“The situation is not serious, it is very serious,” explained the High Commissioner of the Republic in New Caledonia, Louis Le Franc, during a press conference on May 15. At least two people have died and hundreds have been injured in recent days during the riots that have plagued the archipelago since Monday May 13. At the same time, Emmanuel Macron called a crisis meeting at the Elysée. At the heart of this surge of violence is the constitutional revision adopted, on the evening of Tuesday, May 14, by the National Assembly in Paris. The text, which aims to expand the electorate in provincial elections, should make it possible to open voting to citizens residing in New Caledonia for ten years – or 25,000 more voters. Demanded by loyalists, it is strongly criticized by separatists. The latter believe that it risks “even further undermining the indigenous Kanak people”.
In order to ease tensions, the President of the Republic proposed, on Monday, to invite all the New Caledonian parties to Paris to relaunch the dialogue. Without discussion on institutions, he will convene Congress before the end of June. Vincent Bouvier, former Secretary General of the Sea (2016-2019) and High Commissioner of the Republic in New Caledonia (2014-2016), analyzes the reasons for the anger.
L’Express: Why is the reform of the restricted electoral body causing so much excitement?
Vincent Bouvier: Let’s first review the facts. The question of restricting the electorate was raised during the negotiation of the Matignon agreements in 1988, the more precise perimeter of this electorate having been defined within the framework of the Nouméa agreements ten years later. It is part of the logic of decolonization which characterizes these agreements and the creation of New Caledonian citizenship. This restricted electoral body is thus reserved for people who reside permanently in the territory of New Caledonia, considering that it is up to these people to decide the destiny of the territory. To be more precise, there are today three types of elections in New Caledonia, with three types of electorate: a restricted college for provincial elections, a college – also restricted – for self-determination ballots, including the perimeter differs from that relating to provincial elections, and a third for national elections.
The restricted electoral body for the provincial elections, defined within the framework of the Nouméa agreements then the constitutional revision requested by President Chirac, is today a frozen electoral body, with the consequence that people who have been domiciled in New Caledonia after the 1998 referendum cannot vote in provincial elections. Only people domiciled before this date – and their children – can go to the polling stations for these elections. We note in passing that the quality of voter within the framework of this restricted college is not reserved for Kanaks, it benefits other communities which meet the conditions of length of stay.
The issue is technically complex, but it is also extremely sensitive. The restriction of the electorate is the result of a “historic compromise” between the independentists and the non-independentists, a form of social contract passed between the two parties, signatories of the agreements. Its modification requires the political agreement of both parties. Many non-independence activists rightly note the attack on the principle of equality of suffrage. A revision of the Constitution was also necessary to put it into effect. It should be noted, however, that the European Court of Human Rights considered that this exception was justified by the specificity of New Caledonia, a territory undergoing decolonization. And to those who insist on discrimination perceived as unjust, I would be tempted to remind, without malice on my part, that following the takeover of the territory by France, in 1853, the Kanaks did not access French nationality only in 1946 and did not benefit from the right to vote until 1956, a century later. But, in any case, once the question of leaving the Nouméa agreement is raised, that work and negotiations must resume on the status of New Caledonia, we understand that the question of the body electoral be posed again in this framework.
Is the complex relationship with electoral suffrage the only reason that explains this explosion of violence?
The government has decided to return to the freezing of the electorate and to present a draft constitutional law – adopted by the deputies on Tuesday May 14 – which calls into question this rule by relaxing the duration of presence in the territory to ten years, based on particularly on the need to better enforce the principle of equality of suffrage. This proposal worries the Kanaks, who make up around 40% of the population of New Caledonia, who are therefore a minority and thus see the possibility of influencing their destiny reduced. But what also offended the separatists was the method, that is to say the development of the text without the agreement and consensus between the parties, postponing the discussion until after the vote on the law, ignoring thus the spirit of compromise and contractual elaboration which had characterized previous agreements.
This subject of the electoral body cannot actually explain, on its own, the explosion of violence that we have seen in recent days, which it should also be noted that it has been unanimously condemned by the political forces, including the separatists. . She is a factor, for sure, but there are others. Today in New Caledonia there is a whole section of young people who live in the difficult neighborhoods of Nouméa, without training, without employment, recognizing themselves neither in the customary way of life, nor in the “Western” way of life. “. The mode of protest and the violence of this “anti-system” youth are somewhat reminiscent of what we can experience during suburban riots in the mainland. Other observers have recently noted that “a nationalism of Kanak youth” was perhaps emerging, gradually distancing itself from political organizations.
What do you recommend to ease tensions?
Of course the return to peace and public order is an essential prerequisite. But the history of New Caledonia reminds us that the use of force, while necessary, is not sufficient. There can be no non-negotiated solution, which would not be based on the return of dialogue. In this sense, the idea of a dialogue mission, based on the model of what was done in 1988, was put forward. For his part, the President of the Republic proposed to quickly bring together all the Caledonian political forces. We must fervently hope that all political forces, without exception, accept this invitation. But will postponing the Congress meeting be enough? Perhaps we should have gone further and agreed to move towards a withdrawal of the constitutional bill, at least for the duration of the discussion. [NDLR : dans un courrier adressé ce mercredi aux représentants calédoniens, Emmanuel Macron a précisé que ce Congrès se réunirait “avant la fin juin”, à moins qu’indépendantistes et loyalistes ne se mettent d’accord d’ici là sur un texte plus global.]
Since 1988, we have understood that speaking out and seeking consensus were essential in New Caledonia. The handshake between Jacques Lafleur and Jean-Marie Tjibaou during the Matignon agreements illustrates precisely this. But, once we have said that, there are what we could call methodological principles to respect.
What are they ?
We must first agree to take the time necessary for agreement and consensus. This often disconcerts observers, but the time for exchange, for speech, is an essential element in New Caledonia. Then, it is important to maintain and show the impartiality of the State. The State, signatory of the agreements, is not only an arbiter, it is also an active, but impartial, partner. However, it seems that, in the current situation, several indications of partiality – in favor of non-independenceists – may have offended the separatists. Finally, we must also pay attention to the level at which, within the state apparatus, the file is followed. Since 1988, New Caledonia was directly followed by Matignon, this point was recently reiterated by three former Prime Ministers. This is a very broad, cross-cutting subject that deserves to be addressed in an interministerial framework.
You mention “signs of bias” recently given by the State. What are they ?
It seems difficult to initiate dialogue when a person is both a member of the government and a representative of one of the parties to the discussion. I am referring to the appointment, in 2022, of a leader of non-independence activists to the post of Secretary of State in charge of Citizenship of the Borne government. Second sign: the holding in 2021 of the third referendum provided for by the Nouméa agreement. Was it really necessary to organize this consultation on this date, when the separatists had expressed their opposition given the circumstances of the moment, in the middle of the Covid crisis? The result of this referendum, which logically resulted in a very strong abstention and a score very favorable to the maintenance of France, is devoid of any political significance. The third sign is the electoral reform and the methods of development which were chosen to put it in place, which in part led to the current reactions.
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