The possibility of an attack by the Russian army is growing day by day, as Vladimir Putin decided on Monday February 21 to recognize the independence of the pro-Russian separatist regions of eastern Ukraine. Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies and at Sciences Po, Katarzyna Zysk takes stock of the forces involved and the possible scenarios.
L’Express: What assessment can we make of the Russian troops massed on the Ukrainian border?
Katarzyna Zysk: By adding the forces of Belarus, the separatist forces of Lugansk and Donetsk, in occupied Crimea, the Russian National Guard and other internal security units, 190,000 soldiers under the orders of Moscow are stationed on the outskirts of Ukraine. But beyond the number, what counts is the quality of these Russian fighters, having received extensive training and experienced in major exercises. Especially since a large part of this army has experienced combat, in the Donbass, unofficially, since 2014, and especially in Syria, from 2015. In addition to this are more modern armaments and sophisticated and in greater numbers compared to those of Ukrainians.
Kyiv has better forces today than eight years ago, thanks to the help and training provided by NATO member countries, but the Russian military is incomparably superior.
If it takes place, an attack against Ukraine could go through several phases, even before talking about an invasion. What would they be?
It depends, I believe there are several scenarios ready. During this crisis, Russia used to proceed by taking two steps forward and then one step back to test the reactions of Ukraine and the West. Putin decided on Monday to recognize the regions of Donbass and Luhansk as independent republics (Russia did so in 2008 with the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which belonged to Georgia). Next step: these regions should probably ask for military assistance from Russia, which will deploy these forces there. Then, there is always a possibility that the population of the two republics will ask to be part of Russia (the Crimea scenario), a card that Russia can play with the West, by raising and lowering the pressure, by the blackmail. This scenario may be easier to accept for the international community, which Putin scares with his threat to start World War III.
Will he go as far as an invasion of the rest of Ukraine?
It will depend on the military, political and economic responses that his actions will provoke. An occupation of Ukraine is not necessarily Putin’s goal, because it will have a very high military, political and economic price. If ever the Russian president decides to go further, the threat of invasion in several directions, simultaneously, in order to put pressure on Kiev – and influence its domestic, foreign or defense policy – could be at the heart of the first phase of a military intervention by Moscow in Ukraine. This sequence would certainly be accompanied by operations of its special forces and attacks in the cybernetic and informational sphere.
That is to say ?
Influence operations such as disinformation, demoralization and propaganda play a fundamental role in Russian strategic thinking. It has developed the ability to employ new technologies, including drones and cell-site simulators that are able to impersonate cell towers to intercept, jam, spoof or deliver personalized content to corporate-owned mobile phones. civilians and soldiers of the adversary. It has tested such systems during operations in eastern Ukraine and Syria. She had also sent text messages to protesters in Maidan, Kiev, in January 2014, posing as reliable sources. Such capabilities can be important in the initial phase of war and determine the course of the conflict. The Russian authorities themselves participate in this propaganda, the aim of which is to legitimize an intervention, by speaking on television of the danger of genocide of Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine, and of the need to protect Russia. against destruction by the United States and NATO.
ait Russia has deployed forces in an unprecedented way since the end of the Cold War, in Belarus (image released on February 10, 2022).
Russian Ministry of Defense
And what about the use of weapons?
Russia can use nearly 100 combat-ready “battalion tactical groups”, special forces – the “Spetsnaz” -, advanced artillery, its latest models of tanks T-90 (as well as T-80 and T-72 modernized), among others. It can also make use of its air power, including fighter planes, attack and support helicopters, air defense means. Also ships amassed in the Black Sea, equipped with amphibious vehicles that could be used for a landing in southern Ukraine. New technologies too: Moscow has developed drones for reconnaissance and targeting. The Ukrainian forces fear a blue sky which facilitates the task of these devices. Russia also has ballistic missiles like the Iskander or cruise missiles (Kalibr). Armaments she learned to use in real conditions in Syria. The national guard can also be used to control the Ukrainian population. And undercover agents could play an important role in targeting, or carrying out sabotage, propaganda, disinformation or support operations.
Does this Russian army have any weaknesses?
It has vulnerabilities that can be exploited. For example, it has lost the fundamental element of its contemporary conduct of war: surprise. The reason for this is the change in tactics of the United States, which systematically updated Russian propaganda. This did not allow Moscow to dominate the information sphere as hoped, while this process of justification is very important, with a war that could cause tens of thousands of deaths.
Including deaths among the Russian forces…
Body bags returning the bodies to Russia could provoke public rage. This is something Putin fears. Difficult, too, to know if the targeting will be as effective as the Russians hope. Their “C2ISTAR” (“command, control and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance”) system is capable of locating targets at long ranges, especially moving targets, but it is not perfect. Ukraine also has some air defenses that could cause damage. And the war in eastern Ukraine would be mainly on land, and therefore difficult for air operations. Moreover, a war can be something difficult to control, as proved in 2014, in the Donbass, the destruction of flight MH17, shot down by mistake by a Russian missile. Something can always go wrong.
Interview by Clément Daniez