There are only a handful left, but they are still monitored by the French intelligence services. Between 2013 and 2016, 1,500 French jihadists went to Syria to join the fight against Bashar al-Assad. Today, between 110 and 120 free French people are counted by the intelligence services in the area, distributed between various factions. Several participated in the assault on Damascus which led to the fall of the former dictator. Some joined the troops of Abu Mohammed Al-Joulani, leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTC) group. Others – the majority of the contingent – under the orders of Omar Diaby, also called Omar Omsen, a Nice native of French-Senegalese nationality, who left for Syria in 2013 – would also have participated in the capture of Damascus. Others, again, have no affiliation, or participate in more minority fighting groups in the region.
Although there is currently no immediate risk regarding the security impact of these jihadists on the national territory, the authorities are monitoring developments in the situation. Depending on the geopolitical context, the evolution of the groups and the different entities that make up the territory, the intelligence services would be likely to identify the state of the threat.
The HTC leader’s priority, however, for now, it seems, is to focus on the creation of a new regime in Syria. But the presence of personalities like those of Diaby, with a past as an influential recruiter, as well as the risk of a draft, are monitored by the State. “The fall of Bashar al-Assad can be considered a victory for these jihadist groups, which reinforces the attractiveness of this territory. It is possible that some will try to leave, even if HTC promotes a local jihad, on the contrary of the Islamic State”, notes a source close to the executive. Gray areas also exist around the fate of many jihadists imprisoned in the past, or declared dead – without real certainty.
Concern around the camps
The main risk monitored by the French authorities is in Rojava, in Syrian Kurdistan, within the prisons and camps controlled by the Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Nearly 265 French men, women and children are in this area. Turkish pressure, which would like to get rid of its Kurdish adversaries, as well as American strikes in the region could lead to a dispersion of these very radicalized individuals. They remain detained in the camps for the moment.
A little more than a hundred French or French-speaking jihadists are free. Until now established in the north-west area of Syria, they participated in the offensive against Bashar al-Assad. About ten of them are affiliated and fought with HTC. “But these French people are very ‘Syrianized’, assimilated, because HTC is very wary of ‘internationalist’ jihadists since it officially distanced itself from its Al-Qaeda matrix, underlines David Rigoulet-Roze, researcher at the French Institute of strategic analysis. They no longer have any links with France. They notably participated, according to the intelligence services, in “humanitarian activities of food aid distribution in the region”. A small number of French speakers also took part in the offensive through other groups, such as the Turkestan Islamic Party.
The jihadist from the “19HH” videos
The most restless fighters would be more on the side of Omar Diaby’s group, and his Firqat-Al-Ghouraba faction – the “Foreigners’ Brigade”. Constituting the majority of French-speaking jihadists, the agenda of the “katyba” (the “brigade”, in French) would be “neither Syrian nor international”, according to a note from the intelligence services distributed in October 2023 in The World. In fact, Firqat Al-Ghouraba never incited attacks in France. But its leader nevertheless marked the history of French jihad, with his “19HH” videos, one of the main recruitment channels of the early 2010s. Francophone, therefore more accessible for French people than many groups of the region, the katyba of Diaby is also more accessible than the Islamic State via the border with Turkey.
If the authorities consider themselves more able to stop possible departures to Syria than ten years ago – thanks to the establishment of a judicial arsenal such as individual measures of administrative control and surveillance (Micas), by example – Diaby’s capacity for seduction remains substantial. “He still poses a threat, because his propaganda has been very effective,” remarks Jean-Charles Brisard. Present on Telegram, in open but also closed groups – and therefore difficult to access by anti-terrorism agents -, as well as on Discord, his speech challenges. According to Jean-Charles Brisard, another Nice resident who arrived in the area in 2017 would be responsible for the group’s online propaganda. “We would be in a profile that resembles pure Diaby. He would also have in his orbit much older jihadists, who existed in international jihad while Diaby was almost unknown,” comments a well-informed source in the middle of the anti-terrorism.
Among these figures, we find two seasoned veterans, known to gravitate around Diaby: Farid Melouk, 59 years old, and Slimane Khalfaoui, 49 years old this year. These former members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), who took part in the Afghan jihad in the 1990s, had been linked to plans for terrorist attacks in France. However, it is not certain that they are still alive. Other French profiles – at least one nurse, a military instructor, Jean-Charles Brisard tells us – have also joined Diaby over the years. Not directly affiliated with HTC, its members are nevertheless expected to respect its leader. “Especially since Diaby was put in prison by Al-Joulani between August 2020 and January 2022. The idea was to control the ‘free electrons’ likely to pose a problem to the ‘nationalized’ governance of HTC”, continues David Rigoulet-Roze. At present, the concern over a “projected threat” – of attacks on national territory – remains more the Islamic State.
Individual actions
But the possibility of individual actions, apparently detached from the thought of the leader, exists. An isolated individual, living in France, in contact with a jihadist in Syria, could choose to take action on his own initiative: this was, for example, the case of Abdoullakh Anzorov. Samuel Paty’s killer had been in contact with Faruq Shami, propagandist for the HTC group based in Idlib, Syria, several weeks before committing his assassination. “HTC and the groups affiliated with it have a discourse. But in the same way that people from HTC were able to remotely guide attacks and encourage them, those from Diaby can also imitate them. We are talking about a group whose propaganda goes a lot through the jihadosphere, beyond Syria,” observes Jean-Charles Brisard. A final handful of individuals, much more difficult to categorize, occupy the intelligence services. These are around ten French speakers – including French – released from regime prisons following the fall of Bashar el-Assad. Detained for acts of Islamist terrorism, their identity currently raises questions – collaboration between the regime of Bashar al-Assad and Paris having been non-existent in recent years. Their cases are being studied by the intelligence services.
Faced with the changing situation, the national anti-terrorist prosecution wants to be cautious. His prosecutor, Olivier Christen, however mentioned in Le Figaro the need to “prepare for all possible scenarios”. Among them, the risk that “certain individuals […] be tempted” by a departure for Syria, “the brigade of Omar Diaby having recruited jihadists on the grounds of fighting against the regime of Bashar al-Assad”. The risk of a “self-supporting effect” of the events in Syria, allies to tensions in the Middle East, was also mentioned by the prosecutor.
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