We thought they had lost their luster after Vladimir Putin’s foolish decision to invade Ukraine. And that the Boutcha massacre, the destruction of the Kakhovka dam or the march on Moscow by Wagner’s mercenaries, which exposed the cracks in Russian power, would silence them. The ace. The pro Russians and their useful idiots remain very active in France. Bruno Tertrais, political scientist, gives us his analysis of their influence, particularly in the diplomatic, religious and military spheres.
L’Express: What are the historical roots of this French diplomatic tradition which consisted, of Putin’s rise to power in 2000 at the beginning of the war in Ukraineto want to get closer to Russia?
Several factors overlap: romanticism, illustrated in particular by the philosophical correspondence between Voltaire and Catherine II; Gaullism and the desire to be a ‘power of balance’; and anti-Americanism, left and right. A fourth reason stems from the three previous ones: that Russia is a natural ally, including in the face of jihadism. Finally, this temptation also results from our common status: we are both permanent members of the UN Security Council and nuclear powers.
It took the Bratislava speech on May 31 for Emmanuel Macron to update his relationship with Vladimir Putin. “We haven’t been consistent in our approach,” he said. Why so late?
The idea that we ‘humiliated Russia’ and failed to treat her with the respect due to her rank in 1991 is, in the imagination of many officials, an original sin of Western diplomacy. It is a thesis which does not hold water, but which is deeply anchored. Like the idea that Russia is ‘naturally European’. Another illusion, from which stems the idea that we could prevent ‘Russia from falling into the arms of China’. As if we had the means to prevent Putin from making Russia a Eurasian power, which is his plan! The common point of all this, therefore, are the French illusions: the illusion of our ability to change the situation, the illusion of being able to reattach Russia to Europe, the illusion again of wanting to build a new security architecture that suits everyone.
Popularity in the opinion of this erroneous software does not explain everything. I have hypothesized that Putin knows how to hold up a mirror to those who imagine reproducing the Gaullist gesture in spite of the setbacks, in each generation and despite the failures. A form of diplomatic neurosis…
Today, would you say that Russia has contacts within French diplomacy?
Personalities who express pro-Russian views fall into three categories: the paid, the useful idiots, and the naïve. Employees are very rare. France’s problem is the other two categories. It must be said that Putin knows how to seduce his world… Among those who have or have had blinders, cognitive biases on Russia, we find academics, journalists, but also certain former ministers or diplomats. They may be brilliant, but have been unable to see Putin’s Russia for what it is. When Nicolas Sarkozy promises two Mistral warships to Moscow, he adopts the same logic as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, which consists in saying: “The more relations and interdependencies we have with Russia, the less we risk going to war”. Added to this for some is the sovereignist dimension – through romanticism, anti-Americanism, or both. But when it comes to our diplomacy, let’s be clear: making the Quai d’Orsay a nest of pro-Russians would be totally wrong. Diplomats carry out the president’s policy. The best proof that the ministry is not ‘pro-Kremlin’ is the suspicion expressed by the president in 2019 of a ‘deep state’ opposing his open policy. Which is equally false. French presidents risk more, on the part of their diplomats, the excess of zeal than obstructionism…
For a long time, the extreme right and the extreme left did not hide their closeness to Vladimir Putin. They are more discreet, even if Marine Le Pen has spoken out against arms deliveries to Ukraine…
One can no longer be openly admiring of Putin in France. As a result, there is a kind of translation towards other arguments, which fall under anti-Americanism (the idea that the United States is somewhat responsible for the war and benefits from it), balancing act (the dismissal of the two belligerents back to back, insisting on ‘corrupt Ukraine and its extremist actors) and pacifism (the call for peace and negotiations). And you find this dialectic from Marine Le Pen to Jean-Luc Mélenchon, to varying degrees and in various forms.
Will the proponents of negotiation and the end of the war seek to pressure Ukraine to make concessions?
If the current counter-offensive does not change the situation, yes. Otherwise, these ‘pacifists’ will probably wait for the outcome of the November 2024 election in the United States, which could lead to American distancing if a Republican candidate is elected. They are in ambush.
What is the influence of the prorussians in the religious sphere?
The idea of saying that Russia is defending true European conservative values, which was so successful from the Manif pour tous, no longer works. Putin’s Russia is having great difficulty today in convincing French public opinion that it is not the aggressor and that it remains the guardian of true European values. She lost this double battle. It must be said that Russian society and the behavior of its leaders hardly correspond to the values of Europe…
And in French military circles?
There is a certain admiration for Russia in the armies, with several aspects that come together. First, a romantic vision of the Franco-Russian alliance, which does not correspond to the history of our relations. We were more often enemies than allies, and when we were together, it was to face Germany. As for the idea that Moscow is fighting effectively against radical Islam, that is a joke. Then, a convergence based on personal convictions. The army is a rather conservative environment, which includes many practicing Christians who sometimes flirt with traditionalism. And there is also, sometimes, a secret admiration for the ‘strong man’. I would say that the army is not at the forefront of demonizing Putin’s Russia, to use an understatement. It was the same with Serbia in the 1990s. It doesn’t weigh much, and the military are, like diplomats, perfectly legitimists. But we cannot neglect this dimension.