Almost two and a half years after the start of the pandemic, China is the last major country in the world to apply the “zero Covid” policy, which results in long periods of confinement, particularly in Shanghai. An eminently political choice, a few months before the XX Congress of the Communist Party, just like that of not importing foreign vaccines, explains Zhao Tong, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Beijing. Meanwhile, the people are suffering, and their discontent is growing.
L’Express: More than 340 million people are undergoing some form of confinement in China. Do you think the government will continue its “zero Covid” policy, with its severe confinements and restrictions, despite its negative consequences on the country’s economy?
Zhao Tong: It is increasingly clear that this “zero Covid” strategy is not only the result of scientific reflection; it is ultimately a political decision taken at the highest level of power. So far, the top leadership wants to stick to the “zero Covid” strategy because they see it as essential to the credibility of the government. He seems to think that it demonstrates the superiority of the Chinese political system compared to Western political systems, and this is a very important element for him. It therefore seems that he wants to maintain this policy, despite its cost. It is really complicated to say if there will be a change before the XX Congress of the Communist Party, next fall.
In the fight against this highly contagious variant, Omicron, it is very difficult to completely eliminate all cases in China. And we don’t know, basically, if these very harsh containment policies can succeed in effectively containing the spread of the virus in the country. Of course, if this policy continues and tougher restrictions are imposed, the population will be more and more unhappy. Because people suffer economic and human consequences, which are considerable. So it’s also a full-scale test of the tolerance level of the Chinese population, of what they can endure.
It seems that public discontent is already growing…
Certain indicators actually show that discontent is growing, which is not at all surprising. Shanghai’s lockdown started over a month ago… But since people don’t feel free to fully express their opinions and there is no way to fully investigate the public opinion, no one really knows how strong this discontent is and how much longer people can hold out.
Why does China, which constantly promotes its efficiency, have so many unvaccinated elderly people?
The government has not provided a clear answer to this question. So we can only speculate. Government officials may be somewhat skeptical of the effectiveness of Chinese vaccines. Test results appear to show that these vaccines are not very effective in preventing people from becoming infected with the virus, especially its newer variants. The Chinese government may therefore have had no incentive to launch a vigorous campaign to have the elderly vaccinated. In other words, it seems that the government does not think that vaccinating the population with current Chinese vaccines is the ultimate solution to the Covid problem in China.
How do you explain that the Chinese government still does not have messenger RNA vaccines, when an agreement with Pfizer seemed certain?
The government has provided no explanation on this very important issue. Many people are therefore very confused. Why hasn’t China imported foreign vaccines that seem more effective? People know that a private Chinese company signed a contract with Pfizer last year to import messenger RNA vaccines. But the Chinese government did not give this company the necessary authorization to use them in China.
One can only speculate on the reasons why the Chinese government does not import foreign vaccines. One possible reason is that he does not trust Western countries. Above all, China fears becoming dependent on foreign vaccines, giving foreign companies or governments significant influence over Chinese public health. China would, in their eyes, become vulnerable to foreign technology and its supply of essential medical resources. She fears that foreign countries could exploit this dependence or vulnerability for political or even geopolitical advantage. This is why the government wants to give Chinese companies the time and opportunity to produce messenger RNA vaccines designed in China. But it should still take some time. There are also more secondary concerns about whether we can really trust the safety of foreign vaccines. Some people are even worried that foreign companies or governments will modify their vaccines to harm the Chinese population.
The economic and health situation is currently difficult in China. Does this create political tensions, a few months before the XX Congress of the Communist Party?
This situation exacerbates political divisions within Chinese society. People are debating among themselves the politics of “zero Covid”, the increasingly centralized political system, and the implications for the well-being of the population. Foreign media also report growing political struggles at the highest levels of the political apparatus, over the future appointment of leaders to key posts.
Should we therefore conclude that it will be more complicated for President Xi Jinping to be appointed for a third term next fall?
It looks like he’s well on his way to getting it. Despite the growing internal debates and divisions, no serious threat seems able to prevent him from achieving this goal. No one seriously doubts that Xi Jinping will continue to hold the top post. But other high-level positions, below the supreme leader, may still be open to competition. And it is possible that the tense situation will increase the influence of certain political factions to obtain them.
Geopolitically, do you think China could distance itself from Russia, whose invasion of Ukraine it has not condemned?
I don’t see any significant change. China still wants to preserve its strategic partnership with Russia. This is clearly the preference of senior Chinese leaders. And it will continue. On the other hand, of course, as the war drags on, the international community continues to exert strong pressure on China. And Beijing must give the impression of responding to this pressure. This is what drives China to avoid providing substantial economic and military support to Russia. For their part, Chinese companies, financial institutions and banks also want to minimize their own losses in view of Western sanctions against Russia. They therefore also have an interest in avoiding signing major contracts with sanctioned Russian entities.
If Russia loses the war in Ukraine, do you think China will distance itself further?
In the worst-case scenario, in China’s eyes, if Russia loses heavily on the battlefield, it will likely lead to a serious internal problem in Russia that threatens the stability of the regime. In this scenario, Moscow could see a new leader arrive in the Kremlin who would replace Putin and be favorable to Western countries. This would be a nightmare scenario for China, which would significantly alter its perception of the balance of global geopolitical forces. In this extreme scenario, it would be possible for China to significantly change its approach to backing Moscow. But right now, that scenario – which deeply worries Beijing – seems a long way off.