The image made the rounds on social networks: in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, a woman advances against the water cannons of the police, with only a huge European flag as a weapon held at arm’s length. This Tuesday, March 7, tens of thousands of demonstrators marched in the streets of Georgia against the adoption of a law on “foreign agents” strangely similar to the one which made it possible to intimidate Russian media and NGOs. In this small state of 4 million inhabitants located in the South Caucasus, this wind of anger illustrates the fracture between the pro-Russian camp, increasingly represented by the majority party in parliament, Georgian Dream, and the pro-European camp, supporter of joining the European Union, explains Gaïdz Minassian, doctor of political science and teacher at Sciences Po Paris.
L’Express: What exactly does this law on “foreign agents” adopted at first reading by the Georgian Parliament on March 7 say?
Gaïdz Minassian : This text, largely inspired by Russian law, obliges associations and NGOs receiving more than 20% foreign funding to register with the competent minister, under pain of a fine. It is a draconian law that makes the members of these organizations likely spies, outside agents in the service of a third power.
What is its genesis?
The majority party in Parliament, Georgian Dream wants both to be well seen by Moscow and to strengthen its influence in Georgia. Officially Georgia remains a country very open to the West but in reality, since 2012, power has been increasingly subject to Russian influence. Except that the Georgian Dream party, like all the others in Georgia, must abide by the Constitution, which has set in stone its Euro-Atlantic orientation.
Georgian Dream is therefore playing a murky game: aware that this law on foreign agents is contrary to Brussels’ expectations and will keep Georgia away from joining the European Union, the ruling party wants to blame for a tension with Brussels to Europeans by demonstrating to its population: “You see, Brussels does not want Georgia”. This cord is all the more sensitive since last June, the European Council refused Georgia the status of candidate to the European Union on the grounds that the democratic reforms were insufficient. However, this status has been granted to Ukraine and Moldova, which has long lagged behind Georgia in its policy of rapprochement with the EU.
By not giving this entry ticket to the EU, Brussels for its part sent a message to pro-European Georgians by whispering to them, in essence: “Do you want to join the Euro-Atlantic area? Prove it and mobilize you against Georgian Dream, its Prime Minister and its man in the shadows, Bidzina Ivanishvili, oligarch and former Prime Minister close to Russia.” This is what the demonstrators did on March 7 by marching against this draconian law.
How does Russian influence manifest itself in Georgia?
Russia pursues a neo-imperial policy against Georgia through various means. First by the occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, whose independence Moscow has recognized. This influence is also manifested by oligarchs. Bidzina Ivanichvili, who made his fortune in Russia, is the symbol par excellence. There are also political and diplomatic pressures via the Geneva process. Set up after the 2008 war to promote dialogue between the belligerents, this process yielded no results, after 52 rounds of negotiations… The 53rd, scheduled for last February, was postponed to April 2023.
What is the balance of power between the pro-Russian camp and the pro-Western camp in Georgia?
Georgian Dream has a majority in Parliament and holds the government. Opposite, there is a string of small political parties which are unable to unite against the power in place and the stranglehold of Russia, the occupying power (South Ossetia and Abkhazia).
President Salomé Zurabishvili illustrates this difficulty. This pro-European first belonged to the coalition of former President Mikhail Saakashvili (currently in detention, where he claims to have been poisoned, editor’s note). Then she left to create her own political formation, Georgia Way. And she owes her election in 2018 in part to the support of Georgian Dream. But the closer Georgian Dream got to Moscow, the more the president distanced herself from him to enter into a form of cohabitation with the government.
The president spoke on March 8 on television from New York, where she is at the moment, to affirm her support for the demonstrators. How far can this crisis go? Can we imagine early elections?
For now, Georgian Dream looks pretty solid on its base. To change the situation, there remains only the mobilization of the street. It remains to be seen how big it will be…
Could the Kremlin intervene if the mobilization hardens?
Some observers are already talking about a Maidan scenario, in reference to the 2014 revolution in Ukraine. However, we must remain cautious for the moment. But if the mobilization hardens and the Georgian Dream regime is eventually overthrown, Russia could intervene in different forms. On the economic level, Moscow could for example seek to weaken the Georgian currency by drastically reducing its investments. On the political side, Putin could go further in the territories he already occupies, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by declaring for example the annexation of the latter. Militarily, finally, the Kremlin could push the Ossetians and the Abkhazians to violate the ceasefire signed in 2008. But this scenario seems unlikely to me for the time being.
In 2007, you spoke in a book of “the new cold war” in the South Caucasus. More than ever, we are today in this dynamic…
We remain effectively in a Cold War rhetoric. In the background, the war in Ukraine has become for a year the structuring element of the future of all the former Soviet republics. If Russia had won its blitzkrieg in a few days, that would be the end of the independence of these countries. If, on the other hand, Russia completely loses the war – which is far from being done – there will be a risk of erosion of the peripheral territories of Russia, even of eastern Russia, to the benefit of other powers – not by territorial conquests, but by more fluid regime changes than before and far removed from Russia. The third scenario, the most likely at this stage, is that of a weakened Russia still led by Putin.
At the moment, it seems that Russian influence in the South Caucasus is rather threatened…
Due to its setbacks in Ukraine, Russia is in an uncomfortable position on its periphery. In the South Caucasus, contradictory forces clash: on the one hand Moscow wants to keep Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia within its fold, three countries in which the Russians have contingents of soldiers. On the other hand, Westerners seeing Russia in difficulty in its war against Ukraine, are trying to gain ground in the region. This translates, for example, into the deployment of a European Union observation mission along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, something never seen before in the history of these countries. A first mission was sent from October to December 2022 after Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenia; it was renewed in February 2023 for a period of two years.
Another event shows the loss of Russian influence in this area: when it was attacked by Azerbaijan in September 2022, Armenia called for help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization of which it is a member ( the eastern counterpart of NATO, overseen by Russia, editor’s note). She brandished article 4 of the CSTO charter, which stipulates that the organization must assist a member state if it is attacked by a power outside the alliance. The CSTO, led by Russia, refused to intervene.
In Central Asia too, is Moscow’s influence weakened?
For a long time, Russia appeared as a strong, self-confident power, which its neighbors regard with fear. But here again the war in Ukraine changes things and blurs this status of tutelary power. The Central Asian countries clearly see the difficulties of the Russian army, therefore they no longer really look at Russia with the eyes of fear, but with more confidence. Several pro-Ukrainian demonstrations have also been authorized in these countries.