83% of the world’s primary energy comes from fossil fuels. Reducing the dependence of our societies to limit global warming and anticipate the depletion of deposits will require increased use of low-carbon electricity, which will require numerous raw materials to produce, transport and store it. The same goes for digital technologies, the deployment of which is causing a continuous growth in the demand for materials. However, most of the raw materials used in these various applications within the European Union are neither extracted nor refined within our borders.
The growing use of materials raises questions of strategic dependencies, in a rapidly changing geopolitical context. Thus, thirty raw materials are considered “critical” by Brussels because their supply can be subject to hazards, with potentially serious consequences for industry and the economy. This is why the European Union is now seeking to equip itself with a corpus of regulations aimed at better anticipating the risks that may weigh on these supplies, and above all at responding to them.
Fragility linked to a high level of dependence
The risks related to the supply of materials are multiple and complex. First, their extraction and even more so their refining is highly concentrated in a small number of states. This is particularly the case for China, which has made it a national strategy – implemented by acquiring mines all over the world and refining the metals extracted there on its territory – which gives it an advantage. major strategy.
In addition to the risks linked to the political manipulation of access to materials, risks of involuntary imbalance between supply and demand exist – at various levels – for each material. Soaring demand, reduction in the concentration of deposits, increase in energy prices, environmental constraints, opposition from local populations, political and geopolitical risks, regulatory framework… so many parameters that can lead to a shortfall – temporary or long-term – of supply versus demand.
For example, for several of the reasons mentioned above, tensions are expected at the end of the decade in the market for nickel, copper and nickel, three key elements for electric mobility. Anticipating would therefore make it possible to avoid suffering a drastic increase in the price of these metals, which would compromise the trajectory of progressive abandonment of fossil fuels in road mobility.
What answers to give?
Dealing with the concentration of materials production outside the European Union and the supply tensions looming in the short term requires resolute action on several fronts.
The first lever on which to play is to show sobriety and efficiency in the use of materials. That a technology is “low carbon” does not dispense with reflections around sobriety and efficiency. For example, limiting the mass of batteries installed in vehicles would make it possible to electrify a greater number of them. Moderating the amount of material to be used in systems and equipment intended to replace fossil fuels is essential to achieve our climate objectives.
The European Union will continue to need metals for a long time. It must therefore develop extraction and refining capacities – so-called primary raw materials – as well as strategic stocks on its territory. While this presents an obvious challenge in terms of the acceptance of mining projects, Europe would gain autonomy over its supplies and could exercise greater control over the social and environmental conditions linked to the production of these materials. Major projects are thus emerging, such as those carried out by Vulcan Energy for lithium from geothermal sources in Germany and by Imerys for lithium from hard rocks in France.
Sources of secondary materials – from the collection of end-of-life equipment and their recycling – must also be developed. This assumes that end-of-life equipment and components remain in Europe, and are actually recycled, which is not always the case (only 1% of rare earths are). In this regard, standardizing equipment, including batteries, would facilitate and industrialize recycling. However, the proportion of recycled materials will remain low in the manufacture of new products as long as demand is growing strongly: the materials are immobilized for approximately 15 years in a battery and 30 years in a solar panel… Recycling therefore does not dispense with securing supply of primary raw materials.
The research and development of alternative technologies, complementary to each other, can also contribute to reducing the potential consequences of tensions, temporary or long-lasting, on certain materials or components. This is a major lever because a large part of the technologies for the energy transition have yet to be developed. France and Europe, through their research establishments, have a considerable strike force and undeniable assets to support our industrial sectors in this new era of materials!
For example, the CEA is working with the CNRS to develop sodium-ion batteries targeting 180 kWh/kg in 2030, in parallel with the continuous improvement of lithium-ion batteries. This would make it possible to diversify dependencies, while adapting technologies to uses: lithium-ion batteries with NMC (nickel-manganese-cobalt) cathode offering high autonomy would be intended for intensive or long-distance mobility, while lithium-ion batteries LFP ion (iron-phosphate) or ultimately sodium-ion would be intended for local mobility or stationary storage.
The question of sovereignty does not stop at materials
If the question of critical materials is gaining momentum in the debate on the strategic autonomy of the European Union, the subject is much broader. This issue must be examined by considering all of the value chains, from the supply of raw materials to the finished product. Because it is the fact of being able to have finished products – electric motors with permanent magnets, photovoltaic modules, batteries, converters, etc. – in sufficient quantity and at an affordable cost that counts ultimately.
If Europe managed to better secure its supply of materials (from mining and recycling) but these had to be transformed, for example into semiconductors for digital technologies, in countries outside the EU with differences geostrategic, fragility would remain. It is not a question of pursuing an autarkic policy but of ensuring the European Union’s ability to meet its vital needs in all circumstances.
Finally, behind the question of materials and strategic autonomy appears the subject of European industry. If the only determinant of the presence of an industry on European soil lies in its competitiveness in a fully liberalized market – which is not the case of the United States, China, India… – many key stages of strategic value chains will not be able to develop on our soil. In fact, other great powers will have made their capture a national strategy. Building complete value chains requires a real European industrial strategy, based on a holistic vision, and having sufficiently powerful regulatory and fiscal tools to be able to force the location of certain productions on European territory.
* Authors of the forum: Stéphane Sarrade, director of energy programs at the CEA, Luc Aixala, head of the circular economy of materials program at the CEA, Maxence Cordiez, head of European public affairs at the CEA