Colonel Spencer on Ukraine: “Urban warfare is the toughest of all”

A former infantry colonel, John Spencer lives in Colorado (USA) from where he produces a podcast on his subject of expertise: urban warfare. He has also devoted a practical guide to the same subject for the use of his former American brothers in arms. His next book, Connected soldiers, is prefaced by General David Petraeus, former director of the CIA. With L’Express, he delivers his analysis of the conflict in Ukraine, where Russia has just launched a major offensive in the Donbass.

L’Express: President Volodymyr Zelensky affirms that the great Russian offensive on the Donbass has begun. What are your thoughts on this front of the war?

John Spencer: We are entering a new war. The Russians clearly lost the first, which was to take kyiv in a few days. A new battle opens now. The Russians want to conquer territories, including the oblasts (regions) of Donetsk and Lugansk which they only partially dominate. But for this they have to take several cities, for example Sloviansk or Kramatorsk, because in war the control of cities is strategic. They will therefore continue to bombard massively from a distance without worrying about the fate of civilians. This will not be enough to take control of urban centers.

Why do the Russians have such a hard time achieving this?

Urban warfare is the toughest of all. It’s hell. Nobody likes to fight in town because the opponent is nearby, around the corner or hidden in a building. Urban warfare is usually said to be “the great equalizer”. Everyone is equal there in the sense that aerial intelligence (satellite or drone) no longer works and that technology is less decisive than the courage of soldiers. All armies in the world prefer to avoid urban warfare, but this is inevitable because cities are the most important objective.

Initially, the Russians wanted to arrive in front of kyiv, enter the city and hoist their flag on the presidential building. If they had succeeded, Putin would have won the war. He and his generals expected to achieve this in three days, or even a week at most. They configured their entire offensive from this assumption. But things didn’t go as planned. In town, they almost lost all their battles except, probably, Mariupol, and left a lot of soldiers on the carpet.

In urban warfare, the defender has the advantage.

In effect. Once inside the city, the attacker is more vulnerable, at the mercy of thousands of pairs of eyes hidden behind each window which are all firing positions. This is why the assailant must move quickly. Each passing day benefits the defender: time is his ally. As long as the enemy has not arrived at the outskirts of the city, he must tirelessly devote himself to strengthening his defense by building barrages, placing obstacles of iron and concrete, digging tunnels, laying mines , deploying barbed wire.

“The human body can last three weeks without eating and three days without drinking”

The Chinese general strategist Sun Tzu (6th century BC) said that there is no worse strategy than to attack a besieged city. Once the access roads are blocked and the drawbridges raised, it is almost impossible to conquer a city. History repeats itself in Mariupol: despite the bombardments, the Russians had a terrible time gaining the upper hand. In a normal war, it is estimated that it is necessary to mobilize three attackers against a defender to hope to win. In an urban war, the ratio is five to one, or even more. This is why the Russian army had to mobilize at least 15,000 men in Mariupol when it was defended by 2,000 to 3,000 men. While they were fixed there, these 15,000 men could not fight on other fronts as the Russian general staff would no doubt have wished.

How do you defend a surrounded city?

One of the techniques, used in Mariupol, is to bury oneself using sewers, cellars, pipes and by digging new tunnels. It’s as old as the catacombs in Jerusalem at the time of the Roman legions. In Stalingrad too, the Soviets defended their city using the subsoil. However, the fights take place on the surface, in the streets, in the buildings. It may be counterintuitive, but in urban warfare, most victims are killed in the streets, not in buildings, as some war movies might suggest.

How food and water supply when one is besieged?

The human body can last three weeks without eating but only three days without drinking. If it rains, you have to have the reflex to collect the rainwater. The question of stocks (of water, food, ammunition) is crucial. These reserves must be distributed in different places so that they do not have to be transported when moving from one position to another. In the buildings, the defenders must also pierce each partition, each party wall, as well as the floors and ceilings, to transform the buildings in which they are located into Swiss cheese. They will thus be able to move from one room to another, which makes it possible to multiply the firing positions without being noticed. Which, in turn, multiplies the surprise effect and disorients the enemy. Alas, once the stocks of ammunition are exhausted, all that remains is to surrender or to fight hand-to-hand as the last resistants of Mariupol will do.

What are the other tactics of urban warfare?

Defenders must establish strong positions from carefully chosen buildings that can be defended from all four sides. Certain buildings, such as government buildings, are often suitable for urban defense because they are generally solid and can be transformed into mini-fortresses. In September 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad, Russian Sergeant Yakov Pavlov made history for defending a four-story building – later dubbed the “Pavlov House” – defending it for 58 days with only about 20 men against the German assaults. He had surrounded the building with barbed wire and obstacles and, above all, placed artillery devices (which he had dismantled and then reassembled) at the four corners of the building.

“Even surrounded, it is possible to defend yourself for a very, very long time”

Another building that became famous is that of the Public Treasury during the Battle of Manila, which was the scene of the worst urban fighting of the Pacific War (100,000 dead in February-March 1945). Clashes between the besieged Japanese and Americans and Filipinos continued for several days inside the building where bunkers had been constructed and snipers fired at each other from wing to wing. In Mariupol too, the Ukrainians have demonstrated that it is possible to defend oneself for a very, very long time, even when surrounded by thousands of men.

Is a city in ruins easier to defend?

Yes, because the rubble slows down the enemy advance, as shown by the Battle of Ortona between Canadian and German paratroopers in December 1943, nicknamed the “Italian Stalingrad” because of the brutality of the close combat. It’s paradoxical but when the Russians bury a city under bombs, they make it easier for the Ukrainians to defend. A collapsing building is a multitude of new firing positions for defenders as well as additional iron and concrete obstacles. But it’s not just the rubble that serves the defense. In an urban guerrilla warfare, everything is needed, including the sheets, as in Aleppo, Syria, where the streets were obstructed by fabrics to better protect against enemy fire.

How important are snipers?

Their role is crucial and their action is twofold. Tactical and psychological. They kill enemies and they instill in them a sense of fear. Take a walk in any French city and tell yourself that there is potentially a shooter behind every window. This will give you an idea of ​​what a Russian soldier might feel when entering a city hostile to his presence. Snipers are a multiplier force in demoralizing the enemy.

How has the appearance of smartphones changed warfare?

This is the subject of my next book, Connected soldiers (Connected Soldiers), which will be published in June in English based on my personal memories. In 2003, in Iraq, the life of the soldiers resembled what we see in the movies: the fighters lived together and, in the evening, they wrote letters to their families. When I returned there in 2008 things had already changed. In the evening, the soldiers did not take the time to debrief the horrible situations they had experienced during the past day – dead children, killed comrades – because they were each on the phone with their families. On the one hand, it’s positive because being able to talk to your wife and children can help boost morale. On the other hand, if we are careful, it is harmful to the cohesion of the group. The military command today must come to terms with this new reality.

What war movies do you recommend?

The list is long but I advise you Stalingrad by Jean-Jacques Annaud, released in 2001, which is a lesson in the use of snipers, and the series Brothers in arms produced by Tom Hanks in Steven Spielberg, also in 2001, which shows how, even with a lot of injuries and casualties, group cohesion and morale can achieve great things. For the same reason, I also recommend We have to save the soldier Ryan by Steven Spielberg (1998).

Back to the war in Ukraine. According to you, the Russian victory is not guaranteed?

No. This conflict revealed to the world the weaknesses of the Russian army. It’s still a large army, but it’s not the best. Not only can the Ukrainian army resist him, but it can regain lost ground. Hopes for a negotiated political solution are dim or nil. And Russia will not stop the fight until it has been defeated militarily. Moscow will continue to sacrifice a large part of its army to try to win the war. This is the meaning of the recent promotion of General Dvornikov, alias “the butcher of Aleppo”. Russia needs a victory to show its people and to restore the image of its army, which the world has seen is not such a great power.

Will the Russians lose?

You ask me to read in a crystal ball. In war, there is never certainty. In my opinion, one of the determining factors will be the speed with which the West provides Ukraine with the promised material. However, transporting arms to the Eastern Front from Poland is not easy. In the final analysis, however, I think that Ukraine will push back against Russia and that Russia will wear itself out militarily. Desertions, refusals to fight and the death of Russian generals will continue. This last point represents a considerable problem for Russia. It will take years, or decades, to recover.