“The use of nuclear power would be incredibly irresponsible on the part of the Russians”

Former “speechwriter” to Secretary of State John Kerry, expert on Russia, Europe, politico-military issues and nuclear disarmament, Max Bergmann has just joined the very prestigious think tank Center for Stategic & International Studies (CSIS ), in Washington, where he directs the Europe program. The Express met him in the American capital.

“These last decades have led us to believe that the era of military nuclear power is behind us. But there is real potential for a slippage, linked to a miscalculation or miscalculation, on one side or the other. The risk of escalation is inherent in any proxy war, such as the one in Ukraine, which is taking place on the NATO border. We are walking a tightrope. However, without minimizing it, my prognosis is rather that we We will witness a psychological nuclear war: the Russians will make more and more frequent remarks on the risk of a third world war.

In fact, this rhetoric illustrates a weakness of Russia, mired in the military field and crippled economically. This progressive weakening results in a loss of prestige on the international scene. But Russia imperatively wants to be perceived as a great power. In order to preserve this status, it must remind the world – its enemies as well as its allies – that it remains a nuclear force. The Russians play verbal deterrence.

In nuclear matters, their doctrine is based on two pillars: on the one hand, on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), capable of reaching Washington in thirty minutes and, on the other hand, on tactical weapons, which are “small “bombs like those used in Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The proliferation of ICBMs has been regulated since the 1990s by the Russian-American Start treaty, but not tactical bombs – which are intended for use on a battlefield – in which Russia has invested heavily.

“The United States and Russia share a certain grammar of war”

It is terribly dangerous, because the use of such a weapon crosses a threshold. Let’s imagine a strike on the Polish air base where NATO deliveries destined for Ukraine transit. It would be a declaration of war. NATO should respond with an equivalent strike. Russia could then consider using an ICBM. That would be the gear.

Another scenario: the use of a tactical bomb to eliminate thousands of Ukrainian soldiers surrounded as in Mariupol. But does Russia want to irradiate a country it claims or risk the wind blowing radiation into its own territory? Either way, it would be incredibly irresponsible. Moscow would instantly become a second North Korea, a pariah state condemned by the whole world, including some of its allies. It would be a monumental strategic mistake that would push the West to further bolster Ukraine’s combat capabilities with offensive weapons.

I don’t believe in these doomsday scenarios. Moreover, the United States and Russia share a certain ‘grammar of war’. Thus, in the 1970s, the Soviets supplied weapons to the Vietnamese to fight the Americans while the latter, a decade later, delivered Stinger missile launchers to the Afghans to strike the Red Army. Without going so far as to speak of codified rules, the two Cold War rivals mutually understand the limits that should not be exceeded. If Washington provided kyiv with sophisticated missiles capable of reaching Moscow, that would be something else. We would find ourselves in a situation comparable to the missile crisis in Cuba in 1962. But we are not there yet.

On the contrary, the United States calibrates all its actions by anticipating the Russian reaction. That is why, from the start, the United States said that it would not send troops to Ukraine and that it would not deliver offensive weapons to kyiv. And that’s why, too, Joe Biden’s rhetoric about ‘regime change’ in Moscow on March 26 in Warsaw was dangerous [NDLR : “Cet homme ne peut pas rester au pouvoir”, avait déclaré le président américain]. The president’s remarks have only fueled the paranoia of the Russians unnecessarily.”