What if, by dethroning Europe, the cradle of globalization, the industrial revolution, the conquest of new territories and colonization, the great powers had in fact… done it a favor? This is the thesis developed by Pierre Haroche, lecturer in international relations and international security at Queen Mary University of London and associate defense researcher at the Jacques-Delors Institute, in a work entitled In the forging of the world – How the clash of powers is shaping Europe (Fayard).
“Not only are the Europeans no longer the most powerful, but Europe is no longer even the priority region of global competition, as it may have been during the Cold War, analyzes the author to L’Express This is what I call provincial Europe and this promotes a new stage of European unification, particularly in terms of international security. Whether it is China’s ambitions vis-à-vis Taiwan, new American priorities or the war in Ukraine, Pierre Haroche reviews each of the major challenges that Europe must (or will) face . Not without optimism.
L’Express: In 1919, Paul Valéry was surprised that Europe dominated the world. Why was this region, neither richer nor more advanced than others before the 19th century, the cradle of globalization, the industrial revolution, the conquest of new territories and colonization?
Pierre Haroche : This very particular destiny, Europe owes in large part to the constant competition in which the countries which compose it have engaged for centuries. Some 18th century authors like Montesquieu saw this as an effect of geography: with its very jagged coastline, Europe would have favored political fragmentation and emulation between powers.
But Europe has above all been a sort of great cauldron in which the intense rivalry between States has drawn them into a race to conquer the world – the Spaniards against the Portuguese, the Dutch against the Spaniards, France against England… Competition was a powerful engine, encouraging us to go further, to do better than the adversary, militarily, technologically, economically.
However, Europe has not always had the advantage. For a long time, the European economy was burdened by the cost of financing wars and destruction (the advantage went more to pacified imperial China). But around the 18th century, Europe’s competitive system, more favorable to innovation, allowed it to more quickly take the turn towards the industrial economy. It was there that it began to establish its economic domination over the world and, thanks to the new technologies that resulted, accelerated the colonization of the world.
However, you write that as it shaped the world, Europe created the conditions for its degradation, passing from an imperial Europe to a subordinate Europe…
Yes, it’s as if this logic has become self-destructive. Imperial Europe rested on two great pillars: its internal divisions between rival powers, and its domination over the rest of the world. As such, the world wars of the 20th century represent both the apotheosis and the collapse of this Europe. Apotheosis because by involving humanity in its wars, Europe clearly demonstrated that it was the center of the world. But collapse because by mobilizing their colonies for the war effort, Europeans stimulated demands that would lead to decolonization. Not to mention that by weakening the European powers, the war ended up giving way to largely extra-European “super-bigs”, the United States and the Soviet Union. In short, because it pushed its intra-European competitive and colonizing model to the extreme, imperial Europe armed the rest of humanity against it. The conditions for its decentering were set.
Reading you, we have the feeling that by dethroning Europe, the great powers have in fact done it a favor…
Absolutely. It’s a sort of law of history. The more Europe was belittled by the world, the more it was pushed to unify. It was in a Europe dominated by the Americans and the Soviets that the process of European integration began which resulted in today’s European Union. And it is also decolonization which, by diverting Europeans from imperial projects on a global scale, allowed them to refocus on the unity of the continent.
In recent years, we are witnessing a second stage of the debasement of Europe. Not only are the Europeans no longer the most powerful, but Europe is no longer even the priority region of global competition, as it may have been during the Cold War. This is what I call provincial Europe. And this promotes a new stage of European unification, particularly in terms of international security.
What do you mean ?
For the great powers, Europe is no longer central. In the United States, it is clear – both for the Biden administration and for Donald Trump – that eyes are now on Taiwan, and the need to protect it in the event of an attack from China. In the medium term, it is therefore certain that Europe, until now strongly supported by the United States, will have to find a way to protect itself. Likewise, although the United States has released aid for Ukraine, the Ukrainian front is not their priority. An arrival of Donald Trump at the White House would only reinforce this turning point. In this context, the war in Ukraine favors the establishment of new European policies regarding the defense industry. We are getting closer to the idea of a European defense budget.
The process of forming a defense Europe has often been fraught with difficulties. Why would it be any different today?
The conditions that often led to failure are no longer met today. In the 1950s, the first major attempt to form a European army was largely resisted by imperial and colonial logic. In other words, it was necessary to choose, for example, between sending French troops to Indochina and North Africa or to the European Defense Community. This is no longer the case today. Then, an inhibiting factor was the delegation of the continent’s security to the United States. As I said, this is becoming less and less possible. European defense is in line with History. This does not mean that it will necessarily succeed, but the conditions are met.
Economically, Europe is often described as caught between the United States and China. How can Europe find its place in this framework?
The period during which Europe dominated the world was a parenthesis in terms of History. For Europe to find its place, it must understand that its influence is no longer what it once was, that it is now the world that shapes it and no longer the other way around.
Listening to you, we have the feeling that all that remains is for Europe to “save the furniture”…
No way. But the world is changing around us. The neoliberal economic order is collapsing, particularly through contact with Chinese dirigisme. The new order is based on geoeconomics, that is to say the promotion of economic policies which seek less profit than security and autonomy. All countries are in the process of aligning themselves with this model, at least partially, whether on the control of investments, the security approach to technologies, protectionism… The United States has changed. It’s Europe’s turn. Without this, it has no chance of registering as an important actor in the world that is coming.
Is this return of Europe “on itself” that you describe solely guided by the threats that await it? The French army has strongly disengaged in Africa…
It’s true, the anti-European and anti-colonial awakening of Africa also contributes to European recentering. There is an overall movement which is pushing Europe, and in particular France, to reposition itself militarily, to be less present in Africa, more in Eastern Europe. Which does not mean, however, that Europe is completely absent from major strategic areas. For example, Europeans are increasing maritime missions in the Indian Ocean, which is a crucial line of commercial communication. In summary, Europe has not forgotten the rest of the world, but the order of priorities has changed. First, herself, then, the world. I think that in the coming years, Europe has every interest in keeping a low profile in Africa. We must show that we are breaking with neocolonialism if we want, in the long term, to be able to count again in the region.
Could the withdrawal of identity desired by certain European leaders not slow down this shift in Europe towards greater integration?
Not necessarily. Populist parties have an increasing tendency to adapt to the European framework, investing their identity discourses no longer only at the national level, but also at the European level. In other words, they no longer want to leave Europe, but to shape it in their image, according to their values. In December, Viktor Orban, for example, made clear his desire to take power in Brussels. Basically, this seems interesting to me, because it is through the confrontation of values that a real debate on European identity will emerge. In this sense, populism can also help shape Europe.
What does “being European” mean today?
In the 1990s-2000s, European identity was based on cosmopolitanism, post-nationalism, and even a certain repression of power in the name of convergence between peoples. But this idea is becoming outdated. In some ways, America’s pivot to Asia and Putin’s invasion of Ukraine are pushing us toward a combat identity. From now on, the heart of Europe is no longer the Franco-German couple. This is the eastern flank. It’s Ukraine, Georgia… Europe is increasingly defined by its borders, the front line. In many ways, being European today means resisting Russia.
You don’t mention the Middle East. Doesn’t Europe have a diplomatic role to play in the current context?
I think it is difficult to be credible when we talk about peace in the world if we are not capable of managing Russia at home. If we fail to mobilize against it, everything that Europe can say about the Middle East, or even about Africa, will have no impact in the eyes of many international partners. Not to mention that without a defense budget, it is difficult to be truly credible on a geopolitical level. Europe is not at a moment in its history where it is in a “leading” position. But it is only up to it that this changes: with more strategic autonomy (its ability to defend itself) and strategic modesty (putting priority on its own region), the Europe of tomorrow has every chance to once again become an actor who, although provincial, knows how to defend his interests on the world stage.
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