At a time when the world’s eyes are riveted on the war in Ukraine, the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has multiplied the firing of ballistic missiles in recent weeks at a frantic pace. To the point that Washington now fears that Pyongyang will soon launch a new nuclear test. “North Korea’s nuclear capability has increased dramatically in recent years,” said Ankit Panda, a nuclear proliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment on International Peace think tank in Washington. Maintenance.
L’Express: How to explain the multiplication of North Korean fire in recent weeks?
Ankit Panda: This is according to North Korea a response to joint military exercises conducted by South Korea and the United States in recent weeks. It is the return of a well-known dynamic: Pyongyang launches fire, which pushes the United States and South Korea to respond, and again encourages North Korea to retaliate. The difference today is the much more sustained pace of North Korean fire. We have already witnessed 50 ballistic and cruise missile launches since the beginning of the year, which is an unprecedented figure. It is therefore feared that this will become a form of new normal for North Korea. This underscores Pyongyang’s determination to continue developing and modernizing its nuclear program.
Does the focus of international attention on the war in Ukraine create a window of opportunity for Kim Jong-un?
North Korea would have carried out these firings even without the war in Ukraine, insofar as this is part of a long-term strategy. However, it is clear that Western focus on the war in Ukraine reduces their attention to the Korean peninsula. Which plays, de facto, in favor of Pyongyang. Moreover, Russia’s isolation from the West, and from the international community in general, has brought Moscow closer to Pyongyang. The Russians help the North Koreans in many ways. By protecting them, with China, in the UN Security Council, against new international sanctions. But also more indirectly. Reports have accused Russian-based entities of supporting North Korea’s missile development program. A phenomenon against which Moscow will be less and less inclined to fight.
Is the North Korean nuclear threat currently underestimated?
This is indeed the case, and has been for several years. Since the expulsion of experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009, we no longer have the ability to directly monitor the development of North Korea’s nuclear program. And our ability to restrict it is limited. Meanwhile, Pyongyang continues to amass new capabilities, and to increase the number and quality of its missiles and nuclear warheads. Today we find ourselves in a situation where almost nothing that happens outside of North Korea really influences Kim Jong-un’s choices. And he has shown very little interest in coming to the negotiating table with the United States.
Therefore, in my view, we should move away – at least in the short term – from the maximalist goal of denuclearizing North Korea, to focus more on ways to avoid a nuclear escalation with Pyongyang. We need to think about what steps we can take to reduce this risk. And if North Korea is not ready to cooperate with us on this at this time, we must consider what can be done unilaterally by the United States and South Korea to move forward.
North Korea fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Tuesday, October 4, which flew over Japan.
Dario Ingiusto / L’Express
In this context of deadlock, should we expect a new North Korean nuclear test soon?
The probability is indeed strong in the weeks or months to come. Our means of predicting it would be quite limited, but it could happen within 24 to 48 hours after Kim Jong-un gave the order. This new test would likely involve a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon, in which North Korea has recently shown considerable interest.
Why such interest?
North Korea has a strategy that relies on the threat of rapid use of nuclear weapons to compensate for its conventional military inferiority to the United States and South Korea. In this context, the development of tactical nuclear weapons makes sense because it would reinforce the credibility of its deterrence. It is indeed very difficult to imagine that North Korea would have recourse from the start to the use of imprecise ballistic missiles carrying large warheads intended to wipe off the map of South Korean cities…
Pyongyang could threaten to use lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield against conventional military forces from the United States and South Korea. This would in fact increase the risk of their use, and therefore, that of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula. The fact that Pyongyang acquires this new capacity could force the United States and South Korea to have difficult discussions on how to deal with this new threat.
To forget the North Korean nuclear threat would therefore be a serious mistake…
Absolutely, because this nuclear threat is growing. North Korea’s nuclear capability has grown significantly in recent years. It now has more and better nuclear weapons, and continues to build its capabilities. This is a real nuclear threat: it is the third nuclear adversary facing the United States today.
What does China think of the evolution of North Korea’s nuclear program?
Traditionally, China has serious reluctance to allow one of its neighbors to acquire nuclear weapons. And this, despite the historically close relationship with North Korea. However, amid rising tensions between Beijing and Washington, China began to see a nuclear-armed North Korea no longer a liability, but an asset. Thus, Xi Jinping increasingly sees Kim Jong-un as a useful partner in destabilizing the United States. However, if North Korea embarked on major provocations, such as an atmospheric nuclear test, this would undoubtedly cause concern in China. But it seems unlikely to me at the present time that Kim Jong-un will take the risk of displeasing Beijing by embarking on an action of this type.