This Wednesday, September 4, Xi Jinping received 25 leaders of African countries on the occasion of the opening banquet of the 9th edition of the China-Africa summit, which is taking place this week in Beijing. The objective: to think about the future of Sino-African cooperation. Interviewed by L’Express, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, researcher at Asia Centre Paris, discusses Chinese reluctance to increase financial aid.
L’Express: At the end of the summit, African states will know the financial envelope made available to them for the next three years. In 2021, China had promised 40 billion dollars, 20 billion less than in 2018. Will it continue to reduce its scope?
Jean-Pierre Cabestan: I think so: the contribution to African development is changing in nature. Since African states are in debt and cannot repay the banks, China is losing money. It would therefore not surprise me if the envelope were reduced again, or maintained at 40 billion dollars. Furthermore, even if I do not think that public opinion plays a determining role in China, the population is reluctant to give money to Africa when there are needs in the country. The finances of some provinces are in difficulty: civil servants are no longer paid and there are significant salary cuts. Politically, I therefore do not think that Xi Jinping can announce an increase in the envelope.
China is often accused of using its creditor status for diplomatic purposes, will the possible reduction in financial aid impact these arrangements?
It is difficult to assess. Yes, the envelope is impacted, but will Africa’s other partners, namely the United States, Europe and Japan, become more advantageous for African states? I am not sure. China, thanks to its financial aid, its connections and its diplomatic exchanges, has really locked down votes at the UN on human rights issues. Given that most African countries are not really open on these subjects, this suits China. The United States, for example, imposed restrictions and sanctions on Uganda, which adopted an anti-homosexuality law. China therefore took advantage of this to advance its pawns. It does not deal in sentiment.
Failing to increase the amount of loans to build infrastructure, how does the Middle Kingdom intend to continue to extend its influence on the continent?
We have seen clearly since the previous forum in Dakar in 2021 that there is a diversification of the aid provided. The Chinese presence is part of a diplomatic game that goes well beyond an economic presence. It develops the security and ideological contribution. For two years, this has been done in particular through the Leadership School in Tanzania. This establishment financed by China trains executives and political parties in southern Africa such as the African National Congress or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. On paper, this training is supposed to help them improve and modernize, but in reality it is a way of influencing the modes of governance in Africa, of strengthening the articulation between the party in power and the State.
Is increasing its exports to the continent also part of China’s influence strategy?
Obviously. It is even one of China’s priorities to increase its trade with the South, now that protectionist measures have been taken by the North, particularly against electric vehicles and solar panels. Since at present, Beijing’s problem lies in purchasing power: are Africans solvent? How many can buy electric vehicles? Where China is smart is that it is starting to set up factories in African countries, such as Morocco, which have close relations with Europe. This is a way of having easier access to the European market and of getting around the restrictions imposed by the United States and the European Union.
On the side of African states, are there growing concerns about this dependence on China?
This is where there is tension. Some countries like Ethiopia and Zambia are trying to rebalance the bilateral agreement but cannot close the door to China since it is a North-South relationship. Beijing extracts raw materials and showers the States with manufactured products at competitive prices. There is a kind of dumping but these countries cannot develop an industrial base that is powerful and interesting enough to be independent. To get out of dependence on China, the other partners would therefore have to be convincing. The European Union’s “Global Gateway” program allocates 300 billion euros to the South, half of which is intended for Africa, but there is a lot of recycling of already existing projects. This is not necessarily what African States are looking for. Despite the various pressures, their decision-making capacity should not be neglected. They choose what suits them. If they are going to Beijing in close ranks, it is because they know full well that they will get financial aid. All that remains is to know how much.
.