesses. Or to ward off Russia’s social media influence campaign aimed at eroding trust in our institutions and our democracy.
What is your assessment of the Trump era?
President Trump has politicized intelligence, in a way that has undermined the CIA’s credibility, demoralized personnel, and bolstered our enemies; like when, alongside Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, in 2018, he said in essence that he trusted the Russian president’s word more than his own intelligence agencies, regarding Moscow’s interference in the US election.
Has the CIA succeeded in correcting the situation?
The CIA had arrived at a watershed moment, when I retired in 2019. And from what I observe, the agency and its director, William Burns, are heading in the right direction. Today, strategic competition against great powers is at the forefront. The CIA has made great efforts over the past two years to address the areas that need the most attention. This has paid off, especially in Ukraine – where the United States and its allies share intelligence with kyiv, which has noticeable effects on the ground.
It has been more engaged in intelligence gathering than in covert counterterrorism operations – although the latter continue to exist. And I think it’s clear from declassified intelligence reports and some leaks, that the CIA has had great results with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
According to the American press, dozens of CIA agents have been arrested, imprisoned or killed in foreign countries in recent years. Has the agency become less vigilant?
The United States did not pay enough attention to emerging counterintelligence threats, so focused was it on counterterrorism. Still, in espionage, you can never completely eliminate the risk, you can only try to manage it as well as possible.
Isn’t it more and more difficult to recruit sources in China, because of the enormous means of technological surveillance deployed by this country?
The environment has become more complex. But that doesn’t mean it’s getting harder and harder to recruit agents. There are always technological developments: the invention of the telegraph, the telephone, the computer… They entail risks, but also opportunities. Growing repression in Russia and China and their aggressiveness abroad create an atmosphere that foreign intelligence services can exploit to recruit agents willing to act against their regime. I am very confident that the CIA will continue to adapt to technological developments, using them to its advantage or resorting to tools to circumvent surveillance.
Is the CIA still the best intelligence agency in the world?
Yes. Thanks to the quality of our workforce, its diversity, and very cutting-edge technologies, which we use very efficiently.
Certainly, in liberal democracies, secret organizations face more challenges and demands. The CIA must be accountable, comply with the rule of law, guarantee the maintenance of democracy. An authoritarian state like Russia and China works differently. They can do whatever they want, since they don’t have to worry about what the people think. But it also tends to make them much more rigid, because the decision circuits are long. Whereas the CIA is able to have a much more flexible management, which encourages innovation. Moreover, the Russian and Chinese secret services tend to tell their leaders what they want to hear, and not the truth.
How does the CIA cooperate with its partners in other intelligence agencies?
Intelligence agencies collaborate because they have mutual interests. Historically, the United States and France, for example, have a very good relationship in this area, even if there have been ups and downs. It goes back to the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, the OSS, which worked with the French resistance during World War II. And in the 1980s, even when France shared with the United States the revelations of a Soviet KGB agent, Farewell – his real name was Vladimir Vetrov. He provided a wealth of information and helped identify other KGB agents. France and the United States have a long history of mutual trust and support. More than just partners, we are allies within NATO.
Each country takes care to protect its most precious sources and has its own interests. But there is some information that is not good to keep secret. It is more effective to exploit them with an ally. This is what the United States is doing with its partners.
How does the CIA judge French intelligence?
I know, having seen it, that the French intelligence services did an exceptional job in the Middle East, in Africa, in Russia and in the former Soviet republics when I was in office, because France had strong capacities on site, with old and experienced networks. Its long presence in Africa and the Middle East, in particular, is very useful to counter terrorist attacks. But France has also had success against Russia and China.
How do you explain that France did not believe in an attack by Putin against Ukraine, unlike the United States?
The whole question is whether it was the French leaders or their intelligence services, who did not think Putin would attack. Intelligence services inform decision-making, by presenting information and its assessment, they do not tell politicians what to do. I don’t have enough information to know if your intelligence services were wrong or if President Macron decided himself, saying to himself: “I know Putin, he’s not going to do it.”