After three days of a lightning offensive, Islamist rebels opposed to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, dominated by the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), took control of the “major part” of Aleppo, second town in the country. This violence is the first of such magnitude in years in Syria, where the belligerents supported by different regional and international powers with divergent interests were in a phase of war of attrition, with regular bombings on areas held by the opposition.
The director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (OSDH) told AFP that jihadists and rebels, some of whom supported by Turkey, had quickly taken large areas of Aleppo “without encountering significant resistance” . For L’Express, Arthur Quesnay, doctor in political science, affiliated with the University of Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, analyzes this attack which brutally relaunches the Syrian conflict. Interview.
L’Express: The jihadist group HTS and its allies have taken control of the “major part” of Aleppo, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Was this predictable?
Arthur Quesnay: An attack by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, also known as HTS, was expected against the Syrian regime. For a long time, HTS had suggested that it wanted to take advantage of the opportunity of the withdrawal of Lebanese Hezbollah to defend southern Lebanon and massive Israeli strikes against Iranian cadres in Syria. Convinced that the weakening of the axis of resistance gave them a real chance to reopen the battle of Aleppo and a new strategic horizon. Furthermore, HTS knew that the Syrian army was exhausted and incapable of holding the front line alone, much less of carrying out urban combat. The current situation is radically different from 2020 when the regime, supported by its Russian, Iranian, Iraqi militias and Lebanese Hezbollah allies, managed to retake more than 30% of the province of Idlib, then held by HTS.
Thus, if we expected an HTS attack to conquer a few villages and reduce military pressure on Idlib, the surprise comes from the speed of the collapse of the regime’s forces. In barely two days of fighting the front line collapsed, the regime had no plan B. Unable to counter-attack or lead urban battles, we witnessed a rout. The regime evacuates its troops from the north of the country without managing to establish a new front line. After conquering Aleppo almost without fighting, HTS entered the city of Hama this evening. Nobody knows where the regime will manage to establish a front line.
This attack puts an end to years of very relative calm in the Syrian northwest…
We were in a situation of war of attrition, but no lull. Since the freezing of the front lines in 2020, there have been weekly bombings against opposition-held areas in the north of the country, particularly against Idlib, controlled by the HTS, where more than 3 million displaced people lived in poverty in camps. fortune. In the rest of the country, the repression of the regime’s security services against the population has never weakened. In the absence of victors, the war was far from over, as these recent events prove.
What do we know about the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?
Originally, it was a jihadist group formed after a split within Jabhat al-Nusra, which was the Syrian branch of the Islamic State. The IS followed a caliphate project, with a jihad turned towards abroad, a massive repression against the population and all the groups refusing to pledge allegiance to it, while certain executives of Jabhat al-Nusra, like Abu Mohammed al Jolani, the current leader of HTS, wanted to join the Syrian revolution to bring down the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The break with the Islamic State in 2013 was bloody and to this day HTS and ISIS face each other. For its part, HTS is trying to standardize and obtain international recognition. For example, by moderating its modes of governance and openly fighting ISIS, it hopes to be removed from the lists that list it among terrorist groups. Moreover, since 2015, Western strikes against jihadist cadres have always avoided HTS positions.
The group claims more than 30,000 men, perhaps more than 10,000 in reality, trained and motivated, but also well equipped and very organized, as the videos reaching us show. They have almost no international support. The Turkish army also considers them a terrorist group. The strength of HTS was above all to preserve its strategic autonomy with a desire to control important economic points, such as border posts. HTS has given itself the means to achieve its ambitions where other rebel groups have come under Turkish control and are known for their corruption.
How do you analyze the timing of this attack, while the Syrian regime’s ally, Lebanese Hezbollah, is busy on the front lines of the war with Israel?
The weakening of the Iranian axis of resistance, with regular bombings from Israel, as well as the withdrawal of elite Lebanese Hezbollah forces for southern Lebanon, have de facto weakened the Syrian front zones and the regime.
In terms of strategic perspectives, the HTS had to move and change the balance of power if they wanted to avoid suffocation in the pocket of Idlib, with insoluble governance problems – 3 million displaced people for only 9,000 civil servants. paid by HTS – and regular bombings. Idlib was similar to Gaza. Once hegemonic, HTS had no other choice but to attack to restart the game. The Syrian regime’s scorched earth strategy and its refusal to negotiate an end to the conflict ultimately turned against Bashar al-Assad when the regional balance of power shifted with the war in Lebanon and the weakening of its allies.
According to OSDH testimonies, there was no fighting and the authorities withdrew from Aleppo. Does Bashar al-Assad’s regime have the means to retake the city quickly?
Impossible. Its army is in complete disarray and the regime has never won a single urban battle. Apart from holding the front line 15 kilometers from Aleppo thanks to Russian bombings, the regime had no plan B. As soon as this front line fractured, it was over, hence the absence of significant fighting. As in 2012-2013, the regime is currently abandoning its positions in favor of the Syrian democratic forces (the FDS, a Kurdish militia operating mainly in northern Syria). The Syrian authorities speak of a “strategic withdrawal”, but in reality it is a massive defeat. The capture of Aleppo is a very hard blow to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, who had built his authority on the recapture of the city in 2016. HTS seized a lot of military equipment, which will probably make it a leading military actor. With the return of large-scale military operations, the Syrian conflict finds itself in the same situation of fluidity and volatility as in 2013.
Since yesterday, Russia has supported the Syrian regime with strikes on occupied neighborhoods. Is this useful?
Russia has been continuously striking areas occupied by the opposition for years. But the use of aviation is of no use. These are punitive operations where they bomb civilian areas. It is almost impossible to reverse the situation without the support of troops on the ground. Also, the HTS would have recovered anti-aircraft defense means from the Syrian regime forces and therefore the possibility of countering these strikes.
Could the return of the Islamic State and rebel groups to Aleppo trigger the fall of Bashar al-Assad, or at least weaken his power?
Weakening power most certainly. However, it is still too early to talk about the fall of the regime. Three elements emerge from this attack. First, on the political level, by bringing down the regime in the north of the country, the HTS gained long-sought revolutionary credit, becoming a leading actor. Then, on the military level, the conquest of numerous military bases and immense quantities of equipment and ammunition will allow HTS to recruit massively and build a real army. Finally, the territorial gains are immense: Aleppo, the country’s second city; Hama is falling; and who knows then. These gains are crucial in view of the negotiations that will follow. Whether with opposition rebel groups, with countries in the region, or even with Kurdish forces supported by the West.
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