Exactly one year ago, on September 16, 2023, the putschist military regimes of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger adopted the Liptako-Gourma Charter and created the Alliance of Sahel States: the AES. With the stated aim of fighting together the armed groups present on their respective territories. Today, the Alliance has become a Confederation, with an expanded scope of action. One year after its creation, what assessment can we draw?
Initially, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was conceived as a defense pact, to ” “fight against terrorism”, armed groups linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, but also against ” any armed rebellion or other threat affecting the integrity of the territory “, starting with the rebels of the CSP (Permanent Strategic Framework), in the north of Mali.
The Liptako-Gourma Charter thus provided that ” any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one of the member countries ” would be ” considered as an aggression against others “, and would result in ” a duty of assistance “, ” including the use of armed force “. In short, the AES is first and foremost the promise of pooling military resources to combat non-state armed groups in Sahel.
Military cooperation: a mixed record
A year later, from this point of view, the results are mixed. The Malian army has dislodged the CSP rebels from their stronghold of Kidal, an indisputable victory, but only thanks to its Wagner auxiliaries and not to its allies of Niger or of Burkina Faso. Apart from a few meager material loans, no significant contribution. As for the attacks by jihadist groups, and in particular by Jnim, they have never been so numerous and deadly. To cite just this figure: more than 3,000 civilians killed in these three countries between January and June alone, according to the NGO Acled, compared to 2,500 in the previous six months. These numbers have continued to increase in recent years.
” Very often, Malian drones intervene in Burkina or vice versa.explains Arthur Banga, a lecturer and researcher specializing in defense issues at the Félix-Houphouët-Boigny University in Abidjan. There is drone support, air support and information exchange. The psychological aspect is also very important, we felt it when ECOWAS threatened to intervene in Niger. From this point of view, it is a success. »
” After, nuances the researcher, From the point of view of operational success, this assessment is much more mixed. The idea, the commitment, are not enough. It must also be implemented through doctrine, joint headquarters, training exercises, intervention exercises. All of that is missing. And it also shows, beyond the AES, the difficulties posed by collective security issues in Africa. »
Operations Action Plan
A ” AES Country Operations Action Plan ” is in preparation. At the beginning of the month, a delegation from the Malian army went to Burkina and Niger to present it. But at this stage it is only a project, the content of which has not been revealed, and which must be validated by the general staff. To this day, one year after the creation of the AES, Malian, Burkinabe and Nigerien soldiers are not fighting side by side on the front.
It must be said that they each have a lot to do at home, with deadly jihadist attacks almost every week. The recent tragedy of Barsalogho in Burkina, at least 200 dead, probably many more, killed by the jihadists of Jnim, being only the worst of the latest illustrations.
The creation of the AES has even had a counterproductive effect, although very limited at this stage: the CSP rebels in northern Mali announced last month that they were moving closer to the FPL (Patriotic Liberation Front) rebels in Niger. An announcement that was more political than militarily concrete, at least at this stage, and presented by these armed movements as a response to the union of the military regimes of the AES.
Departure from ECOWAS
Beyond the military field, the AES has quickly transformed into a diplomatic tool. Less than three months after its creation, in November 2023, the three countries announced multiple joint economic projects – in energy, industry, finance – without setting a deadline, and ” political and diplomatic coordination measures “At this time, the three putschist countries were suspended from ECOWAS and Niger even suffered heavy economic sanctions imposed by the West African organization, with the aim of forcing the military who had just taken power in Niger to put in place a timetable for the return to constitutional order and to free the deposed president Mohamed Bazoum.
The effect was missed: in January, the AES countries made a resounding demonstration that their alliance was also diplomatic, with a strategy of rupture. They jointly announced their departure from ECOWAS, highlighting their “sovereignty”, a principle brandished on every occasion to legitimize the political choices of the military regimes in place.
In this case, Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou denounce an ECOWAS “ under the influence of foreign powers, betraying its founding principles “, and “became a threat to its member states and populations”. France is not, this time, named, but it is the main common enemy of the three countries, regularly accused of manipulating the heads of state of the sub-region, but also of financing, informing and even arming jihadist groups – and which was fought by the Barkhane force, sent home in the summer of 2021. The AES is therefore now clearly positioning itself as an alternative to the hated ECOWAS. However, the three countries explain that they want to maintain good relations with the countries of the sub-region, by means of bilateral agreements.
This withdrawal from ECOWAS has caused joy among supporters of military regimes, who view this departure as an emancipation. It has also caused shudders among economic players – the three countries’ continued membership in UEMOA, however, considerably limits the consequences of this withdrawal. It is also deplored by supporters of political pan-Africanism, who see ECOWAS as an organization that is certainly imperfect and in need of reform, but essential for global and peaceful regional and continental integration.
Also readWhat ECOWAS must accept for a possible return of the AES countries
The most critical voices believe that, more than defending the sovereignty of the three states, this withdrawal aims to remove them from the rules of ECOWAS and to allow the military who have taken power to remain there.
The efforts of the new Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye, to whom the ECOWAS entrusted with the task of reconnecting with the three countries of the central Sahel, have to date produced no effect.
Creation of a confederation
Finally, last July, during the very first summit bringing together the three heads of state of the AES, the Malian colonel Assimi Goïtathe Nigerien general Abdourahamane Tianiand the Burkinabe captain Ibrahim Traore officially created the Confederation of AES States.
Also readThe three AES countries confirm the birth of the Confederation
The character ” irrevocable ” of the withdrawal from ECOWAS is hammered home, as well as the establishment of a unified military force. Development projects are announced as well as the installation of common bodies: college of heads of state, confederal sessions of the council of ministers, confederal sessions of Parliaments. An additional step, symbolic and institutional, in the rapprochement of the three countries and in their break with the rest of the sub-region.
Halfway between military and diplomatic, the rapprochement of the three countries with Russia and its private paramilitary groups is the latest achievement of the AES.
Without the privileged partnership with the Russia is openly claimed in the AES texts, it is one of the main points in common between the three countries. With reinforced military cooperation – notably the purchase of arms, training – and, for Mali and Burkina, the use of paramilitary groups such as Wagner or Bear: to fight on the ground in Mali – which the Malian transitional authorities continue to deny – or to secure Captain Ibrahim Traoré, transitional president, in Burkina.
Restriction of public freedoms
Last points, which are not included in the texts of the AES but which Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have in common: the privileged partnership established with Russia – with the use of private paramilitary companies such as Wagner, now integrated into the ” African body ” controlled by Moscow – and the degradation of human rights accompanied by a restriction of public freedoms.
The armies are increasing the atrocities against the civilian population, freedom of expression and opinion are flouted, legal proceedings are launched against the most critical voices, opponents are abducted outside of any legal framework and even, in Burkina, sent by force to the front.
This Monday, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the AES, organizations supporting the military regimes in place, grouped within the “CFederation of AES Peoples » (CP-AES) plan to gather in Bamako, « under the high patronage » by Colonel Assimi Goïta, Malian transitional president and current president of the AES confederation.