Born in Moscow, Anna Colin Lebedev is one of the best French specialists in post-Soviet societies. Lecturer at the University of Paris Nanterre, she published last year “Never brothers?” (Ed. Seuil), an essay in which she analyzes the divergent trajectories taken by Russian and Ukrainian societies in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet bloc and the gap deeper than ever between these two peoples since February 24, 2022. “During twenty years, the power of Putin has held thanks to the demobilization of its population, encouraged to be interested neither in wars nor in public affairs in general, she explains. But the regime is now operating a total shift, asking society to stand up as one and make great sacrifices.”
L’Express: Eleven months after the February 24, 2022 invasion, Putin seems to be preparing the Russians for a long war in Ukraine. On what springs does he play?
Anna Colin Lebedev : Since the announcement of the mobilization in September, his speech has focused on the major threat posed by a belligerent West, represented by the armed forces of NATO. This argument echoes the memory of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) against Nazi Germany, and aims to impose the idea of a “just war”. It has two dimensions. On the one hand, the Russian army comes to the aid of poor civilian victims of a neo-Nazi Ukrainian regime; on the other, she defends her country against forces that seek to destroy it.
Is this argument mobilizing?
For twenty years, Putin’s power held thanks to the demobilization of his population, encouraged to take no interest in wars or in public affairs in general. Citizens were invited to get involved in their professional and private lives. The State wanted to be protective, by paying aid to the most precarious categories of the population in order to buy social peace.
Despite this, Russia remained an extremely unequal country. According to the most optimistic estimates, 13 to 15% of the population lives below the poverty line, and there remain great disparities: a century separates life in the cities and in the countryside, and the gap is also enormous between Moscow, Saint Petersburg and the outskirts. In reality, it was less a protective state than a laissez-faire state, which was already precious for many citizens, happy to finally be able to project themselves into their future after decades of communist yoke. However, today the regime is operating a total shift, asking society to stand up as one man and make great sacrifices. I’m not sure this message is getting through…
However, the mobilized and their relatives did not rebel massively…
Some accepted the mobilization with the conviction of engaging in a just fight. For their families, adhering to this discourse is a way of making the inevitable acceptable: since my son is on the front lines, he is suffering and may not come back, it is better that it is not for nothing. Moreover, the population is not yet fully aware of the fate of these mobilized. The coffins have not returned and will not return for the most part, since the army often does not collect the bodies of its soldiers. As for those mobilized in September, some have just arrived at the front. They criticized a lot at the beginning that they had no weapons, no equipment, no training but without contesting the war itself. There will be a second moment of speaking when the soldiers who have returned alive speak.
Can these testimonies cause an electric shock in a Russian society that some describe as “zombified”?
Russian society can only be understood on a long-term scale. The history of the 20th century in Russia and the Soviet Union is that of a State that repeatedly passes like a steamroller over personal and family destinies. During the 1917 revolution, entire social classes were exterminated. The Stalinist repressions of the 1930s followed. Then came the carnage of World War II. Since the end of the 1970s, other wars (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Syria, etc.) have followed one another, and then Putin’s power has become increasingly repressive. In short, Russian families have been facing a state that is potentially murderous and oppressive towards them… for more than a century!
In this context, individual protest is often seen as counterproductive and dangerous. For example, in the Stalinist era, if an adult is arrested and sent to a camp, his children risk ending up in an orphanage and all his relatives threatened in turn with imprisonment. The Russians have therefore developed strategies for generations to survive. Appearing “zombified” and endorsing the discourse of power is one of them – some end up believing it. Others choose to distance themselves by never discussing politics.
Is there not all the same a form of generalized cynicism?
The authorities clearly have a cynical stance, or rather a very particular base of values: “grand designs” matter more than human lives. Within the population, many prefer to turn a blind eye to this war and to the very nature of Putin’s regime. It is a choice of which they bear the moral weight and which also results from a fairly high tolerance for violence in Russian society, where many people have been victims or perpetrators of violence.
Over the past fifteen years, many NGOs have chosen to align themselves with power in an attempt to move society forward, even in small steps. Such is the case of Chulpan Khamatova, a star actress in Russia who set up a foundation to help children with cancer in the early 2000s, at a time when childhood cancer care was at an unworthy level in Russia. Her strategy was to obtain the support of the government to build a pediatric oncology hospital in Moscow, even if it meant showing her support for Vladimir Putin during the 2012 presidential election (in February 2022, she condemned the invasion of Ukraine and left Russia).
Many Russians adopt this type of strategy to save the little normality that remains within society: doctors, teachers, but also a certain number of civil servants and owners of private companies.
Faced with the sacrifices demanded by the State, can the population revolt?
No major street protests are to be expected, but seemingly minor events may occur. When do these grains of sand turn into a storm? Nobody knows. These phenomena are as difficult to anticipate as an earthquake. On the other hand, we already see work-to-rule strikes, acts of sabotage and avoidance on the ground. They are likely to multiply and will ensure that increased militarization, via the mobilization and manufacture of weapons, will not produce the results expected by those in power.
What types of mobilizations are we already seeing in Russia?
In addition to occasional acts of sabotage such as the destruction of railways, the burning of soldier recruiting stations, it is interesting to see that local elites are already adopting strategies of discreet resistance. For example, the headteacher who is asked to force his teachers to distribute summonses for the mobilization, or the business manager ordered to choose 10% of his employees to be sent to the front… In the regions, these work-to-rule strikes are likely to multiply. Power asks society to transform itself at a forced march. But we have the feeling that the country finds itself in a vehicle launched on a slope at full speed with no real objective. Political and military mobilization may therefore not have the expected results.
What role does television play in shaping Russian public opinion?
Television is widely watched by the most modest Russians living in peripheral regions. Nevertheless, I would speak of a “lazy consumption” of this medium – an expression borrowed from the British sociologist Richard Hoggart: the television is on, there is background noise, from time to time you look at it, but what it gives to see is perceived as very far from the daily life of viewers, who do not take the information given at face value.
Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, the audience for state-controlled channels has plummeted in favor of social networks. Fighters and their relatives use them a lot, whether it’s VKontakte (the Russian Facebook), Telegram or WhatsApp. Information on the reality of the front goes up via these networks. This is an eminently sensitive point for power.
The demographic crisis that has been brewing for years will only get worse with the heavy military losses and the massive exodus of Russians… How do these data shed light on the country’s future?
The low level of the birth rate, which the Russian government has sought to boost in recent years by promising allowances, is explained by urbanization and the general tendency of societies to have fewer children, but it also refers to low confidence in the future. Demographically, Russia will soon be faced with shortages in key sectors. The exile following the war was massive among employees of new technologies: these often urban, educated – and rather anti-power – employees were part of the categories potentially mobilized and have the possibility of working remotely. Their mass departure is not insignificant.
A recent study of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shows the difficulties of Russia to accompany its conventional war with a cyberwar, when much was expected in this field. If the Kremlin really wanted to go on the offensive in this area, one can assume that it would struggle to find enough experts. Other areas will be affected: as part of the mobilization, the State targeted those who had skills in mechanics and driving vehicles. Logically, the drivers of agricultural machinery have been called, but also the drivers of construction vehicles, the agricultural and building sectors will therefore also suffer. For the time being, there is no major imbalance because the war has led to economic decline and a drop in orders. In the long term, it’s a whole different story.