The offensive is as sudden as it is impressive: in a handful of days, Syrian armed opposition groups and jihadists seized a significant part of northern Syria, leaving troops loyal to Bashar al-Assad in rout. After Aleppo, the country’s second city, fell in three days, the rebels seized Hama on December 5 and are now attacking Homs, further south. The objective: to cut the only route between the capital Damascus and the Mediterranean coast to the west, leaving the Syrian regime with its Russian and Iranian allies scattered and on the flank.
After Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran sees a new major ally faltering in the Middle East. The fall of Bashar al-Assad would also be the failure of thirteen years of massive investments by Tehran to fully support the Damascus regime. Afshon Ostovar, professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in California, has just published Wars of Ambition: The United States, Iran, and the Struggle for the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2024), in which he dissects the rise of Iranian influence in the Middle East in recent years. According to him, the series of setbacks that Iran has just suffered puts the regime in difficulty, but Tehran keeps regional assets in its pocket. Interview.
L’Express: Do the fall of Aleppo and the rebels’ dazzling offensive against the Syrian regime above all constitute a major setback for Iran?
Afshon Ostovar: This is a major defeat for Tehran. Iran and its allies took four years to reconquer Aleppo when it first fell into the hands of the rebels. And their success, at the time, was mainly enabled by overwhelming Russian air power.
Aleppo is not essential to the fundamental interests of Iran, which can live very well without maintaining control over it. But this rise in power of the rebel movement threatens Iranian interests in Syria, and the fall of Aleppo constitutes both striking proof of the strength of the rebels but also a symbol of the weakness of those loyal to the regime.
Is this success of the rebel offensive in Syria linked to the significant losses suffered by Hezbollah, a key ally of Iran and the Syrian regime, in recent months?
It is too early to say. However, I can imagine that the timing of the rebels’ action was not a coincidence. It certainly helped the rebels that Hezbollah and Iran found themselves struggling and distracted by their war against Israel.
Is the entire “Axis of Resistance” set up by Iran in danger?
No, the Iranian axis remains strong. Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Yemen, for example, can operate freely within the framework of their state. But the Iranian presence in the Levant – and therefore its capacity to threaten Israel from a neighboring country – clearly risks deteriorating and weakening even further.
How will the Iranian regime help Bashar al-Assad?
Iran finds itself in a difficult situation because its conflict with Israel continues to escalate and Washington is preparing to increase pressure on Tehran as soon as President Donald Trump returns to the White House. Iran therefore cannot just transfer forces to Syria. With Hezbollah in trouble in Lebanon, Iran is expected to turn to its proxies in Iraq to provide the bulk of reinforcement troops in Syria.
The Iraqis also want to stop the rebel offensive in Syria because they perceive their advance as a threat to their own national security. It is possible that Iran will also provide troops and weapons to Syria, as it has done for years, but these reinforcements will be limited by the Israeli threat and by Iran’s own reluctance to lose men in a foreign country.
How important is Bashar al-Assad to Tehran?
The Assad regime is vital to Iran’s interests in the Levant, notably to support Hezbollah in Lebanon but also to put pressure on Israel.
But do the Israeli authorities have an interest in the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime?
Israel has every interest in ensuring that the various actors fighting in Syria are as weak as possible and exhaust themselves in their internal battle. A victory for rebels in Syria, led by jihadists, would, however, benefit neither Israel nor any neighboring country. With the exception of Turkey…
Photo taken in the town of Hama, taken by insurgent troops in central Syria, December 5, 2024
© / afp.com/Abdulaziz KETAZ
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regularly speaks of the emergence of a “new Middle East”, in which Israel would be at peace with its Arab neighbors and Iran would be less influential. Is this scenario realistic?
Yes, this scenario is possible and perhaps even inevitable. But I think we are still very far from the emergence of a new regional order in the Middle East.
Since the re-election of Donald Trump on November 5, Iran has suggested that it would be ready to resume diplomacy with the West, in particular to discuss its nuclear program. Is this a sign of a change in regional policy?
It is indeed a change, even if I do not see it as a major change in political line. Iran has always been willing to discuss its nuclear program, but the regime has at the same time always refused to negotiate on any other issue, particularly its ballistic program and its support for its proxies in the region. I see no sign from Iran suggesting that negotiation would be possible on issues other than nuclear power, and even fewer signs that compromises would be possible.
Does this mean that the next Trump administration will resume its “maximum pressure” campaign on Tehran? What impact can it have?
The first signs given by the administration being established in Washington suggest that this “maximum pressure” will resume. Above all, it will have the effect of reducing Iranian oil sales to China.
What will be Donald Trump’s main objective in the Middle East?
Above all, not to let yourself be drawn into a new large-scale war.
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