The climate crisis cuts across all strata of society. The army, too, wonders about the upheavals in progress and to come. From the use of weapons with more than harmful consequences for the environment during the Vietnam War to the energy crisis linked to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, military doctrine is evolving – slowly – to integrate climate-related issues. In his book War and ecology, environment and climate in defense policies (PUF editions), Adrien Estève, CNRS post-doctoral fellow at the International Research Center (CERI) and resident at the Strategic Research Institute of the Military School (IRSEM), has studied the cases of the French and American armies. For them, thinking is more about adaptation than mitigation. And the operational imperative always comes first. “The armies are ready to make efforts from the moment when the reduction of emissions will be accompanied by a strategic benefit”, he explains. Maintenance.
L’Express: To what extent has the military field become involved, or at least has it begun to be interested, in the environment and its protection?
Adrian Esteve: At first, ecology was applied to armies based on the environmental consequences of conflicts. The Vietnam War was a turning point. It was at this time that we had the first international discussions, particularly in the field of law, on the use of certain weapons and their consequences, such as napalm and Agent Orange. Quite quickly in the 1970s, they were categorized as particularly destructive to the environment, and capable of causing ecocide. The environment would thus be a victim of war in its own right. This was not totally new: the world wars had already shown quite serious environmental consequences. But this idea was made aware at the time of Vietnam.
What are the lines of thought in force in the two armies that you have studied, in France and in the United States?
There is currently a difference in strategic context. I would tend to think that the protection of the environment applies to counter-insurgency contexts, since the armies are aware that this can be part of the strategies for establishing themselves in a territory. When you fight insurgents, it “wins hearts and souls”, as the Americans say. In Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, they had a doctrine of protecting agricultural land so as not to alienate local populations.
The context has now changed with the war in Ukraine. We see a return of current armies to high-intensity warfare where, unfortunately, the environment is not considered essential in the deployment of forces and in strategy. In Ukraine, he again becomes a victim of war.
How does the greening of these armies take place? Can they really reduce their carbon footprint?
There is a synthesis to be found between ecological imperatives – reduction of emissions, energy sobriety – and operational ones. The armed forces are always concerned with preserving an important operational capability, their core mission. They are ready to make efforts as soon as the reduction of emissions is accompanied by a strategic benefit. Energy sobriety can make it possible, for example in the case of the abandonment of fuel oil, to reduce the supply convoys (in fuel oil) which were traditionally heavily attacked.
Another example that we see in Ukraine: the difficulties of the Russians with their hydrocarbon logistics. This also leads to reflection on the dependence on these resources and the problems of supply chains. However, today’s armies are not projecting themselves into a decarbonized war; rather in biofuels, where then targeted uses of certain energies. There is the “Eco Camp” project in France, which should normally be operational in 2025, and aims to create self-sufficient energy camps.
It seems easier, for the French army as for any other, to work towards more sobriety on the national territory than during external operations…
There is indeed a difference to be made between the two. In France, there are many standards that apply to the protection of biodiversity and the prevention of pollution. In overseas operations, in war contexts, the situation is not quite the same. The operational and strategic imperative always takes precedence.
The cultural change that must be made within the armies is that of saving energy, optimizing force. For years, armies have assumed that logistics will follow no matter what. With the energy crisis, we realize that certain energies are more expensive. They will be even more so in a few years, and less accessible. But for an armament program, it takes between 20 and 30 years. So if we want to anticipate what will happen in 30 years, we have to do it now in strategic thinking.
What should the French army anticipate concerning its equipment, given these long periods of inertia?
The question of obsolescence will arise. In the large orders currently made, since it reinvests a lot, the question of the life cycle of the equipment will have to be taken into account. How, once these have reached the end of their life, can they reuse their components or recycle them to be intelligent in the use of resources.
Do we already see it?
At this time, there are no constraints related to recycling or the end of life of the equipment. It is therefore more a matter of awareness-raising operations within the Defense industry. But they are more and more important since the armies realize that it is a logic of economy to recover materials and to be able to recycle them.
Can there be, in your opinion, a “sustainable defence”?
Sustainable is a big word. It’s hard to say. There may be a stronger culture of economy within the armies, of energy conservation, which is accompanied by greater operational efficiency. I think the balance can be found. If sustainable defense there must be, the question is how sustainability allows for an operational gain, since that is how the army will agree to provide efforts. There is a big reflection to be had on the balance between ecology and strategy.
It is true that I had a much easier time introducing these subjects at the time when there were counter-insurgency wars, at the time of Barkhane [opération française au Sahel entre 2014 et novembre 2022, NDLR]. The French army was extremely strong compared to the insurgents. She could afford to do environmental protection or energy sustainability. There, in a return to high intensity, the strategic context is changing. The only development in my view is that the war in Ukraine shows the global energy crisis and the problems of energy supply.
Has military theory evolved in the face of the threat of climate change?
The theory, not yet; the doctrine, maybe a little. But these are extremely light things for now. There is a climate strategy from the French Ministry of the Armed Forces. Climate change has been talked about in white papers for a while. But it is above all a question of adaptation. That is to say that there is a reflection on how the rising waters will threaten the military bases, on the natural disasters which will lead to a multiplication of the interventions of the armies, etc.
There is, on the other hand, no real reflection on mitigation, that is to say the way in which the reductions in carbon emissions will be able to be achieved. Moreover, there is no carbon footprint of armies. This is unfortunate since it could make the link with sobriety and energy savings. I am convinced that there is a mitigation strategy that must also be put in place, and that it will not necessarily go against the operational benefits. Just look at the Russian army: today it has completely outdated logistics, and a great lack of optimization of the use of its energy and its forces. This is perhaps a counter-example of what a modern army should do.
Will the missions of the army change in the future, to better support populations in the face of extreme climatic events?
There are civil security forces (police, firefighters) who have been increasingly mobilized for several years. But we have seen, here and there, that armies could be mobilized. Hurricane Irma, in 2017, was the typical example – and a turning point – in a territory that was very remote: the islands of Saint-Martin and Saint-Barthélemy. At the same time, there was Operation Barkhane. And the army had to arbitrate between the two operations: exactly how many means do we send to Irma, without stripping Barkhane? These disasters can therefore also lead to capacity and economic trade-offs. And the question will arise in the future with more force.
What are the budgets allocated to these missions? Are they destined to increase?
I don’t know exactly how these missions are thought out in terms of budget, but it is necessarily something that will have to be integrated. Another example: that of storm Alex, in 2020, in the south of France. The engineers of the foreign legion were sent to clear the roads, secure the supplies from the valleys. The current challenge is the army’s ability to adapt its resources to this new situation. The soldiers, moreover, are rather happy to carry out these operations, they do not go against military missions. But this must be budgeted, thought out, anticipated.
“Just look at the Russian army: today it has completely outdated logistics, and a great lack of optimization of the use of its energy and its forces.”
Is it starting to be?
At the interministerial level, there are response mechanisms to natural disasters which, in France, are very well established. The downside: we know that the events will be more frequent and intense, perhaps the army will be used even more as ultimate ratio. But there is still a trade-off – political – to be made: do we want the armies to intervene or should we strengthen civil security?
On the other hand, the requalification of the missions of the army is not new. There was the Sentinel mission following the terrorist wave, for example. Or with the Covid-19 crisis. The climate crisis will continue this trend, with missions that are rather non-combat, where the army is used as a logistical power thanks to its means capabilities.
In your book, you also mention the growing interest of military command in the geopolitical consequences of climate change…
It is a relatively recent movement. COP21 in 2015 was a turning point. It was at this time that France acquired a Defense and Climate Observatory at the Ministry of the Armed Forces. He has been working for six years on the security crises that will come with climate change, and tries to sensitize the ministry to these issues. This has effects since there is now a climate adviser at the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The subject is gaining momentum internally. From there to say that it is a structuring and dominant subject today, I am not sure. In the hierarchy of priorities, the climate is never the first.