Can France assume a deterrent role for the whole of Europe? – L’Express

The end of the Cold War had removed from the minds of Europeans the risk of apocalypse posed by nuclear weapons, which had long been part of their daily lives. The threats made by the Russian president with the invasion of Ukraine have reintroduced it abruptly. This is not the only symptom of a shift into a new era. The Russian-American bipolarity is being challenged by China, whose arsenal continues to grow in opacity. New “endowed” powers are emerging: North Korea, already; Iran if it decides, and other states, tomorrow, if they see it as the only way to ensure their survival. In 1964, the director Stanley Kubrick titled his satirical film Dr. Strangelove: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the BombThis “mad love” has taken over the world and complicates the game of powers.

EPISODE 1 – Nuclear weapons, the bidding war: how Ukraine had to give up its bomb

EPISODE 2 – Putin and the nuclear bomb: the risk of apocalypse

EPISODE 3 – China and its colossal nuclear arsenal: the inside story of Beijing’s mysterious expansion

EPISODE 4 – The United States’ titanic plan against Russia and China

EPISODE 5 – Nuclear weapons: North Korea’s inevitable atomic test

In the middle of the afternoon on January 30, it was already dark in Stockholm when Emmanuel Macron spoke at Karlberg Castle, the training ground for Swedish officers. In front of King Carl XVI Gustaf, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, and officials and cadets, he recalled that France had “nuclear weapons” and that its “vital interests have a European dimension.”

Emmanuel Macron is not the first president to connect French deterrence and Europe. “The definition of our vital interests cannot be limited to the national scale alone,” declared François Hollande in 2015, linking them to the “survival of Europe.” Before him, Jacques Chirac affirmed that “French nuclear deterrence, by its very existence” is “an essential element of the continent’s security.” Even earlier, at the Ottawa summit in 1974, NATO specified that France, like the United Kingdom, plays “a specific deterrent role contributing to the overall strengthening of the Alliance’s deterrence,” ensured, above all, by the nuclear umbrella of the United States.

New interest in Europe

The current tenant of the Elysée Palace, however, differentiates himself from his predecessors by his insistence on opening a “specific dialogue with [les] “European partners who are ready for it” – the proposal was formulated at the war college on February 7, 2020, before being reiterated at the Munich Security Conference, three years later, and then during the state visit to Sweden. It must be said that there is a new interest in Europe for such a discussion.

This is the case in Poland, whose President Andrzej Duda described as “absolutely positive” the European dimension of French deterrence mentioned by the French president. But also in Germany, even if the continued presence of American nuclear weapons remains the priority. If public reflections on an alternative deterrence to that provided by the United States are nothing new there, “this time, it’s different”, notes in a recent article Ulrich Kühn, director of the arms control program at the University of Hamburg. “The early debates were mainly the work of experts,” while “those who are discussing them today” are also “political heavyweights.”

Finance Minister Christian Lindner thus pleadedin February, to engage in a dialogue on a European deterrent with Paris and London, praising the contribution of their “strategic nuclear forces.” This position came just after a thunderous statement by former President Donald Trump. The Republican candidate warned his NATO allies that if they did not increase their defense budgets, he would “absolutely not” defend them, adding that he would “encourage [les Russes] to do whatever they want.” Of course, he has come back on his words, but the European chancelleries have been worried since then that their American ally will turn its back on them one day or another.

While it seems unlikely, the withdrawal of American troops and nuclear weapons stationed in Europe (the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey) is not impossible and could occur if the United States returns to an isolationist policy. “This is the worst-case scenario, but we can also fear a gradual disengagement to confront China, which is aiming for nuclear parity with the United States by 2035,” underlines a former strategist of French nuclear forces. In 2035, the American umbrella could be less and less credible over Europe, it is at that time that the question of the European dimension of French deterrence will arise.”

A concept of “strict sufficiency”

France’s atomic program, haunted by the collapse of June 1940, was designed to ensure the country’s survival. French deterrence is based on a concept of “strict sufficiency.” Roughly speaking, France’s 290 nuclear warheads correspond to what a stronger adversary would, according to it, use to annihilate it. This calibration is sufficient, in theory, to inflict “unacceptable damage” on the aggressor. “For example, if Russia decides to attack France’s vital interests, it knows that it will have to suffer the damage that its 290 nuclear warheads can cause,” explains Héloïse Fayet, a researcher at the French Institute of International Relations.

What is valid for France is also valid, in terms of deterrence, for a European territory from which the United States would disengage? “There comes a time when the number of nuclear warheads counts,” explains the former strategist. “To be credible, you need to have a force capable of inflicting retaliatory strikes.” In short: French capabilities and those of the United Kingdom (225 warheads) risk no longer being credible to protect the rest of Europe in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike. “If they were to extend their deterrence to the continent, it would be such a paradigm shift that they might have to rearm,” points out Héloïse Fayet.

In this scenario, which is now highly unlikely, France could be forced to restart its production of military-grade uranium and plutonium to supply these additional weapons, even though it has dismantled its facilities. This would be the price of European strategic autonomy.