What are the values of these images of crowds, with yellow and green flags flying above their heads, that reach us during the speeches of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah? Should the fists raised to the sky, each time the leader raises his voice, be interpreted as total and unreserved support for the Shiite Islamist movement, considered a terrorist organization by many countries including the United States, the United Kingdom and members of the European Union, and whose leader promised again in June, during a televised speech, that “no place” in Israel would be spared by his group’s missiles in the event of an attack on Lebanon?
Following a valuable study on the opinion of Gazans towards Hamas, the Arab Barometer has once again set itself the goal of sounding out the minds, this time, of the Lebanese on Hezbollah. The first lesson of this survey, conducted between February and April 2024 in all regions of the country (urban and rural), and whose conclusions were revealed in Foreign Affairssounds like a scathing disavowal. 30% is the proportion of Lebanese who said they had “confidence” in the Shiite Islamist group. Unsurprisingly, 85% of Shiites expressed this opinion, compared to only 9% of Sunnis, 9% also of Druze, and 6% of Christians. [NDLR : le pays n’a pas effectué de recensement officiel depuis 1932, mais, selon le département d’État américain, citant Statistics Lebanon, une société indépendante de sondage et de recherche, les chiites représenteraient 32,2 % de la population, contre 31,2 % de sunnites, 30,5 % de chrétiens et 5,5 % de Druzes].
These rates are all the more damning for the group, which emerged weakened from the 2022 legislative elections, as they have only evolved positively among Shiites since that date. They have remained stationary among all other faiths. “This means that the group retains its base among Shiites, but that it is struggling to broaden its base of support,” MaryClare Roche, a researcher at Princeton, director of technology and innovation at the Arab Barometer, and co-author of the article published in Foreign Affairs.
Is the Shiite movement, a sort of state within a state, experiencing the limits of its model? Not quite. When the Arab Barometer asks the Lebanese about Hezbollah’s involvement in regional politics, the picture is different. While only a third of those surveyed are in favor or very much in favor of this idea (including 78% of positive opinions among Shiites), there has actually been a nine-point increase since 2022. This is mainly among non-Shiites: +10 points among the Druze, +8 among the Sunnis, and +7 for the Christians.
“Gaza” effect
Results that can be linked, according to the researcher, to Hezbollah’s involvement in the war taking place in Gaza. 78% of those surveyed in fact describe Israeli military action on the ground as a “terrorist act”, compared to 11% who consider the attacks carried out by Hezbollah in northern Israel as “terrorism”. A “Gaza” effect that is all the more glaring since the trend is similar with regard to Iran, the main supporter of the Shiite movement and sworn enemy of Israel. Here again, if the image of the country remains at much lower levels among non-Shiites than among Shiites, However, it is among the Druze, Christians, and Sunnis that it has improved the most – the increase running from four to nine points more compared to 2022 in these communities.
An interfaith breakthrough that should be qualified, however: among the Arab populations surveyed in no fewer than seven countries by the Arab Barometer (since September 2023), the Lebanese are the only ones to consider that the Biden administration should prioritize the economic development of the Middle East rather than the Palestinian question… This, even though “the Lebanese have enormous sympathy for the Palestinians, and [qu’] They harbor a deep skepticism toward the United States, even more than in 2022, the researcher is surprised. This may seem surprising, but it is revealing of the suffering of the Lebanese, who certainly see in Hezbollah an actor capable of opposing Tsahal (which they consider the aggressor in the Gaza conflict), but seem ready to rely on the international community rather than their political class (of which Hezbollah is a part) to overcome their internal difficulties.
Lebanon’s economy collapsed in 2019. Among the seven Arab countries where the organization has conducted surveys since September 2023, the Lebanese are (by far) the least satisfied with the provision of water, electricity, internet access and healthcare. Similarly, only 13% of citizens believe that the situation is likely to improve in the next two to three years.
Risk of escalation of the conflict
This lukewarm support for Hezbollah is all the more striking when one considers the country’s political landscape as a whole. While 9 out of 10 Lebanese have little or no confidence in their government, parliament or prime minister, Hezbollah, which calls itself “the Party of God”, is not doing any better – if not less: 3 out of 4 people say they do not trust religious figures, while 65% believe that they can be just as “corrupt” as non-religious political leaders. Thus, only 12% of Lebanese say they feel closer to Hezbollah as a political party than to other groups. Among Shiites, this figure is only 39% compared to… 1% among other faiths. In comparison, the Lebanese army receives a positive opinion from no less than 85% of those surveyed. “But Hezbollah is the only group that has enough resources to fight Israel. And the Lebanese know this. Hence the fact that despite the low trust placed in it, it is garnering increasing support for its regional involvement,” explains MaryClare Roche.
Not insignificant fact: since the survey was conducted, concerns about the deterioration of the situation along the border between Lebanon and Israel have become increasingly strong. This is only reinforced by the rocket attack on July 27 on the Golan Heights, which Israel and the White House attribute to Hezbollah and which caused the death of twelve young people aged 10 to 16 (for the time being, the group denies being the author of this attack). “Support for the group could well increase considerably in the event of an escalation with Israel. It will all depend on the responsibility of each of the two parties in this event,” warns the researcher. In short: in the event of an Israeli military offensive, the Lebanese, already facing a major crisis, could well count on Hezbollah to defend themselves. “This would complicate Israel’s task, if the objective is to attack the terrorist group,” specifies MaryClare Roche.
In the opposite scenario, of Hezbollah initiating hostilities, the group could lose the fragile support it currently enjoys. “It would not be an easy task, with hopes of normalizing relations with the Israelis having been eroded, but if Israel could establish a relationship, or talks, with the Lebanese government, it would signal to ordinary Lebanese citizens that it clearly distinguishes Hezbollah from ordinary citizens. And thus stem a possible surge in support for the terrorist group.”
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