Who will be next? While military coups seemed to be rarer in recent decades, now these authoritarian power grabs are once again spreading in Central and West Africa. Mali in 2020, Guinea in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, Niger in July 2023 and now Gabon, where soldiers announced on August 30 to “end the regime in place” after fourteen years of uninterrupted reign of Ali Bongo.
For L’Express, the American political scientist Jonathan Powell, one of the best experts on the issue and the co-author ofa vast study dealing with the coups d’état from 1950 to the 2010s, analyzes the factors contributing to the resurgence of these putschist impulses. In addition to the poverty or the potential illegitimacy of the leaders, it points above all to the reactions (rather the absence of reactions) of the international community, “more and more reluctant to take action against these attempts to seize power”. At the risk of sending the signal to neighboring countries that getting rid of a leader in this way could be a legitimate way, and without risk… Interview.
L’Express: How to explain this resurgence of coups in Central and West Africa?
jonathan powell : First, this region presents a set of internal conditions that increase the likelihood of a coup. These are poverty, internal instability which can manifest itself in insurgencies, low growth rates or even the dubious legitimacy of leaders.
However, these background characteristics are not unique to this area, and do not necessarily explain why we are suddenly witnessing a resurgence of coups in recent years. Several other factors may come into play, such as the “contagion” effect (individuals quick to organize a putsch observe and retain what is happening elsewhere in the region).
The fact that coups seem to cluster by geographical and temporal proximity is a historical trend, but there is no clear consensus on the nature of this process. It is possible, for example, that these countries, in particular West Africa with its internal problems, are simply confronted with similar problems in the same geographical area and simultaneously, which could explain this impression of “contagion”. . But it seems to me quite plausible to say that those responsible for the coups are influenced by events elsewhere.
The succession of coup attempts in West Africa would therefore, in your opinion, be the result of a mimicry effect?
Not only. The reactions of the international community probably play a role in encouraging the putschists. Since the coup in Zimbabwe six years ago, the international community has been increasingly reluctant to crack down on these power grabs. In 2017, nobody was really disappointed to see Mugabe leave power. The international community has therefore shown itself to be more tolerant of the putschists. However, if this type of case is not harshly sanctioned, the signal sent to neighboring countries is that getting rid of a leader – whatever the justification – can be a legitimate means.
In the Gabonese case, in addition to the fact that the leaders may be perceived as illegitimate, the apathy of the international community in the face of previous coups in the region undoubtedly contributed to the decision-making of the putschists. Admittedly, the tone started to change a little with Niger, but we did not see really spectacular actions on the part of the international community aimed at restoring the government that had been overthrown. If there was a real zero-tolerance policy, I’m not sure the Gabonese forces would have been so quick to try to take power.
A few years ago, Africa was closely followed by South America, which also bears its share of instability factors…
In the 1950s, 60s and 70s, South America experienced coups with a much higher frequency than Africa. But we hardly hear about it anymore. For what ? South America certainly has challenges in terms of poverty, but there have been fewer insurgencies, and overall economic growth over the past four decades has been stronger there than in West Africa. , with the possible exception of a decade in the early 2000s.
Another determining factor is the organization of the American states. If they are open to criticism in many respects, the hegemonic capacity of the United States has greatly contributed to reducing the propensity for coups d’etat in Latin America. In Haiti, when President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in the early 1990s, the island was placed under universal embargo, and the Clinton administration approved the deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. Marines to Haiti to restore it in power. Finally, Raoul Cédras (responsible for the putsch) fled the country to go to Panama. It was a strong message! The kind of message that has not been sent to West Africa.
Should putschs be considered as a sign of rejection of dictatorial regimes?
In many cases, I think it is a rejection of dictatorship. Some putschs have also led to more democratization. An emblematic example is that of Portugal, whose Carnation Revolution in 1974 – a military coup – enabled the establishment of Portuguese democracy. Better: it also served as a catalyst for what political scientists and historians call the “third wave of democracy”. That is, when democracy began to spread in many formerly dictatorial countries.
However, the systematic association of the notion of coup d’etat with a rejection of dictatorship poses at least two problems. First, even in the cases where the fallout has been positive, democracy was not necessarily the initial objective of the plotters. In the Portuguese case, the military simply wanted to end the colonial wars and try to get the economy back on track. This led to a lot of violence and deaths. In other words, transitions to democracy are not always democratic. Not to mention the cases where soldiers take power not to put an end to the dictatorship but to safeguard their privileges within a dictatorial regime.
Second problem that I identify: if we turn a blind eye to a coup d’etat in a country like Gabon or Zimbabwe, assuming that it was carried out in a democratic spirit and that the ousted dictator will not fail to person, we are setting a precedent that can then be misinterpreted. Who knows: some soldiers driven only by the thirst for power and not by a democratic desire could consider in the future such and such a leader as illegitimate or dictatorial for the wrong reasons and feel the right to drive him out on this basis.
In your work, however, you posit that coups in dictatorships significantly increase the likelihood of democratic transition…
Coups against dictators indeed open a window that creates an opportunity for transition to democracy. But it all depends on how the situation is subsequently handled, on the outcome of the infighting within the armed forces… In dictatorial countries, democratic transitions are quite rare, but the chances are better than without the intervention of a coup.
However, when democratization processes do take place, one of the major causes is the pressure put by the international community on the putschist armed forces so that free elections can be held. On this point, the international community has been undemanding in recent years. It seems that the tendency is rather to accept any type of civilian regime resulting from a coup d’etat. Most of the time, all it takes is a superficial signal, and the sanctions are lifted…
According to you, once a country is the target of a coup, it opens the door to other coups in the region. After the Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed putschshould we expect other attempts against the Kremlin?
What Prigojine did is a bit different from military coups in West African countries. It was an independent paramilitary organization, at least in appearance, and not an organization based locally in the vicinity of Moscow or close to power. I don’t think Prigozhin necessarily expected to have to carry out this attempt himself. He probably thought that by organizing this rebellion and starting to move towards Moscow, he was going to incite others to turn against Putin and overthrow him before he got there. When he saw it wouldn’t happen, he gave up his rebellion. In other words, he was trying more to embolden the crowds than to topple Putin.
That being said, we can look at the sequel in two ways. The first would be to consider that since Putin survived this first attempt led by one of the most feared men in Russia, and then sent several dissuasive signals to Wagner (some of his members died…), he will have discouraged the possible future putschists.
The other factor that makes me skeptical of a second coup attempt is that any military figure close to Putin is a priori loyal to him. If Putin is removed from office, most of his followers are likely to leave with him. At this stage, it is almost a suicide pact. Not to mention that Putin is very protected, you never know where he is. The logistics are therefore much more complicated than in West African countries where, in Mali for example, the country’s main military barracks are located next to the capital. In the Russian case, this would require the soldiers to cover a large part of the territory to reach Moscow… Russian geography makes the probability of a coup almost zero. If anyone close to Putin were to consider taking action, the main scenario I would consider would instead be assassination – with no conspiracy plan or government takeover objective. It would be to target Putin by accepting the fate that will ensue.
You called a “rebellion” what many refer to as Prigozhin’s “coup” attempt. When can a coup be considered as such?
When individuals who are officially part of the regime itself (high-ranking civilians, members of the military or intelligence services) attempt to seize power by overthrowing the government. This concept is not exclusive of that of rebellion, which refers to insurgencies that attempt to overthrow the government or secede to create a dissident state. It can happen that rebellions end in coups d’etat, and that attempted coups end in rebellion.
Does Russian or Chinese interference, very present in Africa, have an impact on the probability of a putsch?
It can actually help a country embrace the path of a coup. However, I am very skeptical about the idea put forward by some, according to which the Wagner group would be responsible for the coups d’etat which took place in certain African countries, such as Niger. But it is true that individuals who might consider carrying out actions of this kind are aware of the support available to them. For example, in the event of economic sanctions from the United States or France, they know that they can count on a group like Wagner, or even on countries like Russia or China to get out of it.
Should we deduce from this that coups d’etat could multiply in the future?
I don’t know if the increase is going to continue beyond what we’ve seen in the last two or three years, because these have really been unprecedented. But as a general rule, the number of coup attempts is likely to remain higher than what we have been accustomed to so far. There is not the slightest doubt about it.