“We failed”: almost a year and a half after the horror, the observation is final. The Israeli Interior Security Agency (Shin Bet) admitted Tuesday, March 4, having “failed” in its role in the unable to prevent Hamas’ bloody attack on October 7, 2023 on Israel.
“The Shin Bet did not prevent the massacre of October 7,” said his chief Ronen Bar in a statement on the occasion of the publication of the results of an internal investigation into this national drama. “The investigation reveals that if the Shin Bet had acted differently, both in the years preceding the attack and the night it took place […] The massacre could have been prevented, “he adds.
According to the summary of this report, the investigation focused on two areas: the direct reasons why the Shin Beth failed to recognize the immediate threat represented by Hamas and the actions that led to the attack on October 7, 2023.
No underestimation of Hamas
However, “the investigation did not find any indications that the Shin Bet underestimated” the Palestinian Islamist movement. “On the contrary, there was a deep understanding of the threat, of the initiatives and the will to neutralize this threat, in particular to aim for the management of Hamas,” said the report.
To explain the unlike internal security, the investigation determines that his knowledge of the Hamas plan on a large -scale raid baptized “Jericho wall” were not considered a “direct threat” and that, according to the assessments of the Shin Bet, Hamas was mainly concentrated on “incentives for violence” in occupied West Bank.
There was also, according to the investigation report, “a misunderstanding within the Shin Bet on the solidity of the barrier (of security surrounding Gaza) and the operational response of the army, in particular the military preparation of the forces present in the sector the night of October 6 to 7”, while Israel celebrated a Jewish festival.
An “insufficient” response to alerts
The investigation also judged that a “(Israeli) policy of moderation has enabled Hamas to build an impressive military arsenal” with direct financial aid by Qatar to the military branch of the Palestinian Islamist movement.
In conclusion, the investigation considers that “the Shin Bet failed to provide a warning on the scope of the attack and the large -scale raids of Hamas conducted on October 7”. “The alerts broadcast in the night (from October 6 to 7, 2023) did not lead to operational directives and the response of the Shin Bet […] has been insufficient to prevent or thwart the large -scale attack “on southern Israel.
This internal report is published a few days after that of the Israeli army, which recognized its “full failure” to prevent the attack on Hamas from Gaza, and an “excess of confidence” having led it to underestimate the capacities of the Palestinian Islamist movement.
The attack resulted in the death of 1,218 people on the Israeli side, mostly civilians, according to an AFP count based on official Israeli data and including the dead or killed hostages. The Israeli offensive carried out in retaliation in Gaza left at least 48,405 dead, mostly civilians, according to data from the Ministry of Health of Hamas, deemed reliable by the UN. After 15 months of fighting, a truce agreement, today threatened, was concluded on January 19, which allowed the return to Israel of 33 hostages kidnapped on October 7 against nearly 1,800 Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons.