It is a series of acronyms that look like a coded language. A sabir which the “technos” of Brussels love, they alone or almost being able to find their way around such a maquis. SCF, ETS, CBAM, EED, RED… These abbreviations each designating one of the legislative blocks of the European climate package probably do not mean much to most of the 450 million citizens of the European Union. For Pascal Canfin, they no longer hold any secrets.
President of the European Parliament’s Environment Committee, MEP Renaissance has been sitting in one of the driving seats of the European climate steamroller for two years. On July 14, 2021, the Commission promised legislative fireworks with its “Fit for 55”, a corpus of a dozen texts supposed to bring Europe on the path to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030. Since then, Europe has been carrying out this program with clockwork regularity.
Take a closer look: in the space of eighteen months, almost all of the provisions of the “Fit for 55” have been negotiated and voted on by parliamentarians. And we’re not talking about scoops. End of gasoline vehicles in 2035, creation of a carbon market at the borders of Europe, reform of this same market within borders, social fund for the climate… Ambitious texts, to which we must add others, such as the agreement on the fight against imported deforestation. Among these texts, several world firsts and a general ambition that places Europe by far at the forefront of climate action. “The year 2022 shows the systemic nature of what we are in the process of achieving. The essential projects are landing one after the other, with a level of ambition that has not been downgraded, it is quite remarkable”, welcomes the MEP, met in Paris a few weeks ago.
The role of progressive business
The contrast is striking. While in France the current executive can hardly hope to pass a text in the Assembly without relying on 49.3, the European Union is overcoming the challenge of the political fragmentation of its Parliament and national particularisms. A feat which, to hear the former boss of WWF, is justified by a multiplicity of factors. But the most important thing is undoubtedly the participation of the majority of companies in this shift, even if this sometimes makes NGOs cringe. “Political will is essential, but it is not enough. The key to our success is the ability to form an alliance with the progressive part of the economic world. On the automobile, we managed to reach an agreement because we Volkswagens, Volvos, Stellantis who are already committed on their side. On deforestation, where the final voted text is even more ambitious than that initially proposed by the Commission, players like Danone, Mars, who had themselves made zero-deforestation commitments, actively helped us in the construction of the text. Without these actors, you lose too many bricks along the way.”
However, six years ago, the German giant was entangled in the resounding Dieselgate scandal. This would now lead by example? “There is an awareness among manufacturers that the business as usual at the time of the climate crisis, it is a fantasy. Climate skeptics have become old-fashioned in Brussels”, explains the deputy. According to him, the coming of age of technologies in renewable energies or batteries, for example, constitutes an equally essential fuel for their change.
“The geopolitical and technological battle for the localization of low-carbon economy value chains has begun. The driver of change for these companies is no longer ‘it would be nice if we limited warming to 2 degrees’, but ‘ I want techno in my house. From then on, investments are made. We use the power of capitalism wisely.” To hear it, some players in the business world certainly continue to drag their feet. “You have every right as a private actor to say that such and such a measure proposed by the Commission does not hold water… but you must be able to propose another measure which achieves the same level of climate performance. Otherwise you put yourself out of the game”, he explains again.
Short and long term alignment
Europe, which has experienced three years of lead with the Covid crisis and the current energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has also found – at its expense – the answer to this tragedy of temporalities which means that the short-termism of the political mandate hardly constitutes an interest in acting for the energy transition, the consequences of which we know are spread out over time. The gas shortage is the most perfect example of this: succeeding in doing without the molecules provided by the Russians by developing renewable energies and energy savings is good for sovereignty and good for the climate. . The geopolitical battle for the location of value chains is also a decisive input. “When we see the protectionism of the Chinese and the Americans with the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the 400 billion dollars put on the table by Washington, it’s really the last moment to stall. On the contrary, we must accelerate to maintain our leadership.”
Of course, it would be wrong to say that this momentum in favor of the climate is made in an immediate and generalized consensus. The extension of the carbon market to buildings and transport, for example, was challenged once by MEPs before being adopted at the end of the year. Like the conflict between Paris and Berlin on the question of hydrogen, to which we could add that on nuclear power, on the reform of the European electricity market or the rate of national contributions to the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, divergences continue to exist within the countries members of the European Union.
“We can discuss the settings. But the heart of the political will is to be consistent with the Paris agreement. As long as this point is not called into question, it necessarily limits the field of possible disagreement. , explains Pascal Canfin. It is never a war of trenches. There is the permanent search for compromise, inspired by the German, Scandinavian and Dutch political cultures which infuse within the European Union.
The machine can seize
This beautiful European climate machine could nevertheless seize up in the coming months. The inflation of pro-climate laws and texts could arouse growing opposition in public opinion heated white-hot by the erosion of purchasing power and repeated crises. The recessionary clouds over the Old Continent could upset the order of priorities to the detriment of the fight against global warming. Worse, the bloodless finances of the Member States as well as the monetary tightening to fight against inflation, this means less funds to finance the transition.
The opportunity for Pascal Canfin to entrust a disappointment: “I had proposed in a report that we take advantage of low rates to secure at the time of the Covid, in 2020 and 2021, the public debt necessary to finance the transition. two years ago, we were financing ourselves at zero interest rates, and all the creditors would have bought green debt. This was not done by the government and I regret it…” However, the projects for 2023 are at least as ambitious as those of 2022. Jumble of texts on the response to the American IRA, the circular economy, the reduction of dependence on critical metals, the reform of the electricity market, the doubling of the share of renewable energies in the mix or the acceleration towards carbon-free hydrogen will be on the menu in Brussels and Strasbourg…
To this must be added the risk of execution on all of these major principles. Placing the cursor very high on the legislative level is worthless if the initial ambition withers along the way because of the impossibility for the various actors in the economic and social world to achieve their objectives. “Zero-emission cars mean taking all the pieces of the problem, from the batteries to the charging points. That’s what we do. As soon as you reach a point of balance in the current system, it has to be reconfigured with another. That’s why the 54 laws of the Green Deal are necessary to ensure this consistency”, says Pascal Canfin.
The two other countermeasures found by the European Union are on the one hand the gradual increase in the various texts, so as not to brutalize the industrialists: the carbon adjustment mechanism at the borders for example, supposed to come into force this year, will thus reach its cruising speed from 2026, and again, in a limited panel of sectors, which does not include processed products for example. Manufacturers will be able to benefit for a few more years from so-called free quotas for emitting CO2. The protectionist accents of the same text, which aims for its part to protect European industrialists from their Chinese or American competitors by making the latter pay the carbon price paid by industrialists from the Old Continent, is also an important element of doctrine. Brussels also has other irons in the fire on this subject, with the response to the American Inflation Reduction Act, expected in the coming weeks. This pragmatic approach aimed at protecting European industrialists is sometimes resented by NGOs who believe that the European Union is not moving fast enough. But climate advocates must convince themselves that without a strong and competitive industrial Europe, green Europe will remain a mirage.