Would Manuel Valls have been, in the 1930s, a supporter of the slogan “rather Hitler than the Popular Front”? In any case, this is what the European MP for La France Insoumise, Manon Aubry, implied on RTL on June 18. The former Prime Minister’s crime? Having dared to send the New Popular Front and the National Rally back to back.
It is a marker of French political culture. In times of crisis, references to the 1930s are rife. In recent months, those who oppose too much aid to Ukraine have, for example, been described as “Munichians” – in reference to the supporters of the Munich agreements of 1938.
But what are these analogies worth? For Olivier Dard, historian specializing in the period and professor at Sorbonne University, while it may be relevant to establish parallels between this period and ours, we must nevertheless be wary of excessive comparisons. Interview.
L’Express: What do you think of the multiplication of references to the 1930s in the political sphere, like Manon Aubry’s comments on Manuel Valls?
Olivier Dard: In these words there is an obvious desire to draw a parallel in which the France of 2024 would be Weimar Germany in 1933, Manuel Valls, a social traitor, and Jordan Bardella… Hitler? As a historian, I find this daring. This poses a very serious problem of context. France and Europe today are no longer those of the 1930s. Under these conditions, comparing Bardella and the RN with the rise of Mussolini’s Italian fascism or German national socialism hardly seems practical for understanding this which is being played out, which must first be understood in the light of the political history of contemporary France.
“Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jordan Bardella do not use the same references and do not address the same generations.”
What the left calls “French fascism” is in my opinion much more the legacy of an endogenous phenomenon linked to the history of French nationalism. From this point of view, the RN is an indisputable heir. This question of inheritance is the essential point. But as with any inheritance, it must be understood taking into account the right of inventory proposed by the heirs. If the RN notably took over from the FN the central character of the theme of immigration and “national preference”, we will also note differences between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jordan Bardella.
Let us take for example the historical references used. Concerning Jean-Marie Le Pen, we will recall, among others, his defense of Marshal Pétain, of Robert Brasillach, of the fighters of French Algeria. As for Jordan Bardella, his “favorite character” is General de Gaulle and to the question “the one you hate and to whom you forgive nothing”, he answered Marshal Pétain.
The meetings of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the new boss of the RN have nothing to do with each other: the former were intended to be liturgies, dominated in the 1980s by the chorus of Nabucco slaves. We are far from what Jordan Bardella is trying to do on Tiktok. The two men do not use the same references and do not address the same generations.
In your opinion, the RN and the FN are therefore no longer comparable?
The FN of 1972, which is not yet the thing of Jean-Marie Le Pen, was structured around various strata and various legacies: the occupation, the purge and anti-Gaullism, the Cold War and the colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, which are fundamental in Le Pen’s itinerary; then, after 1968, the reference to Italian neo-fascism theorized by the negationist François Duprat and very popular with the young people of the New Order movement, who were the backbone of the first FN.
“The 1930s are remembered as traumatic years.”
What exactly remains of these roots in the RN today? What we could call this old extreme right has not disappeared, but it is marginal in the France of 2024. Above all, it is fighting an RN that it finds misguided since the advent of Marine Le Pen. We will limit ourselves here to quoting the weekly Rivarol who had always supported Le Pen senior, but who today fights his daughter, or Letter from Young Nation who recently paid tribute to Léon Degrelle [NDLR : ancien combattant sur le front de l’est de la 28e division SS, et défenseur de thèses négationnistes].
Let us also add that if some consider that the anti-Arab racism of the 21st century is a legacy of the Algerian war, I am not sure that the younger generations, although some may have real xenophobic reflexes, connect these feelings to the memory from the Algerian War, to the legacy of the OAS, the pieds-noirs or the harkis. The relationship with Islam seems to me to matter much more when considering immigration.
The electoral battalions of the current RN are far from all the heritage we have just talked about. What they see and challenge is the impression they have of a country in decline and which they no longer recognize. It seems more intelligent to me to try to understand what these people are expressing by voting for the RN rather than wanting to project their own reading grids at full force. This is a bit of the danger to which the historian exposes himself: understanding the present by projecting the patterns that are familiar to him thanks to his knowledge of history. It is rich in lessons, but does not repeat itself.
How can we explain that the reference to the 1930s is a rhetorical element that always comes up, at one time or another, in the political debate?
It’s an almost morbid fascination that comes down to considering them too often and unilaterally as years of decline and decadence. There are many reasons, but what is striking to observe is that the 1930s are remembered as traumatic years. It is February 1934, assimilated by the left to a fascist peril… They are perceived as years of decline, decadence, inevitable bankruptcy preceding the crushing defeat of 1940, occupation and collaboration.
Let us also remember that after 1945, the pre-war period never gave rise to the slightest discussion of a forgotten “beautiful era”, whereas this was the case for the period before 1914. The 1930s were repudiated years of trauma , crisis.
However, on a certain number of points, it may be relevant to draw parallels between the 1930s and today: on the feeling of uncertainty about the future, on political polarization in the country , on the crisis of decision-making and the feeling of powerlessness in politics…
Another obvious reference is that of the New Popular Front. Do you find it relevant?
First, it must be remembered that the Popular Front of the 1930s was an electoral cartel, while the New Popular Front presents itself as a government alliance. It should also be noted that the contexts in which these two fronts emerge are very different. The current one was formed in a few days while the first was the product of a long process. February 1934 played an important role in the mobilization of left-wing activists, in the name of anti-fascism, through strong demonstrations organized in Paris and in the provinces.
Another essential element of the original Popular Front is the importance of the opposition between the Socialist Party and the French Communist Party. We must remember the violence of this opposition; the latter, for example, described the former as “socio-fascists” or “socio-traitors”. It was only thanks to the decision of the Communist International, in the spring of 1934, to put an end to the “class against class” tactic that a rapprochement between the two Marxist forces was possible.
This alliance of apparatus was sealed by the signing of a pact of unity of action in July 1934, which then expanded to the Radical Party a year later to form a Popular Rally. The latter is supported by a CGT which is reuniting, the Human Rights League and the Vigilance Committee of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals. Let us further underline the local roots of this mobilization since Popular Rally committees were created in many localities. The program of the Popular Front, whose matrix was anti-fascism, was intended to be unifying. It was therefore “moderate” since it was not necessary to frighten the Radical Party and its electorate.
This theme of the union of the united left in the face of “fascism”, this capacity of the left to come together despite very different programs, we find it today, whereas we do not find it on the right…
Today, the union of the rights seems to be achieved, but to the right of the right…
“What marks the historical sequence we are going through is the collapse of the right-wing government.”
Yes. This is the first time that a political group from the right-wing nationalist current has found itself with such a percentage of voters. That never happened… There were certainly some outbreaks like Poujadism in 1956, which saw Jean-Marie Le Pen become a deputy, but they were never able to last. Should we recall to what extent the FN’s breakthrough in 1984 was described by commentators at the time as a “flash in the pan”, a protest with no future. However, the RN vote today is a deeply rooted vote and, as we saw in the European elections, capable of penetrating new territories and new social categories.
What marks the historical sequence we are going through is the collapse of the right-wing government. The fact that François-Xavier Bellamy, even after a good campaign, still has a disappointing score, shows that the voters are no longer there, and that the Republicans are today a party of local elected officials rather than a party of activists, and even less a party of voters during major national elections.
This is the first time that the balance of power between the government right and the nationalist right has been reversed to this extent. So these LR voters, who find themselves in the minority, are asking themselves the question of who their party should ally with and who they should mobilize for in the second round. But ultimately, LR’s problem is even more serious: is there still political space for this formation in the face of the three blocs present?
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