The day after the crash of a plane on which he appeared as a passenger, the exact circumstances of the presumed death of Yevgueni Prigojine remain to be clarified. But as soon as the Embraer Legacy, which was transporting him from Moscow to Saint Petersburg, exploded in flight, all eyes turned to the head of the Kremlin. For an obvious reason: during the failed rebellion of Wagner’s boss on June 24, Putin himself assured: “All traitors will be punished”. Specialist of the post-Soviet space and co-author of Vladimir Putin’s Black Book (Robert Laffont/Perrin), historian Galia Ackerman also recalls that “Putin never forgives those he considers traitors”. “We also know, she adds, that assassination is one of the methods favored by the Kremlin.” From there to think that the assassination of Evgueni Prigojine is signed, there is only one step… Interview.
The Express: Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin died yesterday in the crash of his plane. Is it a surprise?
Galia Ackerman: No, insofar as Prigojine, with his abortive rebellion last June, had signed, in the short or long term, his death sentence. Putin never forgives those he considers “traitors”, and we know that assassination has been one of the Kremlin’s favored methods for a long time. To be convinced of this, it suffices to cite the best-known precedents such as those of the journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the opponent Boris Nemtsov, or the attempted poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Alexei Navalny.
Could the order to shoot down Wagner’s boss’ plane have been given without Putin’s agreement?
Theoretically, it’s not impossible. But in practice, even though Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was probably very keen to shoot Prigozhin, he would not have done so without Putin’s approval. Given the importance of a character like Prigojine, and the atmosphere of terror that reigns around Putin, it seems to me hard to imagine that such an initiative could be taken without being validated at the highest level.
Moreover, the way in which Prigozhin will be buried in the coming days will give us indications of the level of involvement that the Kremlin agrees to recognize. If he is buried modestly, without the presence of high-level Russian officials, it will be a sign that the regime is taking, without saying so openly, the responsibility for his death. On the other hand, if Prigozhin is buried with honors, it means that the regime is potentially trying to minimize his responsibility.
Could the presumed elimination of Prigojine be a way for Putin to reassert his authority after his humiliation during the June mutiny?
Putin had already sought by all means to assert his authority and popularity after this mutiny. Soon after, he began to reappear in public, something he hadn’t done in a long time. We must not forget that there will be a presidential election in March 2024, in the context of a war in Ukraine, which for the moment is not victorious. Therefore, killing Prigozhin appears as a way to show that Putin is still in control. However, it is not a won bet, because Prigojine was still very popular with a certain segment of the population.
Some Wagner supporters rightly called for a new march on Moscow after the news of Prigozhin’s death. Is a new rebellion of the fighters of this militia possible?
Some Wagner-linked Telegram channels actually railed against the death of Prigozhin, and his right-hand man, Dmitri Utkin, claiming they were shot by “traitors to the fatherland”. However, Wagner was beheaded. The highest commanders of this militia have been eliminated, and the rest are today scattered in different countries and have been deprived of their heavy armaments. So I don’t see how a new march on Moscow would be possible today. On the other hand, I would not exclude isolated acts of revenge on the part of certain members of Wagner.
How can the announcement of Prigojine’s death affect Russian opinion?
It’s hard to say, but it is clear that Prigozhin’s populist discourse had some echoes in the Russian population. The fact that he presents himself as a true “patriot” who opposes the “profiteers” of the general staff, may have pleased some people, who will probably regret it. At the same time, the population has been very passive so far. Therefore, I doubt that his death could spark a rebellion or mass protests. In my opinion, this will rather reinforce a form of diffuse malaise that is infiltrating within the Russian population.
After the arrest of the extremist Igor Girkin and the dismissal of General Surovikin, does this event constitute a new call to order for the entire Russian ultra-nationalist fringe, which sometimes criticizes the conduct of the war in Ukraine?
I think Putin has effectively decided to subdue these ultra-nationalists, who are sometimes called in Russia the “turbo-patriots”. This brings together all those who want to continue the war at all costs, to occupy all of Ukraine, and are very unhappy with the way this war is being fought. Igor Girkin, aka Strelkov [NDLR : que la justice néerlandaise considère comme le principal responsable de la destruction du vol MH17 en 2014 au-dessus du Donbass] is a striking example of this movement: before his arrest, he never ceased to vociferate and criticize Putin, Shoigu and Guerassimov, who were too soft for his taste.
Before the war, these turbo-patriots could have been useful to Putin in order to mobilize the population, but today, he no longer wants dissenting voices. The Russian president has a well-oiled propaganda machine, and Russian society has come to adapt to the war. From now on, Putin simply needs to have a population that agrees to go to the slaughterhouse without complaining. And all the voices that rise against the methods of the staff will be silenced, one way or another.
Can the announcement of Prigozhin’s death reduce the risk of a palace revolution against Putin?
It is not certain. Putin is certainly very feared, but he is at the same time less respected than before: he still has no victory in Ukraine, and he is isolated on the international scene. The fact of cracking down is his only way of being obeyed. Therefore, the death of a character like Prigojine could reinforce, among some members of the Russian elite, the fear of being next in line. It’s time for reckoning: those who feel threatened could therefore be tempted to act to save their heads. Paradoxically, I think the more Putin cracks down, the less safe he is.
We can add to this the fact that today there is a proliferation of armed forces in Russia: whether those of companies such as Gazprom, or those of certain local governors. Large armed groups, not directly under Putin’s command, could pose a danger. The Prigozhin mutiny showed very clearly that the state no longer has a monopoly on violence. Under these conditions, even within the regular army, there can be movements. Moreover, in the face of the ongoing purge in the army, as shown by the dismissal of Surovikin, there could also be attempts to mutiny or overthrow Putin.
What can become of Wagner after the decapitation of his staff?
Prigozhin was both Wagner’s mastermind and fundraiser, so now that he’s gone, it’s hard to conceive of this organization surviving him. Moreover, its dismantling has already begun: some fighters have signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense or have returned home, and others are dispatched to different countries, particularly in Africa.
Without Wagner’s leadership, what will become of these fighters? Some will certainly be recruited directly by local juntas in Africa, but Wagner should no longer have a future as an entity in its own right in these countries, any more than in Russia or Belarus. Ultimately, Wagner’s fighters will probably be recycled in other movements.