It has become a habit, between two leaders who call themselves “friends”. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met for the 43rd time this Thursday, May 16, during a new visit by the Russian president to Beijing. The head of the Kremlin reserved for his counterpart his first trip abroad since his “re-election” last March; thus returning the courtesy to Xi Jinping, who flew to Moscow after being reappointed for a third term last year.
This visit comes barely ten days after the mini-European tour of the Chinese leader, who, after France, visited Serbia and Hungary, two notoriously pro-Russian countries. While Emmanuel Macron has tried to convince Xi Jinping to pressure Putin to end the war, the strategic partnership between China and Russia still appears to be in good shape. The China-Russia relationship “is not only in the fundamental interests of the two countries and the two peoples, but it is also conducive to peace,” said the Chinese No. 1. “Together, we support the principles of justice and a democratic world order reflecting multipolar realities and based on international law,” Putin, for his part, boldly declared, implicitly emphasizing a common desire to shake up an international order dominated by the United States and its Western allies.
For China, “the end of the war in Ukraine must not be for the benefit of the West, nor of Ukraine”, underlines Alice Ekman, analyst responsible for Asia at the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union and author of China-Russia. The great rapprochement (Tracts Gallimard, 2023). Beijing should therefore, according to the sinologist, “continue to support Moscow, diplomatically, economically and technologically”. Interview.
L’Express: After his visit to France on May 6 and 7, Xi Jinping visited Serbia, then Hungary, two pro-Russian countries. He receives Vladimir Putin in Beijing for a two-day visit. What message is the Chinese president sending with this sequence?
Alice Ekman: Xi Jinping confirms the rapprochement initiated with Russia for ten years now, following the annexation of Crimea, and which has accelerated for two years, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Because China has chosen its side a long time ago. She never condemned the Russian invasion, and never even named it as such. Beijing has regularly called for Russia’s security concerns to be taken into consideration. And has just as regularly condemned Western sanctions against Moscow. At the same time, Sino-Russian trade has exploded since the invasion of Ukraine and reached 240 billion dollars (222 billion euros) in 2023, according to Chinese customs. Diplomatic coordination between the two countries has been strengthened within international organizations (UN, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Brics +, etc.) and China has done everything to prevent Russia from becoming a “pariah state”. Furthermore, the two countries continue to organize joint military exercises.
Emmanuel Macron sought to convince Xi Jinping to pressure Putin to end the war. But is this in the Chinese leader’s interest? Can he seek to slow down the Russian president so as not to complicate his relations with the United States and Europe at a time when his economy is slowing down?
The Chinese economy is indeed in a very complicated phase, but so far the slowdown in its growth has not profoundly changed the orientations of China’s foreign policy, nor its approach to Russia.
In my opinion, it is not credible that she could play mediator to try to find a way out of the crisis, given her obvious bias in favor of Russia.
What is China’s strategy regarding the war in Ukraine? What does she ultimately want for Russia? Will it slow down the sending of “dual-use” materials or components (civil and military) to avoid sanctions?
China wants a strong Russia, which remains led by Vladimir Putin. For her, the end of the war in Ukraine should not be for the benefit of the “West”, in the broad sense, and of a Ukraine which, according to official Chinese perception, would be used by the United States and its allies for the promotion of their geostrategic and economic interests. This perception appears reductive, but it is indeed the one that is reflected in Chinese communication currently. It is possible that in the short term, China wants to give the impression – to its Western interlocutors – of being willing to slow down the shipment of dual-use components, but its real and deep perception is that these Western sanctions are totally illegitimate, and that it is within its rights to continue to “trade normally” with Russia, which it probably will do.
Beijing will continue to support Russia economically, diplomatically and technologically, considering that victory will be decided over time.
Is Xi afraid of locking himself into a relationship with Putin that could harm him if Russia spirals out of control?
Its relationship with Russia has already been harming it for more than two years: sanctions, degradation of its image in part of the world, including within the European Union, which remains a very important market for China. But Beijing appears willing to pay the price for its rapprochement with Russia. For the moment, China is not seeking to slow down the rapprochement, or to provide safeguards.
How to characterize the relationship between Xi Jinping and Putin? Can we talk about friendship?
Certainly, the Sino-Russian relationship is maintained by the very frequent exchanges between the two leaders: today is their 43rd meeting, and Vladimir Putin’s second visit to China in barely 6 months. It is also his first visit abroad since his “re-election” – just as Xi Jinping visited Moscow shortly after the 20th Party Congress and the extension of his own mandate, in March 2023.
Beyond the personal relationship, the two countries above all have increasingly convergent political and geostrategic interests. Their rapprochement is not only pragmatic, short-term. It is based on the desire to form a common front against the United States, the West in the broad sense, and to restructure global governance together to their advantage, by supporting the rise of initiatives and institutions where countries Westerners would be absent, in the minority or marginalized. The very first, ambitious declarations at the start of the visit remind us of this: they refer to joint work for the advent of a new “world order”, to common opposition to “alliances”.
For some observers, the fact that Russia becomes more and more dependent on China would threaten the partnership in the long term. Is that your opinion?
No. We were already saying this in 2014, and the rapprochement has nevertheless been consolidated quickly and continuously since. Of course, there is a very strong imbalance between the 2nd and 11th economic powers in the world, and Russia’s dependence on China has increased since the invasion of Ukraine. China would have the capacity to “vassalize” Russia, but today it has no desire to do so, because it is really not in its interest. On the contrary, she does everything to take care of Russia, nourish the relationship, maintain it without making her partner feel that he is the “weak link” in the relationship (or the junior partner). When Xi Jinping declares today that “the China-Russia relationship today has been hard-won and both sides must cherish and nurture it”, this is to be taken at face value.
Besides Russia, China is close to Iran and North Korea. As well as many countries that criticize the West, such as Hungary or Venezuela. Is China seeking to form an anti-Western coalition?
Yes, very clearly, China has had a coalition strategy in place for over six years now. It seeks to unite as many countries as possible around its positions, always with the objective of building a broader anti-Western front. She considers that Russia is a central partner in the deployment of this strategy.
How does China view the rapprochement between North Korea and Russia? Is this something that worries him? Is she afraid of losing her influence over Pyongyang?
I think we need to put possible Chinese concerns into perspective. First of all, objectively, we have so far no concrete evidence or signs of such concern. Then, seen from Beijing: the first threat remains American, by a long way. Russia and North Korea are not currently perceived as such, rightly or wrongly. As partnerships between the United States and its allies in the region consolidate (United States-South Korea-Japan trilateral dialogue in January, and United States-Philippines-Japan in April), developments that China sees With a very bad eye, I would not be surprised if Beijing seeks to strengthen China-North Korea-Russia cooperation in the medium term, capitalizing on the current rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang. To confirm.
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