In fatigues, assault rifle on his shoulder, the chief of staff of the Israeli army, Herzi Halevi, visits his troops stationed near the northern border on September 25. For several days, IDF aircraft have relentlessly pounded the positions of Hezbollah forces in neighboring Lebanon. “You can hear the planes here, we are attacking all day, both to prepare the area for the possibility of your entry, but also to continue hitting Hezbollah,” the general says to the soldiers of an armored unit gathered before him.
At a time when Hezbollah has confirmed the death of the leader of the Lebanese militia, Hassan Nasrallah, in a strike on September 27 on the HQ of the Islamist movement, and where Israeli forces are amassing troops along their northern border, the scenario of open war between the two adversaries has never seemed so close. “Today we are clearly on this trajectory,” says Hugh Lovatt, Middle East specialist at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “The question now is whether we are heading towards an Israeli ground offensive.” The continued escalation and the rejection of calls for a ceasefire by the Jewish state leave little room for optimism.
If confirmed, this offensive would represent a much more perilous challenge for the Israeli army than that carried out for eleven months in Gaza. Because the opponent is of a completely different caliber. In 2006, the IDF and Hezbollah had already clashed in the 34-day war – it ended with no real winner, but the Party of God claimed it as a strategic success. During these fierce battles, which ravaged southern Lebanon and killed 121 Israeli soldiers and more than 600 Hezbollah fighters, the IDF forces penetrated as far as the Litani River, about twenty kilometers from the border, before to withdraw following UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
A huge arsenal of rockets
During the 18 years separating it from this last conflict, the Islamist militia has considerably strengthened. Considered the most heavily armed para-state group in the world, it now has an immense strike capacity. According to estimates, its arsenal includes between 120,000 and 200,000 rockets, drones and other missiles, some capable of hitting targets up to 500 kilometers away – or the entire Israeli territory. “Even if Hezbollah does not have the capacity to defeat Israel in the conventional sense, its guided missiles and heavy rockets can inflict heavy damage on Israeli cities and infrastructure,” said Michael Koplow, research director at the Israel Forum Policy. in New York. Despite its excellent performance, Israeli missile defense could see its imperviousness put to the test under the weight of numbers.
Over the years, Hezbollah fighters have also become professionalized. “Whether in terms of weapons, numbers or combat experience, Hezbollah is much tougher than Hamas,” points out Hugh Lovatt. After having fought in Syria alongside the forces of Bashar al-Assad, the movement began to structure itself more like a traditional army.” In its ranks, Hezbollah currently has around 50,000 fighters, although its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claims double that number.
Unlike the men of Hamas, enclaved in the Gaza Strip and cut off from the support of their allies, those of Hezbollah can also count on logistical support from Iran, including supply routes passing through Iraq. and Syria, allow it to transport missiles and munitions as close as possible to the front. “Tehran could facilitate the transfer of fighters from Iraqi or Syrian Shiite militias, notes Fabian Hinz, researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Direct intervention by Iran, however, seems more improbable at this stage.” The lack of reprisals following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in August showed Iranian reluctance to become directly involved in a conflict with the Jewish state. However, the status quo could be difficult to maintain in the long term in the event of a threat to the survival of Hezbollah.
Guerrilla risk
Still, with its budget of $27.5 billion in 2023, the Israeli army far exceeds the capabilities of the Lebanese militia, and even those of Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon combined. Its forces can rely on 1,300 Merkava tanks and nearly 1,200 armored personnel carriers, to which can be added 43 attack helicopters and 345 fighter planes, including 36 latest generation F-35s. “One of Israel’s great strengths would be its air supremacy,” continues Fabian Hinz. “Israel’s strikes against several high-ranking commanders as well as missile sites also show the undeniable quality of their intelligence services.” What the attack on beepers and walkie-talkies in mid-September, which left more than 2,900 injured and 37 dead in the ranks of Hezbollah, has recently proven in a spectacular way.
Despite this profusion of means, the question of Israel’s military objectives remains raised. The authorities said they wanted to push Hezbollah away from their border, to allow the return of 60,000 Israeli civilians who had evacuated their homes because of rockets fired by the Shiite militia. “If an Israeli ground invasion were to turn into a long-term occupation, we would probably see a murderous guerrilla war on the part of Hezbollah,” notes Fabian Hinz of the IISS. “This would then turn into a war of attrition with, in fine, the question of knowing which of the two belligerents is more willing to suffer losses over time. The asymmetry of forces would undoubtedly lead Hezbollah to prefer, as in 2006, a strategy of harassment to that of a frontal clash. His knowledge of this mountainous terrain conducive to ambushes, and the numerous tunnels dug in recent years – whose network could exceed, according to certain analyses, those of Hamas in Gaza – would allow him to do so, placing Israel at the risk of lasting stagnation.
Beyond military losses, the threat also affects residents on both sides of the border. As early as June, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned that the IDF would be capable of returning Lebanon to the “Stone Age” in the event of war. “In any prolonged ground campaign, there are usually many civilian casualties,” fears Michael Koplow of the Israel Forum Policy. “Especially given the way Hezbollah has established itself in the villages of southern Lebanon.” As in Gaza, the population could pay the heaviest price.
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